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Foreword 
This report is the product of a semester-long graduate Capstone course in the Bush 
School of Government‘s Masters Program in International Affairs.  The course provides a 
research experience for students in the final semester of the two-year program, as they operate in 
teams to address an important policy issue (under the direction of a faculty member) and in 
support of a client. Students draw on the coursework and experiences of their Bush School 
education to develop specific recommendations for design, implementation and evaluation of this 
project task for the government client. 
 
The client for this project is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability 
Operations.  The project title is ―The Interagency Process in Support & Stability Operations: 
Integrating and Aligning the Roles and Missions of Military and Civilian Agencies in Conflict 
and Post-Conflict Environments.‖  This study addressed the topic by focusing originally on ways 
to provide insights on five key questions:
1
 
 
1. What are the military and US government agencies roles and missions in stabilization and 
reconstruction efforts in counterinsurgency warfare (historical background from case 
studies)? 
2. What are the recommended ways to improve leadership (for integrating and aligning 
roles and missions) in the interagency coordination of military-civilian operations? 
3. What are the military and civilian leadership functions, or skill sets, for conflict and post 
conflict environments? 
4. How should military and civilian agencies develop those leadership skills needed in short 
term and the long term? 
5.  Does the U.S. government have a means for rating the effectiveness of civil-military 
coordination? 
 
Military veterans of Iraq note that they were not fully prepared with the skills needed for 
support and stability operations, especially cultural and linguistic skills.  In the case of the Army, 
some believe that the military is adapting fairly rapidly to the demands of counterinsurgency in 
Iraq and Afghanistan and starting to internalize those lessons. The Department of Defense and 
National Security Council have published directives on counterinsurgency operations that 
propose an important role for the military in post-conflict reconstruction and support and 
stability operations.  A newly published field manual on counterinsurgency is a sign that the 
Army and Marine Corps are internalizing and institutionalizing these directives and their 
learning from wartime operations. Many with experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, note 
that the ―interagency process‖ for coordinating the efforts of military and other U.S. government 
agencies is inadequate.  In sum, what knowledge is there regarding the development of the 
current constructs delineating the civilian and military roles and missions in support and stability 
                                                 
1 These research questions are adapted from a Creative Associates International, Inc. conference panel and report on 
―Stabilization and Reconstruction: Closing the Civilian-Military Gap,‖ held in Washington, DC on June 20, 2006.  The 
conference co-sponsors were the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies of 
the National Defense University, the Bush School of Government and Public Service, and the Triangle Institute of Security 
Studies.  The questions were refined after discussions with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability 
Operations. 
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operations?  What recommendations are feasible, acceptable and affordable for improving 
interagency operations as well as the functioning of U.S. government civilian and military 
agencies?  The following papers address these questions. Each section includes research 
findings, inferences, and recommendations for improving interagency operations in 
counterinsurgency warfare.  These papers reflect the views of the study group‘s individual 
authors and do not claim to represent the views of any government agency, the Bush School, or 
Texas A&M University. 
 
 
Dr. Joseph R. Cerami 
Study Director 
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I.  Executive Summary: Key Findings and Inferences 
Note: the following compilation of ideas and insights are based on a Bush School Capstone 
seminar, 5/3/2007.  Detailed treatments of the questions below are found in the papers 
below.   
 
1.  What are the military and US government agencies roles and missions in stabilization and 
reconstruction efforts in counterinsurgency warfare (historical background from case studies)? 
 
 The record from this research reflects varying degrees of agency roles and missions in 
stabilization and reconstruction.  There was no evidence in the cases examined that once the 
hot war ended there was an immediate transition to civilian leadership and control of post-
conflict support, reconstruction, or institution building.  For instance, in post World War II 
Japan, the military ran operations for seven years in a hierarchical structure headed by 
General Douglas MacArthur.  Some thinking about a transition to civilian control was 
discarded after early successes became institutionalized.  In other cases, the guidelines on 
roles and missions were not clear.  At times, a desire to be adaptable and flexible became a 
way to avoid addressing the difficult questions related to interagency as well as 
organizational responsibilities, accountability and oversight. 
 
 In the cases studied, under ambiguous and dynamic circumstances it is usual for the 
military, because of its organizational and resource capability, to fill the void.  Especially in 
crisis situations, the tendency for existing routines and established relationships will become 
hard to change over time, regardless of prescribed agency roles and missions.  For instance, 
in the case of Afghanistan provisional reconstruction teams, there were individual agency 
guidelines, however, because of the ad hoc nature of team recruiting, lack of interagency 
training, and short-term deployments and operations, often individual agency representatives 
were unaware of their agency guidelines, responsibilities and authority.  At times, because of 
ongoing military conflict, civilian agencies were overwhelmed by the better organized and 
resourced military components. Roles and missions under ambiguous conditions and in times 
of transition become especially difficult. Research did not find examples of planned 
transitions or orderly phasing from conflict to post-conflict to reconstruction activities. 
 
 Specific ways of providing incentives for aligning and integrating agency roles and 
missions may best be coupled with performance management techniques.  For instance, in 
the evolution of provisional reconstruction teams, there were no apparent measures of 
success.  In most cases, successful interagency operations resulted from the efforts of 
experienced leaders, such as military officers with Balkan peacekeeping service.  
Synchronizing diverse agencies would benefit from established performance standards, with 
systematic accountability, reporting, and oversight processes. 
 
2.  What are the recommended ways to improve leadership (for integrating and aligning roles and 
missions) in the interagency coordination of military-civilian operations? 
 
 A common view is that training and education programs are needed prior to deployment.  
The nature of crisis action becomes an excuse for a lack of preparedness; and the short-term 
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nature of crises demands a long-term, progressive system for preparing and certifying leaders 
and teams for complex contingency operations.  The history of US government efforts in 
interagency education and training is not promising.  For instance, where is the interagency 
equivalent to the military‘s national training centers?  It may be an overstatement, but what is 
needed is a transformation to create a civilian agency training and education culture.  A 
formal leadership development process should continue to evolve to explicitly link series of 
synchronized and progressive professional education, training, assignments and promotions 
that provide opportunities to interact in diverse agency and international contexts.  
 
 In addition, there is a need for formal interagency knowledge management processes.  
The architecture for an interagency knowledge or learning system should include several 
components, such as: data bases, on-line learning courses and simulation networks; 
predeployment training and certification systems; individual leadership development survey 
and planning instruments; subject matter and subject matter expert networks; and an 
interactive center for interagency lessons learned. 
 
 At the same time the Federal Office of Personnel Management efforts to enhance 
individual leader develop and education should be expanded.  The leadership literature 
stresses the need for continuous learning, constant assessments, 360-degree feedback, and 
progressive assignments.  These efforts to foster the development of a sense of military and 
civilian professionalism and public service are critical for interagency coordination.  
 
 The military services stress the professional ethic.  Can we define and develop a notion of 
an interagency professional that transcends real but sometime harmful agency loyalties?  The 
military services efforts to move officers from branch to combined arms to joint training, 
education, certification and promotion may serve as a model.  A new interagency 
professional culture that systematically trains, rewards, and promotes a new culture can 
extend the scope and reach of individuals who can improve the effectiveness and value of 
their agencies as well as serving the national interest in stability, support and reconstruction 
efforts.  Leadership can be developed over time and with thoughtful approaches based on 
legitimate research knowledge.  Shifting from adhocracy, crisis management, and firefighting 
to a trained and ready professional interagency cadre is not beyond the reach, capacity, or 
imagination of the US government. 
 
3.  What are the military and civilian leadership functions, or skill sets, for conflict and post 
conflict environments? 
 
 Several researchers highlight the significance of being able to see the nature of individual 
and collective tasks within the context of the strategy and operational priorities.  Linked to 
this concern for the big picture was the notion of understanding the resource capacities and 
constraints for all interagency projects and programs for the alignment and integration 
necessary to achieve a unity of effort on a local, regional, country, area, and wider 
geographical or regional bases.  One researcher also notes the need for guidelines and 
standards that provide a baseline for integrating interagency functions at each operational 
echelon, while aligning activities at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.  It is also 
necessary to translate the military framework of dividing and synchronizing the levels of war 
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vertically, as strategic, operational, and tactical levels, to enhance interagency 
communications and coordination.   
 
 Baselines, guidelines, and standards can be perceived as barriers to creativity and 
innovation.  Of course, these findings strongly reinforce the significance of flexibility and 
adaptability in dynamic situations.  Without serious efforts to synchronize efforts, however, 
there is the open-ended possibility for endless reinvention and inefficiencies.  These 
problems are especially pronounced in situations of high personnel and organizational turn 
over.  The possibilities for false creativity and wasted efforts are very real and, therefore, 
educated, experienced and high-performing individuals, teams and organizations are a 
necessary condition for interagency effectiveness.  
 
 Communications skills are especially important for enhancing interagency effectiveness 
at all levels.  Real concerns about overcoming turf and stovepipe pathologies cannot be 
erased by achieving false consensus among diverse agencies for the purposes of group 
cohesion and conflict avoidance.  Time must be allocated for agencies to insure that 
interagency communications do not water down or camouflage clear core competencies, 
capabilities, and possibilities.  The notion of ―I don‘t speak State Department‖ should be the 
beginning of an in-depth conversation to develop the deeper understanding of the intent and 
meaning of interagency written and oral communications. 
 
 A notion of cross-cultural savvy applies for both interagency and intercultural 
communications.  A common lexicon for unifying the understanding of key terms would 
improve the possibilities for improving interagency communications.  While there is no 
substitute for face-to-face, on-scene interpersonal relations, there is no excuse for failing to 
begin by building a common vocabulary as a foundation for developing a deeper 
understanding among agencies.  
 
4.  How should military and civilian agencies develop those leadership skills needed in short 
term and the long term? 
 
 Systematic, progressive, and career long leadership education and development focused 
on interagency skills must become part of the culture of the US government‘s military and 
civilian agencies.  Interagency subject matter expertise and experience should become part of 
selected individual‘s career progression and linked to promotion and other incentives, such as 
advanced civil schooling opportunities at prestigious schools of public and international 
affairs.  Research studies, reports and publications should expand on the nature and 
importance of interagency work as important, career enhancing and critical for the US 
government and the national interest.  Formalizing mentoring systems to support non-
traditional career paths that extend opportunities for interagency and international work are 
essential. As previous national studies of US government performance have stressed, in an 
age of globalization, there is an urgent need to break away from stove piped agency 
education and promotion systems.  
 
 At the same time, developing a reservoir of interagency talent will have to focus on 
individual as well as team development.  Creative solutions, using on-line educational 
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technology, should provide educational support for individual and team training and 
development.  New and distributed educational networks that can meet individual as well as 
team and organizational training and educational development needs can substitute or 
supplement full-time, long-term, traditional schooling.  In a period of increasing demands 
and decreasing personnel, there is a need for more focused and efficient skill development 
programs. 
 
5.  Does the U.S. government have a means for rating the effectiveness of civil-military 
coordination? 
 
The ad hoc and personality driven nature of many civil-military operations has been a 
fairly common response by the US government, especially in the crisis atmosphere of the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  It is noteworthy that the successful case of postwar Japan 
included more than two years of predeployment preparation, study, policy development, and 
capacity-building among several US agencies.  Non-traditional measures of effectiveness are 
needed for non-traditional missions and tasks, such as those required for successful support, 
stability and reconstruction activities.  What does it mean to conduct successful interagency 
operations over time?  What standards are needed to measure effectiveness in interagency 
operations in a counterinsurgency context? 
 
The military equivalent of the ―nested bowls‖ of aligning and integrating the strategic, 
operational and tactical levels provides a framework that should be converted for 
understanding the analytical levels for coordinating interagency efforts horizontally and 
vertically.  In short, there is a need for rating the links and systems necessary and sufficient 
for relating local, task oriented, mission essential programs with regional or national level 
programs, priorities, resources and oversight functions, all in the view of the grand strategy 
or big picture lens at the US national, host country and, in most cases, international 
institutional levels.  
 
The amount of information available due to modern information technologies is 
staggering for any organization.  Efficient, real time, and focused information needs for 
counterinsurgency operations will continue to be a major challenge for improving 
interagency effectiveness.  A search for the ―deeper meaning‖ of useful and actionable 
intelligence and information requires new ideas, new systems, and real creativity.  Along the 
same lines, more imagination would be helpful for balancing real information needs and 
countering the false creativity of allowing all agencies to continue to develop and use 
agency-specific information reporting and coordination documents.  There is certainly a need 
for accurate and meaningful processes for measuring interagency communications and 
effectiveness.   For instance, using surveys to rate employee satisfaction along with program 
performance measures using ―balanced scorecard‖ techniques for assessment and evaluation 
with the interagency processes/opinions would be an important step in creating useful 
knowledge.  
 
Current systems developed by and underpinned by agency traditions, cultures and 
communication patterns all serve to unwittingly divide, separate and differentiate common 
management processes in complex information, personnel, finance, accounting, and logistics 
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systems.  The effect is to dilute any potential foundation for creating an interagency culture 
that aligns and integrates instead of cultures that divide, dilute and fragment individuals, 
teams, organizations and institutions.  Everyone with interagency experience knows that we 
can do much better.  The following abstracts provide an overview of the attached research 
papers that address the above questions in more detail.   
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ABSTRACTS 
 
The Interagency Process in Reconstruction of Post-WWII Japan    15 
Kate Rogers 
The reconstruction of post-WWII Japan is commonly considered both a great success as a 
nation-building effort, and completely inapplicable to the problems that the U.S. government 
faces in nation-building efforts today. By examining initial policy creation in Washington and 
the application of policy in theater during the occupation of Japan, the paper aims to show that 
the occupation of Japan succeeded in spite of complications and that this success in the face of 
adversity yields valuable lessons for the present day. Modern nation-building efforts can apply 
lessons from Japan on creation of stability and democracy, the role of the military in nation-
building operations, and cultural understanding to the interagency process.  
 
US Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan 2003-2006: Obstacles to                 
 Interagency Cooperation        43 
Carlos Hernandorena 
The experience of US Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan from 2003-2006 
provides an excellent case study for evaluating interagency cooperation in a counterinsurgency 
environment. A detailed assessment of interviews and reports written on PRTs provided insight 
into some of the major obstacles which impeded the interagency teams‘ ability to coordinate 
effectively. Factors such as the failure to provide guidance on the roles and responsibilities of 
individual team members; the military‘s disproportionate amount of influence and resources 
within the teams; inefficient PRT deployment policies, failure to provide adequate interagency 
and cultural training; and the weak participation and logistical support of civilian agencies all 
played a critical role in hampering interagency coordination within the teams. Recommendations 
including greater flexibility in PRT leadership structure; specialized pre-deployment training 
courses; alignment of PRT personnel tour lengths; the establishment of clear guidelines detailing 
individual roles and responsibilities; and increased civilian involvement and support in PRT 
operations are all designed to address the major obstacles PRTs faced during their initial 
deployments to Afghanistan.     
 
An Alternative View: Sri Lanka’s Experience with an Enduring Insurgency   82 
Patrick Baetjer 
The current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have led policymakers and war fighters to search for 
applicable lessons from past counterinsurgency efforts. Typically, these individuals have studied 
the French experience in Algeria, the British efforts in Malaysia, and the well-documented war in 
Vietnam.  Yet these examples may not be the most applicable and there is a tendency to ignore 
other examples such as the Sri Lankan government‘s more than 30 year-old campaign against the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.  Sri Lanka is riddled with ethnic, religious, and 
socioeconomic divides much like Iraq and Afghanistan.  The Sri Lankan government‘s response 
to the Tigers and to the broader Tamil community have at times alienated Tamils and at other 
times provided narrow windows of opportunity to end the conflict.  Given the complexity of Sri 
Lankan society, the government‘s various campaigns provide important lessons for the US in 
current and future support and stability operations.  These lessons include the significance of 
understanding the culture the US operates in, the importance of establishing personal 
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relationships in counterinsurgency efforts, and the utility of joint government-minority 
population initiatives to build trust and marginalize the insurgents. 
 
Strategic Communication:  Interagency Rhetoric and Consistent Interpretation  128 
Amanda Smith 
In complex operations such as today‘s conflicts and Iraq and Afghanistan and conflicts of the 
past such as Somalia, the importance of civil-military communication and coordination is widely 
acknowledged and essential for success.  However, the difficulties of interagency coordination in 
support and stability operations have proven to be incredibly challenging.  Strategic 
communication, embodied in interagency rhetoric, is of primary importance to the success of the 
interagency at all levels.  Communication and organizational theory have much to say about the 
manner in which rhetoric is formed and understood by organizations of varying cultures and 
missions.  Building upon that theory and the lessons learned from the conflict in Somalia, this 
analysis examines the key policy documents for interagency coordination such as Presidential 
Decision Directive 56 and National Security Presidential Directive 44 in order to best understand 
how rhetoric is being used and interpreted in the interagency.  From these findings, 
recommendations for understanding and implementing the current documents as well as 
recommendations for future documents are made.   
 
Counterinsurgency Doctrine FM 3-24 and Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Bottom-Up 
 Review          170 
Tyson Voelkel  
The American Way of War is not doomed to fail in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. 
The military and other federal agencies have the talent and motivation to achieve success in 
Stability and Support Operations but are hindered by a desynchronized interagency process in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Reviewing tactical operations compared to the prescriptions in FM 3-
24 provides three key findings and eight recommendations for Operation Iraqi Freedom decision 
makers. 
 
Leadership Education and Training for the Interagency     211 
Brian Polley 
The international environment and the threats to US national security have changed dramatically 
over recent years, and the current situation in the world requires a different understanding and 
approach to training leaders to work on interagency teams in dangerous post-conflict 
environments.  Efforts aimed at educating leaders and preparing them for these environments 
should be based on comprehensive knowledge of leadership theory and careful consideration of 
the unique challenges support and stability operations (SASO) entail.  Three main problems have 
hampered effective leadership on interagency teams in SASO: the lack of a common lexicon 
shared across agencies of the US government, few training and education opportunities offered 
with both civilian and military personnel participating, and no formal system of managing and 
sharing knowledge of previous experiences and lessons learned.  To address the problems and 
challenges faced in the current engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as those that will be 
faced in future engagements, American military and civilian policymakers must address these 
three main deficiencies and better prepare the next generation of leaders to solve difficult 
problems using the full spectrum of interagency resources.   
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The Influence of Stability Operations on the Army Profession and Public Management 
            244 
Chris Cline 
The Army and civilian government leaders play integral roles in the planning, coordination and 
execution of stability operations.  The publications of National Security Presidential Directive– 
44 (NSPD-44) and Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05 challenge the Army 
professional and civilian leaders, or more specifically public managers in government, to accept 
stability operations as a core mission with importance parallel to traditional combat operations.  
At the same time, Army professionals and public managers should adapt their respective cultures 
to this new operational dimension and evaluate their professional knowledge base and skill sets 
to achieve success in stability operations. 
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II. Selected Case Studies of Counterinsurgency Operations 
A.   The Interagency Process in Reconstruction of Post-WWII Japan 
      Kate Rogers 
 
As the sole world superpower and arguable global hegemon, the United States has 
become increasingly involved in nation-building efforts since the end of the Cold War. In these 
efforts, U.S. forces have encountered some recurring problems. These problems include the 
destruction of physical infrastructure, dysfunctional institutions, and violent opposition. The 
inability to cope with these issues would both prevent U.S. forces from gaining any opportunity 
to leave ―gracefully‖ (i.e. without creating a failed state and without appearing to lose the 
conflict) and create a loss of legitimacy for any U.S. occupation. To avoid this dilemma, 
successful state-building is imperative.
2
 
The United States government has successfully dealt with the issues of nation-building in 
the past, most notably in the case of post-World War II Japan. In seven years, the occupying 
force under General Douglas MacArthur transformed a nation broken by over a decade of 
militarism into an economically successful, peaceful democracy. At least, it looks that way in 
retrospect. This paper looks at the entirety of the occupation of Japan, examining both the 
achievements and the complications that occurred.  
Section 1 describes Japan‘s condition immediately following the war. Section 2 describes 
the creation of initial policy for Japan and the interagency cooperation from which it emerged. 
Section 3 examines the unique structure of Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers‘ General 
Headquarters (SCAP GHQ) and its function in executing policy, and Section 4 describes the 
                                                 
2
 State-building is defined as ―the creation of new government institutions and the strengthening of existing ones.‖ 
Fukuyama asserts that the sense of shared history and culture implied in the word nation makes the term ―nation-
building‖ a misnomer, but one commonly used in the United States. Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance 
and World Order in the 21
st
 Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), ix, 99. In recognition of this 
common usage, the words state-building and nation-building will be used interchangeably in this paper. 
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achievements that resulted from SCAP‘s policy execution. Finally, Section 5 examines some 
complications that occurred during the occupation, and Section 6 suggests some lessons learned 
from the experience. 
Japan’s Condition after the War  
At the end of the war, Japan was devastated. Some 65% of Tokyo lay in ruins from 
American firebombing runs and only two million citizens remained of the city‘s original 
population of seven million.
3
 Nagasaki and Hiroshima had suffered massive structural damage, 
loss of life, and debilitating radiation sickness from the atomic bombs. The nation lay drained of 
resources after 13 years of constant military action. After a decade of war, the nation had gained 
little and lost much. Japan had lost the goodwill of its neighbors; the loss of the territories 
occupied during the 1930s would cut off all access to imports. Since Japanese textile and food 
production supplied only a fraction of the public demand, millions of people faced starvation.
4
 
Nine million citizens were homeless as a result of Allied bombing campaigns, and a further three 
million were stranded overseas.
5
 Economic infrastructure was crushed, with coal production ½ 
the wartime production rate and steel production ¼ the rate of the wartime peak.
6
 
As a result of the pitiful state of affairs in Japan at the beginning of the war, the country 
found itself completely at the mercy of the Allied victors. Because of this the population was 
willing to accept the long occupation necessary to achieve stability and promote nation-
building.
7
 For its part, America saw the continued threat of communist expansion in China and 
Korea as an incentive to invest in a lengthy occupation. David Edelstein remarks that occupation 
                                                 
3
Edwin A. Locke, ―Notes on the Current Situation in Japan,‖ October 19, 1945. 
4
 Edwin A. Locke, ―Notes on the Current Situation in Japan,‖ October 19, 1945. 
5
 James Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
2003), 26-28. 
6
 Edwin A Locke, ―Notes on the Current Situation in Japan,‖ October 19, 1945. 
7 The necessity for a lengthy occupation to achieve stability is argued by David M. Edelstein, ―Occupational 
Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail,‖ International Security 29:1 (Summer 2004), 50-51. 
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interests do not always include nation-building. However, in this case the Americans found 
themselves with two distinct occupation responsibilities. First, the international politics 
surrounding the occupation dictated the demilitarization of Japan. Second, the need for continued 
support from Japan, which the Americans desired in anticipation of the future conflict with the 
USSR, dictated the requirements for nation-building and democratization. These coincident 
needs for the advantages of a lengthy occupation provided an opportunity for the United States to 
succeed in the reconstruction of Japan. 
Initial Occupation Policy  
The Allies laid out their official goals for Japan during the Potsdam Conference in July 
1945. The resulting document, known as the Potsdam Declaration,
8
 listed five major goals the 
Japanese would have to accept as part of their unconditional surrender:
9
 (1) disarmament of the 
military and removal of militarists from power; (2) return of occupied territories as specified in 
the Cairo Declaration;
10
 (3) justice to war criminals; (4) strengthening of democracy; and (5) 
economic demilitarization. Additionally, Japan had to accept military occupation by the Allied 
forces until it met all conditions of the surrender. 
The U.S. State and War Departments played large roles in defining these goals, both 
before and after the Potsdam Conference. The State Department formulated the Interdivisional 
Area Committee on the Far East in 1943 to analyze possible occupation solutions in Japan. The 
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Committee consisted of representatives from the Division of Far Eastern Affairs and other 
divisions with interests in the area, including the new research division. They considered issues 
including the optimal composition of occupation forces, the meaning of ―unconditional 
surrender,‖ the postwar objectives of the U.S. in Japan, and the role of the Emperor in postwar 
Japan. By February 1944, the War and Navy Departments began to consider these policy 
questions as well, and asked the Department of State for definitive policy statements on some 
twenty questions that required answers prior to Japan‘s surrender. These questions included 
many of the same issues the State Department had studied during previous months.
11
 The War 
Department also conducted independent studies on occupation policy issues. General John F. 
Hilldring, the Director of the Army‘s Civil Affairs Division, began preparing JCS 1380/15 as 
early as January 1944. On July 4, 1945, General George Lincoln ordered the Policy Section of 
the War Department to prepare a study on the post-defeat control of Japan and Japanese territory 
for the Secretary of War and Chief of Staff. The study was completed on July 9, just in time for 
the Potsdam Conference.
12
  
In November 1944, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy agreed to appoint a 
committee to ―coordinate the views of the three Departments in matters of common interest.‖13 
The following month, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) came into 
existence. Subcommittees like the Pacific Far Eastern Subcommittee submitted recommendation 
papers to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for military advice, and then to the Committee itself for 
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approval. After approval, the Joint Chiefs implemented the recommendations.
14
 Over the course 
of the reconstruction of Japan, the SWNCC approved many documents instrumental in the 
rebuilding process. 
One recommendation paper, the "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" 
(SWNCC150/4), proved particularly useful. SWNCC150/4 reiterated the goals laid out in the 
Potsdam Declaration and detailed methods for achieving these goals. It was the first document 
MacArthur received that gave him guidelines for his role as the Supreme Commander of the 
Allied Powers (SCAP). SWNCC 150/4 directed the Supreme Commander to work toward two 
ultimate objectives of the U.S. for the Japanese occupation:  
(1) To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and 
security of the world, and 
(2) To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which 
will respect the rights of other states and will support the objectives of the United States as 
reflected in the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The United States 
desires that this government should conform as closely as may be to principles of democratic self-
government but it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of 
government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people.
15
 
Ironically, SWNCC 150/4 considered the requirements of the Potsdam Declaration means 
to these ends rather than goals in and of themselves. The document then gave the Supreme 
Commander more specific instructions as to the extent of Allied authority for military 
occupation, relations with the Japanese government, military disarmament, treatment of war 
criminals, economic demilitarization, promotion of democratic forces, resumption of peaceful 
economic activity, and payment of reparations.
16
 Many of these instructions established specific 
SCAP policies. These directions included orders to dissolve ―ultra-nationalistic or militaristic 
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social, political, professional and commercial societies and institutions,‖ to ―favor a program for 
the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of 
a great part of Japan‘s trade and industry,‖ and to make reparations ―through the transfer of such 
goods or existing capital equipment and facilities as are not necessary for a peaceful Japanese 
economy or the supplying of the occupying forces.‖17 Further examination shows that SCAP 
followed these directions to the letter in its operations. 
Although the three departments had considerable clout in creating policy, one might 
argue that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had more influence in shaping events as they unfolded in 
Japan. The military chain of command placed the Joint Chiefs between the President and the 
Supreme Commander, so MacArthur took his marching orders from them. Shortly after the 
drafting of SWNCC 150/4, the Joint Chiefs drafted a parallel document called the ―Basic 
Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper‖ (JCS 1380/15). This top 
secret directive informed MacArthur of ―the authority which you will possess and the policies 
which will guide you in the occupation and control of Japan in the initial period after 
surrender.‖18 JCS 1380 fleshed out the directions of SWNCC 150/4 in the same way SWNCC 
150/4 had developed the ideas expressed in the Potsdam Declaration. For example, where 
SWNCC states ―Persons who have been active exponents of militarism and militant nationalism 
will be removed and excluded from public office and from any other position of public or 
substantial private responsibility,‖19 JCS 1380/15 elaborates as follows: 
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5b. Except as indicated in paragraph 7c below, in no circumstances will persons be allowed to 
hold public office or any other positions of responsibility or influence in public or important 
private enterprise who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression, who 
have been influential members of any Japanese ultra-nationalistic, terroristic, or secret patriotic 
society, its agencies or affiliates, who have been influential in the activities of the other 
organizations enumerated in paragraph 5g below, or who manifest hostility to the objectives of the 
military occupation.
20
 
 
This degree of detail, as well as the direct address of MacArthur (as opposed to speaking 
indirectly of the ―Supreme Commander‖), may have made the military commander more 
comfortable since it resembled a set of orders more closely than a policy recommendation. By 
1946, the SWNCC began filtering its recommendations through the JCS, presumably to 
minimize this type of duplicate effort.
21
 
Organization in Theater 
Any examination of policy in theater must include the role of the U.S. military. The 
military and General MacArthur, in particular, dominated the operational implementation of 
occupation policy. Initially, this resulted from the necessity of having military forces present to 
conduct the war against and later the occupation of Japan. However, in the first year of the 
occupation the State and War Departments solidified the military approach with an agreement on 
the division of labor in Japan. In a memo to President Harry Truman, Secretary of State James 
Byrnes suggested that the State Department bear primary responsibility for the formulation of 
occupation policy, including chairmanship of the SWNCC, while the War Department take 
responsibility for execution and administration. The memo also suggested requiring all other 
agencies to assist the War Department in finding ―suitable civilian personnel to complete the 
necessary field staff to discharge the War Department responsibility for government in these 
Occupied Areas by assignment of their existing personnel and facilities, by assistance in 
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recruiting specially qualified persons and in all other practicable action.‖22 The President 
approved this memo, and encouraged other agencies to fall in line. In part due to this memo, the 
reconstruction of Japan remained a military mission for all seven years of the occupation, rather 
than transitioning to civil authorities. This historical fact directly contradicts current opinions 
that the job of nation-building traditionally belongs to civilians. 
The main responsibility for managing the occupation in theater fell to General MacArthur 
as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. MacArthur also headed the Far East 
Command of the Army (also called Army Forces Pacific). To handle his two hats, MacArthur 
ordered his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Richard Sutherland, to draw up a new 
organization plan. Due to the dual mission of occupying and reconstructing Japan, Sutherland 
split the new Civil Affairs section into a separate General Headquarters (GHQ) for SCAP.
23
 The 
Far East Command GHQ and the SCAP GHQ would both operate under MacArthur and the 
same Chief of Staff, but would operate more or less independently of one another. The Far East 
Command (FEC) would bear responsibility for the bulk of occupation and security 
responsibilities. On the other side, the SCAP GHQ managed the many processes associated with 
nation-building. The majority of the regular Army worked in FEC GHQ, while SCAP GHQ 
consisted mostly of reserve officers with a civilian perspective. This organizational structure 
largely removed the career military from the process of democratization, and eased the inherent 
tension between the necessary autocracy of military culture and the requirements of a budding 
democracy. SCAP initially consisted of nine sections (Economic and Scientific, Civil 
Information and Education, Natural Resources, Public Health and Welfare, Government, Legal, 
                                                 
22
 James Byrnes, memorandum for the President, April 18, 1946. 
23
 The original plan was to add G-5 Civil Affairs to the existing four Assistant Chiefs of Staff: G-1 Personnel, G-2 
Intelligence, G-3 Operations, and G-4 Supply. Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan, (New York: The Free Press, 
1987), 82. 
  
 
23 
Civil Communications, Civil Intelligence, and Statistics and Reports), and these sections were 
responsible for the overwhelming majority of accomplishments in reforming Japan.
24
 
Policy in Theater 
Francis Fukuyama describes successful nation-building as occurring in three phases. In 
the first phase, the U.S. solves immediate problems of physical infrastructure through the 
infusion of security forces, humanitarian relief, and technical assistance in restoring physical 
infrastructure, e.g. water, electricity, etc. The second phase begins once some level of stability is 
restored, and focuses on building self-sustaining state institutions. Finally, in the third phase, the 
U.S. helps the state institutions provide public services including public education and protection 
of property rights. American values may dictate the inclusion of civil liberties and democratic 
structure in the newly developed institutions during the final phase.
25
 
The original goals of the occupation as stated in the Potsdam Declaration were as 
follows: (1) disarmament of the military and removal of militarists from power; (2) return of 
occupied territories as specified in the Cairo Declaration; (3) justice to war criminals; (4) 
strengthening of democracy; and (5) economic demilitarization. Of these categories, the first 
three dealt with the aftermath of World War II and the latter two encompassed the 
accomplishments described by Fukuyama‘s concept of nation-building.  
Once ensconced in the reconstruction process, SCAP discovered that the disarmament of 
the military and removal of militarists from power, although means to the same end, required 
vastly different approaches to accomplish. As a result, one branch of the organization dealt with 
demobilization of the military and repatriation of Japanese military and civilians from abroad, 
and another branch dealt with the elimination of aggressive forces in the government, under the 
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larger goal of strengthening democracy. Similarly, demilitarizing the economy became one of 
many goals in the reorganization of economic institutions to promote democracy.
26
  
Disarmament of the military: SCAP delegated the initial demobilization of troops to the Japanese 
War and Navy Ministries, which by December 1, 1945, had completely demobilized the 2.2 
million men on the main islands. After that point, the main task of demobilization was the 
repatriation of approximately 6.5 million Japanese residing in the former colonies as well as the 
return of some 1.25 million foreign nationals found residing in Japan at the end of the war. By 
early 1948, virtually all of the Japanese expatriates had been returned to the home islands, with 
the exception of some 765,000 Japanese citizens in Soviet-controlled areas. By May 1949, the 
Soviets officially ceased sending ships with Japanese records still unable to account for some 
375,000 expatriates. The loss of these Japanese, presumed dead, created a stark contrast between 
the performance of the Americans and that of the Soviets in repatriation efforts. Repatriation of 
foreign nationals (predominantly Koreans) largely ended in 1947.
27
 A large portion of the 
Korean population chose to remain in Japan, a decision vindicated as conditions deteriorated on 
the Korean peninsula. However, the large foreign national population later caused security 
concerns for SCAP.
28
 By 1948, at least half of the Koreans in Japan were under leftist influence, 
mirroring the political polarization on the Korean peninsula.
29
 
Return of occupied territories: Territorial changes occurred in accordance with the Cairo 
Declaration, with all changes determined by 1947, with the exception of certain small islands in 
the Pacific such as the Ryukyus.  Japan ceded Manchuria to China and liberated Korea. The loss 
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of these territories, although considered an accomplishment by the Allies, deprived Japan of 
many of the resources it had access to during the war and severely handicapped the recovery of 
the Japanese economy.
30
 
 
 
Figure 1: Japanese Empire before and after Enactment of Cairo Declaration
31
 
 
Justice to war criminals: To try Japanese war criminals, the allied nations chartered the War 
Tribunal for the Far East. The Tribunal presided over the trial of 28 men on counts of waging 
war against China and the allied nations; ordering, authorizing, and permitting inhumane 
treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs); creating or executing a conspiracy to wage wars of 
aggression; and deliberately and recklessly disregarding their duty to take adequate steps to 
prevent atrocities. Defendants included four former premiers, three former foreign ministers, four 
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former war ministers, two former navy ministers, six former generals, two former ambassadors, 
and three former economic and financial leaders, but did not include the Emperor or any 
members of the Imperial family. The absence of the Emperor from this list has been a cause of 
criticism on many fronts, but the United States decided the legitimacy of the Imperial house 
would serve the occupation better by supporting U.S. measures than by hanging from a gallows. 
All of the defendants who survived the trial with their sanity were sentenced to death or extended 
prison terms. Of the seven men sentenced to death, all bore responsibility for mass-scale 
atrocities, most prominently the Rape of Nanking.
32
  
In 1937, during the Japanese offensive against Nanking, several prominent civilians 
established a ―safety zone‖ which both China and Japan agreed to hold neutral so long as it did 
not harbor soldiers of the opposing force. The Japanese took the city on December 13, and over 
the next six weeks Japanese soldiers murdered an estimated two hundred thousand Chinese 
civilians and prisoners of war, many of whom were taking refuge in the recognized safety zone.
33
 
Mr. Tillman Durdin reported to the New York Times that ―all the alleys and streets were filled 
with civilian bodies, including women and children.‖34  
A contemporary account of the trials considered the exercise unsuccessful, as the trials 
did not excite widespread feelings of shame or guilt in the Japanese population for initiating the 
war.
35
 The trials did not serve the purpose of reducing the legitimacy of the former regime, 
either. On the contrary, Prime Minister Tojo salvaged his reputation as a loyal Imperialist by 
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accepting full responsibility for the war, indirectly absolving the Emperor.
36
 The Nuremburg 
Tribunals and the Far East Tribunals were some of the first examples of international law 
enforcement. The Allies conducted the tribunals without judicial precedent, solely on the 
conviction that some crimes were so great the Allied conscience could not allow the committers 
of these crimes to walk free.
37
 As a deterrent or a political maneuver, the trials may have failed to 
serve their purpose, but as a precedent for enforcement of international law, the trials succeeded. 
Strengthening democracy: SCAP made its greatest effort in strengthening democracy in the 
revision of the Japanese Constitution. The revised constitution, written by Americans and forced 
through the Diet, made four major changes to the Japanese government.
38
  First, it changed the 
upper house of the Diet to an elected body. Second, it moved executive power from the Emperor 
to the cabinet, as designated by the Diet. Third, the constitution endowed Japanese citizens with 
civil rights, similar to those granted to Americans in the Bill of Rights. Finally, the constitution 
forswore the use of war as a prerogative of the state.
39
 These revisions all still exist in present 
copies of the Japanese constitution, but many other programs contributed to the democratization 
of Japan. Unlike the three preceding goals, improving the democratic foundations of Japan 
proved a multifaceted endeavor. In addition to revising the constitution, the Allies focused their 
efforts on removing the militarists from government and positions of influence, educational 
reform, reorganization of economic institutions, labor reform, and agrarian reform. 
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Government purge: As recommended by SWNCC 150/4, many of the reforms were instituted by 
the Japanese government with SCAP oversight. The Japanese government even established the 
procedures for conducting the purge. Basically, the government required any person to whom the 
purge might apply to complete a three-page questionnaire. A series of boards then screened the 
2,308,863 completed papers and purged approximately 220,000 individuals.
40
 The purge affected 
significantly more people than Washington anticipated. Richard Finn attributes this surprise to 
the inevitable communication errors that occur when policymakers are not involved in policy 
execution. The purge also expelled 80 percent of the Diet and half of Shidehara‘s cabinet, almost 
crippling the government.
41
 
Educational reform: The purge also extended to the educational field, where the removal of 
certain teachers complemented an overall policy of eliminating all militaristic and ultra-
nationalistic influences on the education system. As part of the education reform, SCAP also 
worked to simplify the Japanese writing system and standardize the education program nation-
wide. However, the post-war recession limited the amount of money the government could spend 
on education, limiting the extent to which reforms could be effected. Some of these programs 
found resonance in the Japanese government, like the institution of compulsory education in the 
elementary and middle school levels.
42
 Other reforms, like the attempt to create general 
education programs at the university level, found little support in the Japanese system. Akihiro 
Itoh draws a distinction between voluntary, piecemeal reforms and externally enforced reforms. 
He notes that those of the former category tend to succeed while those of the latter create 
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conflicts within the system.
43
  In educational reform, as in other areas, a lack of cultural 
understanding impaired the extent to which the American occupation could make an impact. 
Economic reorganization: To democratize the economy SCAP began a number of initiatives 
aimed at disbanding the zaibatsu, or large family-controlled banking and industrial 
conglomerates that controlled large portions of the Japanese economy. SCAP proceeded along 
four paths to reach this goal: (1) dissolution of zaibatsu holding companies; (2) dissolution or 
reorganization of companies whose relative size restricted competition; (3) enactment and 
enforcement of anti-monopoly registration; and (4) wide distribution of securities seized by the 
government from zaibatsu in enforcement of anti-monopoly laws.
44
 
These efforts might have achieved the desired goal in a nation that truly desired a 
capitalist government, but Japanese economists heavily supported the zaibatsu.
45
 Conservative 
economists saw the conglomerates as necessary for economic growth, much like proponents of 
big business in the United States. It may surprise Americans that liberals also supported the 
zaibatsu, but wished to nationalize them in the manner of a socialist government. As a result, in 
spite of American anti-monopoly efforts the zaibatsu reappeared as keiretsu shortly after the 
occupation ended.
46
 
Labor reform:  To promote labor reform, SCAP encouraged the organization of unions and 
implemented protective legislation. Initially, SCAP encouraged the expansion of organized labor 
across the board. However, a series of strikes in the fall of 1946 and the growing presence of 
communist sympathizers in the upper ranks of labor unions led to the creation of regulatory laws 
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to prevent organized labor from paralyzing the nation on a regular basis. Public safety employees 
were denied any labor rights, and administrative employees in public service were barred from 
striking.
47
 
By 1948, the Japanese government had passed legislation creating a comprehensive 
system of labor standards. The Labor Standards Law regulated ―minimum standards for hours of 
work, rest periods, vacations with pay, safety and sanitation for all non-self-employed industrial 
workers in Japan.‖48 Another law provided worker‘s compensation to over six and a half million 
laborers. These laws and the inspectors that enforced them improved labor standards throughout 
the country. It must be noted, however, that although the improved standards promoted the 
egalitarian way of life espoused by the American occupation, it also put a serious strain on the 
already troubled Japanese economy.
49
 
Agrarian reform:  SCAP policy for agrarian reform tried to promote democracy by eliminating 
the feudal system commonly seen in Japanese agriculture. They effected this change by buying 
land from large landowners and selling it to the tenants that farmed the land. The government 
also fixed money rents at low levels, which encouraged landowners to sell land rather than 
continuing to rent it to tenants. As seen in Figure 2 the project achieved tremendous success, 
reducing the overall land tenancy from nearly half of all cultivatable land before the war to 
approximately 10% in 1950. Tsutomu Ōuchi suggests that this trend quieted rural political 
movements, which were largely supported by tenant farmers concerned about losing land access. 
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The dissipation of this political force removed a support base for socialist and communist 
movements in rural society.
50
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Proportions of Owners and Tenants, and Changes in the Tenancy Rate
51
 
 
 
All of these actions, while promoting economic and political democracy, impaired the 
recovery and growth of the Japanese economy. Additionally, SCAP made many of Japan‘s 
restitution payments in the form of capital necessary for industries that enabled war. Needless to 
say, the loss of capital further stunted Japan‘s economic recovery. 
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 In addressing the first three concerns of the Potsdam Declaration, SCAP provided some 
stability within Japan, as recommended by Fukuyama. Similarly, the new constitution was aimed 
at building a self-sustaining government, and the various reforms forced the government to 
provide certain public services. However, SCAP addressed all of these issues simultaneously, 
rather than sequentially as Fukuyama recommends. This methodology led to several notable 
complications. 
Complications 
 Although the occupation of Japan serves in many ways as a positive example of nation-
building, SCAP also encountered some serious difficulties during its seven years reconstructing 
Japan. Among these difficulties SCAP had to cope with include the influence of communists in 
unions, the negative effects of pro-democratic policies on the struggling economy, 
miscommunications and disagreements between MacArthur and policymakers in Washington, 
and the general problem of creating cultural understanding between two completely different 
societies. 
Unions and communists: SCAP initiated all of the policies mentioned in the previous section 
more or less simultaneously. As a result, labor unions began to form in 1946, while the economy 
was still recovering from the war and many of SCAP‘s other reforms. In the fall of 1946, with 
rampant inflation and unemployment, labor unions negotiated wage increases in dozens of 
industries. In retrospect one could have predicted that the communists in Japan would take 
advantage of a dissatisfied proletariat. They did so with a vengeance, organizing the diverse 
labor unions under a single leader and turning their demands on the government. Events 
escalated over the course of the fall and winter. The Japanese government, deprived of its secret 
police, feared the labor unions meant to revolt and refused to negotiate. The unions responded 
  
 
33 
with a threat of a general strike. Ultimately, MacArthur brokered an agreement between the 
government and the unions, in which the unions would refrain from striking and the government 
would raise the living wage by 42%. All of this occurred by proxy, without MacArthur so much 
as leaving his desk, and only the respect the Japanese people had for him prevented disaster.
52
  
Democracy vs. Stability:  In the three and a half years following the war, MacArthur 
accomplished all of the tasks laid out by the Potsdam Declaration and gained the adoration of the 
Japanese people. In Shinto, the state religion of Japan until 1945, the Emperor was revered as 
one of a pantheon of gods.
53
 When the emperor deferred to MacArthur, the Japanese people 
logically assumed that MacArthur was a god as well. MacArthur had experience with Eastern 
philosophy, having served under his father in Tokyo during his early career and having spent 
several years as the commanding general in the Philippines. He meticulously played the role of 
the aloof ruler he thought appealed to the Japanese psyche.
54
 During MacArthur‘s time in Japan, 
the Emperor and the Prime Minister were the only Japanese he saw in an official capacity. He 
refused to leave Japan for the duration of his tenure as SCAP. The Japanese responded by 
treating MacArthur with a reverence previously reserved for the Imperial family. MacArthur 
received almost 500,000 letters from the Japanese public during the occupation, many of which 
addressed him in the formal style of Japanese previously used only for the Emperor.
55
 
As the de facto ruler of Japan, MacArthur exhibited tireless enthusiasm and dedication to 
the cause of Japanese democracy. In the first six months of the occupation, he ordered the 
removal of the censorship system, the release of political prisoners, the installation of women‘s 
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suffrage, and the abolition of child labor.
56
 This dedication was very much in keeping with the 
spirit of reconstruction at the time. The Potsdam Declaration, SWNCC 150/4 and JCS 1380/15 
all emphasized democratic development in all areas of life, so it came as a complete surprise 
when Washington turned its focus to economics. 
By the end of 1948, most of the programs resolving issues from the war were complete, 
and many of the programs for promoting democracy were well entrenched. At this point, 
Washington felt pressure to relieve the tax burden and make Japan self-sufficient. Japanese 
production and trade had recovered at disappointing rates through 1949 while postwar inflation 
raised costs at staggering rates. During the period between September 1945 and August 1948, 
prices in Japan rose more than 700 percent. To remedy this situation, Washington appointed the 
Young Mission.  
The Young Mission consisted of some half-dozen economists from various government 
agencies, including the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Board, which before this 
point had influence reconstruction very little. The Mission traveled to Japan in early 1949 and 
spent 18 days examining the economic situation in the country and writing a report of their 
findings, without the help of the economists stationed in Tokyo. The Mission recommended a 
180-degree change in economic policy, evidencing a change in emphasis between promoting 
democracy in Japan and reducing the tax burden in the United States. The economists at SCAP 
assured MacArthur that the current approach showed positive results and MacArthur stood 
behind them, rejecting the report entirely—a historic first (and last) in his time with the 
occupation. Washington overruled MacArthur, and ordered the change in policy.
57
 This event 
marked the divergence of interests of the United States and Japan. 
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Incidentally, accounts differ on whether the change of policy improved the Japanese 
economy. Joseph Dodge, President of the Detroit Bank, arrived in Japan and enforced a strict 
regimen to enforce the new policy. He set an exchange rate between the dollar and the yen and 
enforced Washington‘s demand for a balanced budget. This method may have improved the 
Japanese economy, given the chance; however, the start of the Korean War in June 1950 created 
an enormous new demand for military support supplies to which the Japanese eagerly catered. In 
the second half of 1950, Japan had a surplus in its international accounts for the first time in the 
occupation.
58
 The Korean War saved the Japanese economy. 
The end of MacArthur: MacArthur sometimes disagreed with Washington on policy issues. As 
the de facto leader of Japan, he was entitled to these disagreements, but for a military officer to 
countermand a direct order constituted insubordination. As a result of the economic redirection, 
MacArthur largely lost control of the reconstruction. He ventured two more disagreements with 
Washington. One involved the treatment of the Chinese government-in-exile on Formosa, who 
he thought the U.S. should support on principle in spite of political considerations. The other 
involved the war in South Korea, where a congressman publicized his correspondence with 
MacArthur after a Presidential Directive forbade MacArthur from stating a public opinion. D. 
James Clayton largely attributes the escalation of the Truman-MacArthur controversy, as it later 
became known, to ―failures in communication and coordination within the chain of command.‖59 
This failure resulted partially from the physical distance between Truman and MacArthur. They 
only met face to face once, at Wake Island on October 15, 1950. Consequently, all 
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communication between the two men was overshadowed by stereotypes and preconceptions 
derived from third-party information.
60
 
 This series of disagreements between MacArthur and Washington led to Truman 
dismissing MacArthur for insubordination. The dismissal came while the Americans and the 
Japanese were negotiating the terms of agreement on the peace treaty, and the loss of MacArthur 
came close to breaking Japanese faith in the U.S. The dearth of communication between 
Washington and Tokyo and the resulting lack of trust endangered the accomplishments of the 
occupation. 
Cultural Misunderstandings: SCAP ran into cultural misunderstandings with the Japanese 
throughout the course of the occupation. Some of these misunderstandings had comical results, 
while others proved troublesome. Theodore Cohen relates one such incident: 
Not knowing the tastes of the Americans, the Japanese devoted themselves to a serious study of 
them. At one small party (small because of a tiny budget) given for four of us by the two labor 
bureaus of the Welfare Ministry in February 1946, three of the bureaucrats plied us with whisky, 
beer, and sake while asking questions about our hobbies and likes. Gradually, as the Japanese 
became drunker, our responses became more imaginative. When all but one of the Japanese were 
hors de combat, apparently asleep under the table, we said our farewells to the last surviving host. 
We had not gone more than a hundred meters in our jeep when one of us discovered he had 
forgotten his overseas cap. We turned around, and he was back within minutes at the room we had 
left. There were our ―drunken‖ hosts, suddenly sober, sitting around the low banquet table and 
comparing notes on their departed guests. I don‘t know who fooled whom more that evening.61 
Americans did not always put as much effort into understanding their counterparts. In November 
1946 the Hoover Mission made a series of recommendations to liberalize the Japanese 
bureaucracy. The Americans failed to address the educational elitism in the government and the 
feudal nature of employer-employee relationships in Japan, opting instead to utilize American 
concepts like ―equal opportunity for promotions‖ and the nobility of service to the public. As a 
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result, the Mission‘s recommendations were ―almost totally irrelevant.‖62 Cohen remarked, ―I 
sometimes thought that if the Mission had been sent to the Artic Circle instead, it would have 
come up with the same prescription for the Eskimos, seals, and seagulls.‖63 Another mission, 
tasked with making recommendations for reforming the Japanese education system, created a 
report which ―sometimes offers more insight into U.S. education than into Japanese.‖64 This 
ethnocentric approach to recommendations and reforms appears repeatedly throughout the 
occupation, and frequently undermined U.S. initiatives. The Americans attempted to minimize 
these effects by acting through the Japanese government using persuasion and influence rather 
than by issuing directives. However, the inherent power imbalance between the Americans and 
the Japanese frequently made this measure ineffective. 
Findings 
The case of Japan as described above demonstrates several major findings. First, 
interagency cooperation in Washington creates clear policy, but only cooperation between 
Washington and the theater results in clear policy execution. Second, efforts to create stability 
and democracy simultaneously can interfere with each other. Third, extended occupations 
increase the probability of success, but are difficult to sustain. Fourth, although the U.S. 
government recognizes the importance of cultural understanding in successful nation-building, it 
has no systematic approach to create the intellectual capital needed to provide that cultural 
understanding. Finally, the expected role of the military in nation-building operations has varied 
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over the course of the last 60 years, but successful nation-building requires cooperation between 
civilian and military efforts.  
 Due to interagency cooperation in Washington, the two major documents dictating initial 
policy, SWNCC 150/4 and JCS 1380/15, agreed with one another and with the Potsdam 
Declaration on policy in Japan. However, since none of the people in SCAP were privy to the 
discussions and considerations that created these documents, SCAP had to extrapolate 
Washington‘s policy vision. Ideally, at least one of the people intimately involved with 
formulating policy would sit down with the person coordinating the execution effort and talk 
through the strategy and philosophy behind the policy directives, so that the coordinator could 
execute policy in the frame of reference which the policymakers originally intended. In the real 
world, where policymakers and executors have many demands on their time, one can achieve 
approximately the same results by sending a liaison with peripheral involvement to the theater to 
ensure consistency between strategy, policy, and operations. Washington did send liaisons to 
Japan, but their roles involved offering technical expertise in economics or politics or agriculture 
rather than the communicative role I suggest. For this purpose, the military structure did a 
disservice to MacArthur, because a soldier expects his subordinates to take orders without 
question, but policy execution requires a unity of vision with the policymakers.  
 The second complication in Japan stemmed from attempting to achieve stability and 
democracy simultaneously. As seen in the case of the labor strikes, and suggested by Fukuyama, 
policies that promote democracy can interfere with stability. Conversely, measures to promote 
stability can stifle democratic growth. Although it offends American sensibilities, stability 
should precede democracy. The basic needs of humans for food, water, and shelter supercede 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Democracy exists to allow the greatest number of people to 
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fulfill their basic needs with the greatest success. Without some measure of stability, democracy 
is pointless. 
Creation and maintenance of stability and democracy often requires an extended 
occupation. The occupation of Japan lasted 3-4 years longer than originally anticipated. 
However, maintaining support for an occupation that lasts the greater part of a decade challenges 
the governments of both the occupied and occupying nations. David Edelstein suggests a 
paradox in nation-building, namely that it requires a lengthy occupation to work, but that 
extended presence of external influences often precipitates nationalist movements against the 
foreign occupation.
65
 The occupying government also has trouble rallying support for long 
occupations. After the initial enthusiasm for national defense fades, wives want their husbands 
back, mothers want their sons back, and taxpayers want their money back. Governments 
anticipating the need for an occupation should consider this dilemma before instigating a 
conflict. Further, the political interests that necessitated the occupation will probably also lead to 
a semi-permanent relationship with American troops on the ground. Some 65 years after the end 
of the occupation of Japan, U.S. forces are still stationed in Okinawa and Japan. Similarly, South 
Korea has hosted American military bases since the beginning of the Korean War in 1951. 
Instead of looking for ways to minimize occupation time, policymakers should focus efforts on 
maintaining support for an occupation in both countries involved. By rallying support, 
policymakers can buy time to create the stability necessary to permanently eliminate the need for 
foreign occupation. 
Some people might question the ability of the United States to create either stability or 
democracy in occupied nations today, let alone create both, given the end of total warfare and the 
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elusive nature of America‘s current enemies. The use of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki certainly ended the war in the Pacific decisively and demoralized the Japanese people. 
These two results put the Americans in an enviable situation at the beginning of the occupation. 
However, counterfactual studies suggest a significant possibility that Japan would have 
surrendered by the end of 1945 even if the Americans did not use the atomic bombs.
66
 Under 
interrogation Marquis Koichi Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, stated, ―Our decision to seek 
a way out of this war was made in early June before any atomic bomb had been dropped.‖67 It is 
impossible to gauge the success of an occupation in this counterfactual situation, but the question 
merits consideration. 
As to the elusive character of the Iraqi insurgency, one might suggest that this resistance 
resulted from a lack of legitimacy
68
 in the invasion. When people accept the legitimacy of their 
government, they do not start insurgencies. In Japan, a respected leader of the government 
accepted American occupation. As previously discussed, the Emperor of Japan had legitimacy 
not only as a political leader, but as an object of religious worship. The support for the Emperor 
translated to the American occupation with the Japanese formal surrender. In newer nation-states 
like Iraq, where the government has less legitimacy than tribal relationships and patronage 
networks, American occupations cannot use government surrender as a method of obtaining 
legitimacy. In this situation, legitimacy must come from other sources. Occupations can foster 
legitimacy at the global level through multilateral efforts or at the local level by soliciting the 
support of local leaders. Either way, policymakers need a modicum of cultural understanding to 
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anticipate the effects support from various factions will have on the overall legitimacy of the 
occupation. 
Cultural understanding is perhaps the most important factor in occupation success, and 
the least often taken into consideration. Ironically, policymakers understood this necessity 
beforehand both in Japan and in Iraq, but the resources simply were not available.
69
 In the 1940s 
very few Americans had experience with Japanese language and culture. Similarly, today very 
few Americans have experience with Arabic, Dari or Pashtu. With major oceans on the eastern 
and western borders and relatively weak neighbors, the United States has had the luxury of 
relative isolation for most of its existence. Unlike citizens of nations in Europe or Southeast 
Asia, Americans had no need to learn foreign languages to communicate and little opportunity to 
experience foreign cultures. The American education system has failed to compensate for this 
shortcoming. In many states, high school students can graduate without any knowledge of a 
foreign language and minimal understanding of international history and culture.
70
 Similarly, 
after joining government service Americans find that opportunities for language study can delay 
their career advancement rather than the reverse.
71
  Until the United States government decides 
to make development of this intellectual capital a priority, cultural barriers will continue to 
frustrate nation-building efforts. 
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Cultural barriers inhibit cooperation between civil and military elements of occupation 
forces as well as between occupation forces and local government. The role of the military in 
nation-building operations has implications from the highest levels of policy-making down to the 
mentality of the foot soldier on the ground. Policymakers face the temptation to use military 
forces for occupation operations simply because the Army has the men on the ground. Not only 
does the military have by far the largest amount of deployable manpower in the U.S. 
government, but at the outset of an occupation, which often occurs right after the end of an 
armed conflict, the military already has soldiers deployed in theater. On the other hand, a change 
in assignment from conflict to reconstruction would effectively require the man on the ground to 
change vocations overnight. In Japan, SCAP solved this problem by utilizing civilian resources 
in a military hierarchy.  
The five themes seen throughout the occupation of Japan resemble the headlines of 
newspapers in the last four years. Conflict between creating stability and democracy, tension 
between the need for a long occupation and the desire to cut and run, and efforts to increase 
cultural understanding have all been manifested in the war in Iraq.
72
 The role of the military and 
the structure of interagency communication have also required closer consideration in recent 
years, especially with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the consequent 
rearrangement of the bureaucracy.  
These themes lead to three critical policy recommendations: 
 Institute incentives for cultural understanding in government offices and/or raise the 
standards for cultural education during primary and secondary schooling. 
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 Create liaisons between Washington and occupation directors in theater tasked 
specifically with ensuring that in-theater decisions coincide with overall policy 
motivations and underlying strategy. 
 Focus on rallying support for extended occupations, not minimizing occupation 
duration. 
 
 These three recommendations have universal value, whether in a completely subjugated 
country or in an atmosphere of limited warfare and counterinsurgency. The need for interagency 
cooperation between Washington and the theater, the vital importance of stability, and the 
perennial need for communication transcend the particularities of a given conflict. Indeed, they 
are as applicable today as they were sixty years ago.  
 
B. US Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan 2003-2006: Obstacles to   
 Interagency Cooperation 
     Carlos Hernandorena 
 
 The aftermath of major combat operations launched by US and coalition forces in 
October 2001, during Operation Enduring Freedom, presented the United States and other 
participant nations with the daunting task of rebuilding the fractured Afghan state. Following the 
rapid collapse of the Taliban and the destruction of al Qaeda training camps, the United Nations 
Security Council enacted resolution 1386 on December 20, 2001. Resolution 1386 sought to 
provide Afghanistan‘s new interim government with support, establishing security in Kabul 
through the creation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Efforts were soon 
made to expand the scope of ISAF into the Afghan countryside as a means to stabilize the war-
torn nation.
73
 Afghanistan remained unstable due to lingering elements of al Qaeda and the 
Taliban, which began waging an active insurgency against coalition forces and the Afghan 
Interim Authority. Additionally, tribal factionalism, powerful warlords, and the lack of any 
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established legal system posed other challenges to peace in the region.
74
 Coalition and ISAF 
forces found themselves fighting an insurgency while carrying out Support for Stability, 
Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations.  
As a result of the security threats posed to both military and civilian personnel involved 
in reconstruction missions, and as a way to share the burden of operations among coalition 
partners, US officials developed the concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in 2002 
and established the first teams by early 2003.
75
 Consisting of both civilian and military personnel 
from different government agencies, PRTs were designed to spread the ―ISAF effect‖ through a 
combination of quick impact reconstruction projects, security sector reform, and the extension of 
the Afghan Central Government‘s influence, all under the protection of embedded military 
forces. Initially, the United States set up the first few PRTs along with coalition partners such as 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand. As the PRT program took off, the United 
States began to hand over some PRTs to Coalition allies and ISAF participants.
76
 Eventually, by 
late 2006, all PRTs in Afghanistan were placed under ISAF control.
77
        
 The civil-military and interagency aspects of Provincial Reconstruction Teams make 
them a unique case study. In order for PRTs to function the way they were intended, high levels 
of coordination between team components were necessary, yet not always present. Assessing the 
manner in which different agencies as well as civilian and military personnel interacted, 
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especially within a counter-insurgency (COIN) environment, provides an excellent opportunity 
for improvements to future interagency teams.     
Although there are many different opinions regarding the effectiveness of PRTs in 
Afghanistan, much of the literature written about the teams views them as having had a positive 
impact in the region. A report written by the USAID claims that ―Provincial reconstruction teams 
(PRTs) have been an effective tool for stabilization in Afghanistan, strengthening provincial and 
district-level institutions and empowering local leaders who support the central government.‖78 
Another report, written by a specialist on support and stability operations, further explains that 
PRTs, while plagued with difficulties, made a number of helpful contributions by representing ―a 
positive international presence in places where there otherwise would have been only combat 
forces conducting kinetic operations.‖79  Indeed, many experts on SSTR believe that PRTs were 
and continue to be a viable option for countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq with the provision 
that certain changes be made to maximize the efficacy of the teams and overcome some of the 
challenges they face. 
 While the debate over PRT effectiveness is important, the key purpose of this study is to 
identify obstacles to interagency cooperation in the US PRTs during Operation Enduring 
Freedom, specifically for the period of 2003-2006. This paper assumes the position that PRTs 
were useful tools in Afghanistan and models to improve upon for the future. As previously 
stated, there are many different opinions on the impact PRTs have had in Afghanistan and could 
have in future SSTR roles. There has also been considerable discourse on the effect and interplay 
between the provincial reconstruction teams and NGOs operating in the same regions. These are 
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all important issues that must be debated; however, an assessment of interagency cooperation is 
just as critical.  
 An analysis of interagency cooperation within provincial reconstruction teams in 
Afghanistan is essential for determining the structure and guidelines of future PRTs or other 
interagency organizations operating in COIN environments. Considering the high probability 
that future US operations may involve support, stability, and reconstruction functions, it would 
be remiss to disregard the lessons presented in cases such as Afghanistan. The United States 
must prepare itself to conduct SSTR operations in similar threatening environments in which 
insurgencies, terrorism and other dangers constitute a genuine menace to the military and civilian 
agencies aiding in reconstruction. An example of this need can be seen with the current 
deployment of provincial reconstruction teams in Iraq where efforts are being made to ameliorate 
dire security threats to rebuilding efforts there.  
The United States Army‘s new counterinsurgency (COIN) field manual FM 3-24 has 
within it a section dedicated solely to explaining the importance of interagency coordination for 
successful counterinsurgency operations. It clearly states that: 
The integration of civilian and military efforts is crucial to successful COIN operations. All efforts 
focus on supporting the local populace and Home Nation government.  Political, social, and 
economic programs are usually more valuable than conventional military operations in addressing 
the root causes of conflict and undermining an insurgency. COIN participants come from many 
backgrounds. They may include military personnel, diplomats, police, politicians, humanitarian 
aid workers, contractors, and local leaders. All must make decisions and solve problems in a 
complex and extremely challenging environment.
80
 
 
This quote shows the importance of provincial reconstruction teams in establishing a joint 
mechanism for dealing with situations, such as Afghanistan, where security threats must be met 
with a multifaceted approach involving military and civilian resources. Most importantly, 
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statements made in the Army‘s counterinsurgency manual outline the critical nature of 
interagency cooperation between the various entities involved in support and stability operations 
in a COIN environment. 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Development History  
 The concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams was not introduced at the outset of US 
and coalition operations in Afghanistan. It took more than a year from the initial stages of 
Operation Enduring Freedom before the integrated civil-military units designated as PRTs were 
deployed in Afghanistan.
81
  
 Planning for civil-military cooperation, deemed essential for reconstruction efforts in 
Afghanistan from the beginning, coincided with the initial preparations for military operations 
against the Taliban. The military coordinated with a number of humanitarian agencies to prepare 
for the rebuilding efforts which would be needed after the conclusion of major combat 
operations. One author describes how 
humanitarian agencies, including InterAction the World Food Program (WFP), were invited to 
participate in a Coalition Coordination Council, based on the US Central Command (CENTCOM) 
in Tampa, Florida, which was created to enhance coordination between coalition partners, UN 
agencies, and the non-governmental health agency (NGHA) community.
82
 
   
As preparations continued for military operations in Afghanistan, General Tommy Franks, the 
US commander of United States Central Command (CENTCOM), relayed orders to establish the 
Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF). This task force consisted of a 
command and control unit designed to direct the actions of all civil affairs teams operating in 
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Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom and was responsible for establishing the 
predecessors to provincial reconstruction teams.
83
  
 Shortly after the fall of the Taliban, in December 2001, the CJMOTF established the 
coalition‘s first civil affairs teams in country. Labeled as Coalition Humanitarian Cells (CHLCs), 
outposts of approximately 12 Army civil affairs soldiers, called ―Chiclets‖ were deployed with 
the intent of winning the ―hearts and minds‖ of the local populace. As Afghan reconstruction 
expert Robert Perito explains, personnel of the CHLCs were assigned the ―task to assess 
humanitarian needs, implement small-scale reconstruction projects and establish relations with 
the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and non-governmental organizations 
already in the field.‖84 
 The Army civil affairs personnel, which composed CHLCs, fulfilled a role as non-combat 
troops with unique technical capabilities, also known as Military Occupational Specialties 
(MOS). Their background was primarily as reserve unit soldiers with considerable experience in 
the civilian realm. These ―citizen-soldiers‖ were called to active duty already possessing a vast 
array of specific knowledge and training in law enforcement, cultural affairs, labor, education, 
logistics, health care, and various other areas of civil service.
85
 The purpose of these civil affairs 
members operating in CHLCs was to provide Army commanders in the field with readily 
available and deployable sources of civilian technical skills that could be adapted to minor 
reconstruction projects throughout the Afghan countryside.
86
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 In November 2002, the deployment of CHLCs was soon followed by a plan to create 
Joint Regional Teams (JRTs). During a series of meetings in Kabul, attended by NGOs, 
diplomats, UN representatives, as well as ISAF and coalition military personnel, the concept of 
JRTs was outlined. During these meetings participants determined that remnants of the Taliban 
and al Qaeda, in addition to increased infiltration of hostile forces across the Afghan-Pakistani 
border, posed a significant risk to personnel involved in support and stability functions. Key 
figures also mentioned that operations in Afghanistan had reached ―Phase IV.‖ According to a 
report by Barbara Stapleton of the British Agencies Afghanistan Group, Phases I and II involved 
the toppling of the Taliban and al Qaeda, Phase III related to stabilization efforts, and Phase IV 
was labeled as the reconstruction phase.
87
   
 To accommodate reconstruction efforts while simultaneously addressing legitimate 
security concerns, Joint Regional Teams were designed to consist of three parts. They were to 
include mobile Civil Affairs Teams (CATs), a civil-military operations center headquarters, and 
a contingent of combat troops to provide force protection. The JRTs had four primary functions. 
The first consisted of coordinating the activities of the numerous entities involved in 
reconstruction, ranging from NGOs to the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA). Second, JRTs 
would identify possible reconstruction projects that could further improve Afghan civilians‘ 
opinion of coalition and ISAF forces. Third, the teams would conduct village assessments to 
determine the needs of the local populace. Lastly, JRTs were expected to liaise with regional 
commanders on matters relating to security and reconstruction efforts.
88
  
 When the idea of Joint Regional Teams and their intended mission was developed and 
presented to Hamid Karzai, the interim president of the Afghan Transitional Authority, in 
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December 2002, he proved eager to have the teams deployed as soon as possible. Karzai did, 
however, present the United States and its allies with one request: he asked that the title of the 
teams be changed from Joint Regional Teams to Provincial Reconstruction Teams. The Afghan 
president felt that the concept of regional teams promoted factionalism and bolstered the idea of 
regions controlled by warlords. Shifting from the term regional to provincial indicated the 
purpose of the teams was to ―provide support to the government (as opposed to regional power 
brokers or warlords) and to denote reconstruction as the principal activity of the teams.‖89  
 The first PRT was stood up in the city of Gardez in February of 2003. Soon after, teams 
were deployed to the cities of Bamian, Kondoz, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar, and Herat.
90
 By 
October 2005, there were 22 provincial reconstruction teams operating inside Afghanistan, with 
12 of them controlled by US forces. The other PRTs remained under the control of either 
members representing the Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan (CFC-A) or ISAF, led by 
NATO members.
91
         
US PRT Model and Mission 
 The United States government embraced three primary goals they intended PRTs to work 
toward, the first of which involved enhancing security. The US, in conjunction with its coalition 
partners, hoped to create a secure environment where US government agency representatives, 
international aid organizations, NGOs, and United Nations assistance programs could work to 
develop Afghanistan‘s infrastructure. PRTs were intended to achieve this by helping ―defuse 
                                                 
89
 Michael J. Dziedzic and Colonel Michael K. Seidl. ―Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Military Relations with 
International and Nongovernmental Organizations in Afghanistan.‖ United States Institute of Peace Special Report 
147, (September 2005), 3. 
90
 Perito (2005), 2. 
91
 Robert McMahon, ―Afghanistan: PRTs Spreading, Though Impact Remains Unclear,‖ Globalsecurity.org, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/10/mil-051020-rferl02.htm (accessed February 20, 2007). 
  
 
51 
factional fighting, support deployments by the Afghan National Army and police, conduct 
patrols, and reinforce security efforts during the disarming of militias.‖92  
The second goal called for a strengthening of the Afghan central government‘s reach. 
President Hamid Karzai‘s fledgling government was weak and possessed little influence outside 
the capital of Kabul. The US PRTs mission demanded that the teams work in conjunction with 
local provincial leaders on promoting local elections and undertaking quick impact projects. 
These projects, designed to better the Afghan people‘s everyday life, were expected to improve 
the population‘s perception of the central government and thereby solidify Kabul‘s influence 
over the Afghan countryside.  
The last mission goal aimed to facilitate reconstruction in Afghanistan. PRTs were 
designed to directly aid in small reconstruction projects, and more importantly, help 
representatives from different US agencies to implement civilian funded projects. Additionally, 
PRTs were expected to work cooperatively with international aid organizations and NGOs. 
These groups, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and Doctors Without 
Borders, possessed greater experience in certain areas of development, a deeper understanding of 
local customs and culture, and had better access to some volatile regions of the country because 
of their perceived impartiality.
93
 
While all three mission goals were valued as critical components for effective support 
and stability operations in the region, many countries adopted different priorities for operating 
PRTs in Afghanistan. The US PRTs primarily worked toward extending the influence of the 
central government‘s authority and on ―quick impact‖ reconstruction projects. The UK, on the 
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other hand, focused less on physical reconstruction efforts and worked harder to promote 
security sector reform and defuse factional fighting between Afghan tribes.
94
   
Each coalition partner involved in Afghanistan‘s reconstruction followed a particular 
structural model for their PRT. Different states varied the amount of military and civilian 
personnel in the teams, leadership roles, PRT mission statements, and rules of engagement 
(ROE). According to a special report written by the United States Institute of Peace, ―the size 
and composition of US PRTs vary depending on maturity, local circumstances, and the 
availability of personnel from civilian agencies. Combined Forces Command (CFC) does, 
however, have a model, which US PRTs generally emulate.‖95 
 As of 2006 American PRTs consisted of less than 100 personnel. The teams were led by 
an Army Lieutenant Colonel who commanded approximately 82 other civilian and military 
members. Civilian components included a representative from the State Department, United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA), and Agency for International Development (USAID), 
although in some cases contractors filled in for USAID officials.
96
 PRTs also incorporated a 
member of the Afghan Ministry of the Interior (MOI), in most situations represented by an 
officer from the Afghan National Police, and three or more local interpreters. 
 The military component of the PRT was represented by a number of specialized Army 
units. An Army officer, normally a ranking Lieutenant Colonel along with his command staff, 
always commanded the teams. Each PRT, depending on regional demands, was expected to have 
two Army civil affairs teams; a military police unit; a psychological operations unit (PSYOP); 
explosive ordnance/de-mining unit (EOD); intelligence team; medics; force protection unit, 
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normally composed of a 40-man infantry platoon; and administrative support and personnel.
97
 
Each of these PRT elements played different roles in promoting the team‘s mission and its 
interaction with the local civilian population. 
 The US PRT commander‘s duties included, first and foremost, acting as a liaison with 
key Afghan government and civilian personnel. Considering the primary mission of PRTs 
demanded an extension of the Afghan government‘s control over its territory, constant 
communication with key local officials remained critical for efficient coordination. The 
commander maintained contact with provincial governors, police chiefs, mayors, and any other 
influential figures such as tribal leaders who possessed influence over the region. Because 
international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) often worked in 
US PRT areas of operations, the commander, while not required to, regularly acted as a liaison 
with these groups as well. The commander also routinely attended meetings of the Provincial 
Development Council, where they met with local Afghan officials to coordinate development 
projects, and with Combined Forces Command (CFC) to coordinate military operations with 
combat units located within the PRTs vicinity. Lastly, the commander sat in control of the team‘s 
Project Review Committee, which reviewed and decided on which projects to undertake and 
fund.  
 According to Robert Perito, an expert on post-conflict peace and stability operations, 
PRT State Department representatives ―have no standard job description,‖ and served primarily 
as political advisers to PRT commanders and Afghan provincial governors. They also operated 
as members of the Project Review Committee and often acted as a key source for reporting PRT 
activities to the US embassy in Kabul. In many cases, State Department officers represented the 
PRTs principle source of information regarding local culture and politics. 
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 The representative from the USAID was tasked with acting as the team commander‘s and 
Afghan provincial governor‘s main adviser on topics related to development. Much like State 
Department officials, USAID members reported directly to the US embassy in Kabul on the local 
government‘s suitability and capacity for development projects. Representatives also worked as 
key members of the Project Review Committee and directly interacted with Army civil affair 
teams and local NGOs to maximize the impact of development projects.  
 USDA representatives were selected from a number of different areas of specialty, 
ranging from veterinarians to soil specialists. According to a report from the USDA website:  
Representatives served as agriculture advisors working actively with the PRT Commander, aid 
organizations, and the national and local governments to enable, support, and foster reconstruction 
of the Afghan agricultural sector and to help build the ability of the central government to support 
and provide services to the agricultural sector.
98
  
 
USDA projects included cotton and soybean variety trials, animal health issues, water 
management and irrigation systems, farm planning, and alternative livelihoods to opium poppy 
production.
99
 
 Along with the PRT commander, Army Civil Affairs Teams constituted one of the more 
important military elements involved in actual Afghan reconstruction efforts. These teams, 
comprised of four soldiers each, were tasked with assessing the needs of the local population and 
viability of providing for those needs. Each team had a different role to play with Civil Affairs 
―A‖ teams: 
Conducting assessments of reconstruction needs and contracting with Afghan firms to build 
schools, clinics, bridges and wells. Civil Affairs ―B‖ Teams operated the PRTs Civil Military 
Operations Center and coordinated with the UNAMA regional office and international NGOs 
engaged in providing humanitarian relief and development assistance.
100
  
 
Obstacles to Interagency Coordination within US PRTs 
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 Provincial reconstruction teams were designed and structured to integrate military and 
civilian agencies so they might coordinate a joint effort in establishing security, extending the 
influence of the Afghan central government, and promoting reconstruction. In order to achieve 
this goal, intense cooperation between the military and the various civilian entities proved critical 
for meeting the diverse security, political, and cultural environments present throughout 
Afghanistan. FM 3-24, the Army‘s new guidebook for counterinsurgency, states: ―Military 
efforts are necessary and important to counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts, but they are only 
effective when integrated into a comprehensive strategy employing all instruments of national 
power.‖101 Considering that PRTs implement such a strategy, it is imperative to identify any 
obstacles that hamper or retard the teams‘ ability to accomplish their mission.  
An assessment of civil-military coordination within US PRTs from 2003 until early 2006 
showed an interagency process that varied in its levels of effectiveness.
102
 Provincial 
reconstruction teams were designed to be flexible so they could best fit the different needs of the 
34 Afghan provinces. This adaptability also subjected PRTs to different challenges, making it 
difficult to identify broad problems that affected most US PRTs‘ interagency coordination. 
Additionally, interviews of civilian and military PRT members conducted by the United States 
Institute of Peace (USIP),
103
 rather than recognizing uniform problems, indicated that a high 
turnover rate for PRT personnel presented a diverse array of opinions on the quality of 
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cooperation between team members. In spite of these challenges, an assessment of US PRTs 
identified five prevalent obstacles which had a negative impact on the interagency process within 
these teams. 
The first factor causing difficulties for interagency coordination in US Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams was the lack of clear guidelines and mission goals for key PRT personnel. 
As previously mentioned, the teams were structured to be flexible and adaptive to regional needs. 
In order to maintain this flexibility, the designers of the PRT concept believed that creating a 
static set of guidelines prevented teams from sustaining the malleability necessary for adapting to 
their region-specific operational needs.
104
 One author, however, describes how this mentality 
adversely affected team coordination: 
Absent an established concept of operations and a clear set of guidelines for civil-military 
interaction, PRT commanders and civilians had to improvise. This was problematic because 
military officers and civilian agency personnel came from different ‗corporate cultures‘ and had 
different, sometimes competing mandates. Without an interagency pre-agreement on individual 
roles, missions, and job descriptions, it took time and trial and error to achieve a common 
understanding of mission priorities.
105
 
  
More often than not, PRT personnel, especially representatives from civilian agencies, found 
themselves in-country with little understanding of the specific role they were expected to fulfill. 
The fact that other team members often proved incapable of providing new arrivals with 
operational guidelines due to the uncertainty of their own specific PRT roles exacerbated the 
situation.  
 While adaptability remained an important feature for provincial reconstruction teams, the 
lack of individual mission descriptions sacrificed productivity and cohesion between team 
members. A Foreign Service Officer (FSO) who spent four months stationed in the Parwan PRT 
as the State Department representative, commented that his initial deployment to Afghanistan 
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was devoid of any operational instruction. During an interview with USIP he stated ―nobody 
really gave me any guidance. I was just basically cut loose and told ‗Okay, you‘re at the PRT‘ 
and that was about it. Nobody told me anything. I had no idea what my function, what my role 
was going to be.‖106 Under these circumstances, a key member of an interagency team spent the 
first few weeks of a relatively short deployment uninformed of his duties and incapable of 
fulfilling a meaningful role within his PRT.  
Not all civilians assigned to provincial reconstruction teams experienced the same lack of 
instruction. Analysis of other State Department and USAID representatives‘ interviews 
demonstrated that, in some cases, individuals did receive limited instruction from their respective 
agencies, or the PRT commander, regarding the functions they should carry out. Civilian team 
members also attempted to identify their roles through research and communication with 
acquaintances possessing PRT experience.  The fact remains, however, that an established 
system for disseminating guidelines and individual mission statements did not exist and the 
amount of research, as well as experienced personnel, was minute due to the recent nature of 
PRT operations in Afghanistan. 
The second obstacle impacting interagency coordination in US PRTs involved the rigid 
and military-oriented structure of teams. A United States Army Lieutenant Colonel, or Major in 
the case of smaller sized teams, always commanded American provincial reconstruction 
teams.
107
 Officially, PRT doctrine dictated that civilian representatives from the State 
Department and USAID take the lead on political and reconstruction issues, while the 
commander had authority over matters related to security. Yet, according to a USAID 
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interagency report, ―PRT culture, people, and resources were predominantly military.‖108 This 
factor created a sense of military dominance which, in some instances, caused interagency 
cooperation to suffer. The combination of a lack of mission guidance, along with the 
predominance of military staffing, created a scenario in which personalities played a 
disproportionate role (especially the personality of the PRT commander) in determining the 
direction of PRT efforts.
109
  In a situation where the vast majority of the team was comprised of 
military personnel, and most of the resources came from the Department of Defense, it became 
very easy for a commander to feel the unit‘s focus and projects should be military in nature. 
Civil-military tensions ran highest during the initial stages of PRT development. As 
previously mentioned, limited or a complete lack of guidance on mission and individual roles 
resulted in considerable friction between military and civilian personnel. One author describes 
how: 
Many of the State Department personnel and other civilians on the team had military experience, 
but this did not reduce civil-military tensions. On the contrary, some of the harshest criticisms of 
the military personnel on PRTs came from retired military members of the team. During one of the 
author‘s trips to a PRT, a member of the team confided, ―Those briefing slides look good, but this 
place is completely dysfunctional.‖ Civilians complained that the military personnel on the PRTs 
were reluctant to support them and treated them as outsiders.
110
     
 
In a June 2006 Interagency Assessment written by the USAID, its authors determined that 
situations, such as the one referred to above, in which the PRT commander failed to integrate 
―non-DoD‖ team components into leadership decisions caused the overall mission of the team to 
suffer.
111
 
 PRTs not only had to contend with civil-military tensions within the teams, in some 
instances their attachment to larger combat maneuver units created external influences that 
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negatively impacted a wider interagency process. Provincial reconstruction teams, depending on 
their location and the security environment they faced, often worked alongside larger combat 
units or task forces. The teams were expected to coordinate with these larger units to supplement 
their force protection and work jointly to diffuse regional political challenges. The combat 
maneuver units also provided additional military cover that allowed PRTs to function in wider 
areas of operations or in regions with greater security threats. These relationships, however, were 
not always cooperative or cordial. Robert Perito states that ―in some cases combat units looked 
down on PRTs and treated their civilian affairs teams and National Guard units as ‗not real 
soldiers‘ who required protection. In extreme instances, tension between soldiers in PRTs and 
those in combat units precluded cooperation.‖112      
The case of a PRT civil affairs (CA) member, who was a retired Foreign Service officer, 
spoke Farsi, and had previous operational experience in Afghanistan, illustrates the interagency 
difficulty between some teams and the combat units they were attached to. Assigned to the PRT 
located at Herat for a few months, this CA member‘s role was to act as a political and cultural 
adviser to the team commander and other civil affairs members. Task Force Saber, a combat unit 
charged with disarmament efforts and general security of the area, was also present in the region. 
In a situation such as this, the military officer in charge of the task force outranked the PRT 
commander. The CA member explained that the task force commander assumed a very active 
role in the political affairs of the region, which was dominated by the volatile warlord Ismael 
Khan. According to USIP interview transcripts, the task force commander, lacking any civil 
affairs advisers of his own, refused to accept any counsel from the PRT CA cultural and political 
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specialist and ignored advice from other civil affairs members when it came to selecting 
reconstruction projects.
113
                
It is important to note that there were many cases in which the high proportion of military 
staff and resources in PRTs did not hamper interagency coordination. In these instances, PRT 
commanders went out of their ways to integrate civilian personnel in key decision processes and 
project implementation. The important factors to consider in these cases are that US PRTs were 
always led by military personnel, and insufficient guidance existed for directing commanders to 
integrate civilian team members into key decision-making processes.
114
  
 The third challenge that threatened the US PRT interagency process involved poor tour 
synchronization and team deployment policies. The sudden and ad hoc nature of PRT 
development resulted in considerable personnel gaps, poorly established team member 
relationships, and periods of relative disjointedness among PRT staff. The combination of teams 
being assembled in theater, in addition to different tour lengths for the various civilian agencies 
involved, ultimately had a degenerative affect on interagency coordination.
115
 
 Two main factors influenced the deployment lengths of civilian personnel to PRTs in 
Afghanistan. The first involved the volunteer basis for acquiring civilian representatives. The 
Department of State, USAID and USDA could not force employees to accept a posting in a 
hazardous working environment such as Afghanistan. In the initial stages of PRT development, 
keeping tour lengths between three and six months acted as an enticement for volunteers who 
might not want to spend longer periods of time in country.
116
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The security environment and location of PRTs acted as a second factor. Some locations 
with higher insurgent activity were viewed as hardship posts and civilian agencies found it 
difficult to find people willing to spend more than three months at these PRTs. One State 
Department representative who served two 90 day tours at PRTs in Jalalabad and Tarin Kowt 
explains:  
I basically went to places that nobody else wanted to go, and actually places I didn‘t want to go. 
So, that‘s why I went 90 days. But they prefer at least six months and would really like to have 
you for a year. It was either me at 90 days or nobody. So they took me. Ninety days was their bare 
minimum.
117
   
 
Both civilian and military team members regularly admitted that 90-day deployments were too 
short to establish effective working relationships. They described an environment in which PRT 
staff cycled in every three to six months, at a time when team members finishing their 
deployments were up to speed and had a unified vision of the way to proceed with PRT projects. 
The replacement of these members with new ones forced many teams to start from scratch, 
thereby nullifying much of the progress previously achieved.
118
 
 Poor tour synchronization among the civilian agencies also led to gaps within key PRT 
positions. Ample cases existed in which teams lacked State Department, USAID, or USDA 
representatives because former members finished their tours and were not immediately replaced 
by their corresponding agencies. One PRT commander interviewed commented on this 
challenge: ―there was no consultation about which State officers would be posted at what PRTs, 
and on what schedule. This resulted in gaps at critical times.‖119 In these situations PRT 
commanders often scoured the ranks of military personnel with civil affairs training to fill in 
civilian gaps and took the lead on political and reconstruction issues.
120
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 Michael J. McNerney, Director of International Policy and Capabilities in the Office of 
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, stated that toward the end of 
2003 plans were made to extend civilian representatives‘ tours to one year.121 Yet, a review of 
over 50 PRT members‘ tour length, from different agencies, showed a wide span of deployment 
lengths ranging from three months to one year, with the average being around six months. The 
deployment of military personnel and commanders appeared far more consistent, however, with 
most tours lasting approximately one year.  
 The creation of provincial reconstruction teams in theater was another critical factor 
related to US PRT deployment. As new provincial reconstruction teams emerged to spread the 
―ISAF effect,‖ US team members were simply assigned to their new postings and rarely, if ever, 
had any contact with other PRT components until they arrived on-site. Consequences of this 
policy included periods of lost productivity and a lack of civil-military coordination as teams 
took time to build internal relationships and align their individual mission roles with that of the 
team‘s overarching mission. A lack of civilian representatives with interagency team experience 
and understanding of the military further retarded initial cooperation.
122
 
 The training, or lack thereof, provided to civilian agencies and key military figures 
composing provincial reconstruction teams represented the fourth obstacle to interagency 
cooperation. In the case of US PRTs, no implemented training regimen existed for State 
Department, USAID, or USDA officials prior to their deployment.
123
 One of the primary 
complaints of these officials was that they received little if any instruction on how to operate 
within a military-dominated or interagency environment. Additionally, the Department of State, 
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USAID and US Army provided minimal guidance or instruction about the cultural and 
sociopolitical surroundings civilians and military PRT personnel were expected to operate in. 
 The integration of numerous agencies into a team of individuals expected to coordinate 
with one another required that the different components have a basic understanding of each 
other‘s institutional culture and standard operating procedures. Thrusting civilian representatives 
with poor understanding of the armed forces into a military-dominated group such as a PRT 
often resulted in poor understanding and communication between team members. The same rang 
true for military personnel with no experience working with civilians. Fortunately, a good 
portion of the civilian representatives assigned to US PRTs either had prior military service or 
working experience with military personnel.
124
  Most PRT commanders also possessed 
backgrounds working in joint operating environments with civilians. In spite of this fact, no pre-
deployment training existed for civilian representatives lacking in civil-military work experience. 
One State Department official who served in a PRT commented that ―getting some sort of 
acquaintance with military structures and military operations would be very useful. There are a 
lot of acronyms that fly around and a lot of things that are just common language for everybody 
involved with the military and really alien for people who aren‘t.‖125 
 Civilian and military PRT members also complained about the lack of language and 
cultural training they received prior to their assignments. Civilians and military civil affairs 
members often acted as political and cultural advisers to team commanders and were expected to 
use their knowledge to recommend reconstruction projects that would be beneficial to the local 
Afghan populace. A poor understanding of the local culture or basic native language skills not 
only affected the ability of PRTs to function within Afghanistan, it ultimately had a negative 
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impact on interagency cooperation within PRTs. One commander assigned to the PRT in 
Jalalabad claimed that he inquired about a pre-command course to prepare him for his role, he 
was told that there would be no pre-deployment training and, in fact, no such course existed.
126
  
State Department representatives vented similar frustrations with their agency‘s failure to 
institute a language or cultural training regimen prior to their assignments. Many PRT 
Department of State representatives were selected based on their prior backgrounds, experience 
in the region, and linguistic abilities. In some cases former Foreign Service Officers were 
brought out of retirement to serve in PRTs. When interviewed by USIP, a high percentage of 
these representatives stated they wished the Department of State had provided them with more 
time and resources to either learn, or brush up on language skills and cultural aspects of 
Afghanistan. One representative from the State Department described his pre-deployment 
language training as two weeks of self-taught practice and a Rosetta Stone audio guide.
127
  
Ultimately, the absence of sufficient training designed to increase PRT members‘ understanding 
of the cultural environment in which they operated added to the obstacles PRTs faced for 
interagency coordination.
128
      
The fifth impediment to interagency coordination faced by US PRTs involved the staffing 
and resources provided by civilian agencies. The Department of State, USAID, and USDA 
proved incapable of supplying sufficient representatives with proper backgrounds to satisfy the 
increased demand PRTs created. Civilian agencies also fell short when it came to supplying their 
representatives with necessary logistics and resources to effectively carry out their missions. 
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These two factors increased friction between civil-military relations and impeded team 
coordination. 
 Many of the USAID, State Department and USDA representatives were described as 
being inexperienced junior officials or Personal Services Contractors hired because of staffing 
shortages.
129
 PRTs lacked senior-level civilian professionals with experience operating under 
diverse cultures and within interagency teams. This situation created a gap between the military 
and civilian personnel. A PRT interagency assessment report by the USAID explains this 
disparity: 
Military and civilian representatives were doing extraordinary work under very difficult 
conditions. They were smart, energetic, and dedicated. However, junior or non-direct hired staff 
civilian representatives often lacked experience with and knowledge of their own agencies. By 
comparison, most military counterparts had 16-20 years experience prior to PRT command.
130
 
 
Because of this experience gap, military commanders, in some cases, felt their civilian 
representatives were unqualified and therefore alienated them from the decision-making process 
and project implementation. At the same time, civilian representatives, who represented a 
minority of PRT personnel, with minimal training and poor logistical support from their 
respective agencies, found it difficult to establish their credibility and promote their ideas. 
 Even when civilian agencies were capable of providing provincial reconstruction teams 
with representatives, they lacked the necessary funding and resources to adequately support their 
staff in the field. In the initial stages of PRT development neither the State Department nor 
USAID supplied their team representatives with independent funding for reconstruction projects. 
The Department of Defense provided all the financing for reconstruction projects using Overseas 
Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) and Commander Emergency Response 
Program (CERP) funds. By 2004, however, funding availability for PRTs improved and 
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Department of State and USAID supplied their representatives with independent financial 
resources.
131
 Even with the addition of separate funding, civilian representatives still depended 
on the PRT military component to provide for transportation, interpreters and other essential 
operational resources.
132
  One interviewed civilian PRT member stated, ―I do wish the 
Department of State provided more than just one person. I think that we‘d be more effective if 
we had our own interpreters, our own transportation, and some programming funds to be able to 
bring to the table.‖133  The added burden of providing resources for civilian representatives, 
which should have been supplied by their corresponding agencies, sometimes frayed interagency 
cooperation between military and non-DoD personnel. 
 It is important to note that the five discussed obstacles to interagency coordination in the 
US provincial reconstruction teams were not present in every situation. There were cases in 
which PRT commanders eagerly integrated civilian agencies in the decision-making process and 
accepted counsel on cultural and political matters. Additionally, on certain occasions, US PRTs 
had no trouble discerning the roles different agency representatives needed to fulfill in spite of an 
absence of clear guidelines. There were also instances in which civilian representatives had 
extensive backgrounds in Afghan culture and language abilities, proving indispensable to the 
team‘s mission. An analysis of PRT assessments in conjunction with interviews with former 
team personnel, however, revealed that on a number of occasions the above-mentioned 
challenges created significant barriers to effective interagency cooperation, hampering the 
overall mission. 
Recommendations 
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 Establishing solutions and integrating operational guidelines to create seamless 
cooperation between the different components of US PRTs is a far more daunting task than 
identifying the challenges that obstruct team coordination. Yet, there are reasonable solutions to 
improving many of the complications that plagued the interagency process within American 
provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan. These solutions involve a milieu of different 
approaches, including: changes to team command structure; the implementation of individual 
mission/role guidelines; various pre-deployment training programs; increased participation from 
civilian agencies; and assessments of other nations‘ PRT models. 
 The first recommendation designed to improve coordination within US PRTs is the 
creation of leadership opportunities for civilians. Allowing both military and civilian personnel 
to command PRTs, depending on the conditions of the region, would create a flexible command 
structure supporting the concept of PRT adaptability. Second, leadership positions for civilians 
could address the prevalent complaint denoting PRTs lack of senior-level officials with extensive 
experience.
134
  
One of the key advantages of provincial reconstruction teams was the notion of their 
adaptability. The idea that teams remained flexible and molded their missions and operational 
procedures to fit the various cultural and political environments present in Afghanistan proved 
essential for effectiveness. Yet, this flexibility did not seem to apply to leadership demands. It 
makes perfect sense that military commanders take the leading role in a PRT's activities in 
regions affected by high levels of insurgent activity with poor security conditions. Under these 
circumstances it is critical that the team‘s focus remain on the security of its members and of the 
Afghan populace within its area of operations. In environments where security is less of a 
concern, however, a civilian team leader could prove more effective in promoting the PRTs 
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mission and improving interagency coordination. This rationale is supported by one author who 
believes that establishing civilian command of PRTs allows the entire team to align its focus 
along the same axis, establishing more unified operational policies and team coordination.
135
 
There are two additional advantages to creating leadership opportunities for civilian PRT 
members. First, having a civilian leader within a military-dominated structure could act as a 
balancing factor. As previously mentioned, PRT staff and resources were predominantly 
supplied by the Department of Defense, aligning PRT culture with the military and, in some 
cases, marginalizing civilian representatives.
136
 Placing a non-DoD official in charge of the civil-
military teams, in regions where the security environment allows, could present a more efficient 
way to promote interagency cooperation. One former PRT member mirrored this sentiment and 
claimed: 
I think you need, understanding the challenge, senior level experience managers to be assigned for 
the civilian leadership piece and civilian leadership on interaction with the local government as 
well as on a PRT. Any other additional staff needs to be subordinate to a civilian leader who can 
then be the counterpart to the military liaison. I think that would go a long way towards managing 
relations, managing priorities, and working towards how you can de-conflict and develop 
complementary approaches between the civil affairs teams of the military and the civilian 
agencies.
137
 
 
 While PRT resources and personnel would still be overrepresented by the military, the decision-
making process would be mainly under the auspices of a senior civilian representative, most 
likely from the Department of State. This PRT structure creates a far more uniform dispersal of 
influence between civilian and military components, forcing the different members of the team to 
coordinate their efforts in order to achieve their mission. 
The second advantage attained by creating US PRT leadership positions for civilians is 
the recruiting potential within non-DoD agencies. The possibility of a command role in teams 
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designed for SSTR operations could entice senior-level civilians, with extensive experience, to 
seek assignment in the US PRTs, especially if it is a way to get promoted. The context in which 
civilians view their assignments to PRTs is essential. If most civilians, especially senior-level 
officials, see deployment to PRTs as having a negative or irrelevant impact on their future career 
advancement they will remain unwilling to accept such hardship posts. Placing State Department 
or other non-military staff in charge of provincial reconstruction teams, however, could make 
assignment to the teams a coveted position because of the leadership experience gained while in 
Afghanistan. Having a greater number of qualified and experienced civilian personnel within US 
provincial reconstruction teams would clear a significant obstacle hindering interagency 
coordination. Doing so would aid in establishing a higher degree of confidence team members 
have in each other‘s ability to fulfill their individual roles, therefore increasing their willingness 
to cooperate with one another.    
 Lessons from the German PRT model, which operated out of Konduz, provide important 
insight into a PRT structure under civilian leadership. The German provincial reconstruction 
team possessed a considerably different design from the US model. Termed as a ―heavy PRT‖ by 
Colonel Gerd Brandstetter, of the US Army War College, the German team, with 400 plus 
personnel, consisted of more than triple the amount of staff in ―light‖ American PRTs.138  
Brandstetter describes the PRT at Konduz as an ―inter-ministerial venture between the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), the Ministry of the Interior (MoI), the Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (MoEC) and the Ministry of Defense (MoD).‖139  Heavy 
involvement from German civilian agencies supplemented the large military task force, 
responsible for protecting and facilitating PRT mission goals, with a separate, ―robust‖ 
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contingent of civilian representatives.
140
  In contrast to the US model, and due to a more relaxed 
security environment in the region, the German PRT at Konduz had a senior member from the 
MoFA placed in command of the team. This leadership structure made the German military 
commander, who took the lead on all operational facets linked to security issues, subordinate and 
responsible for coordination with the MoFA in all PRT related matters. Ultimately, the German 
PRT leadership structure, in conjunction with the support of civilian components, allowed the 
team in Konduz to foster strong interagency coordination among team members in spite of a 
strong military presence.
141
 
A second recommendation that could prove useful in establishing better interagency 
cooperation in US PRTs is the establishment of specific guidelines that explain the roles, 
missions, and authority of individual team members.
142
 A Foreign Service Officer who spent 
over a year deployed in Afghanistan explains: 
So, a lesson learned right up front is, if you‘re going to have these types of entities like a PRT and 
even now people need to be fully briefed up on the interagency, the role of the PRT, what they do 
and don‘t do, have the documentation, understand what the expectations for these bodies are, and 
to right up front, before either getting deployed or going out to visit, have a sense of what a PRT 
strategy is.
143
 
 
While it remains important to maintain PRTs and their methods of operation adaptable to 
regional demands, keeping the roles of team personnel obscure and unclearly outlined does more 
harm than good. The confusion and uncertainty many PRT members, especially civilian 
representatives, suffered from during their initial tours in Afghanistan, which wasted time, 
resources, and hampered interagency coordination, must be improved. Disseminating guidelines 
prior to deployment that delineate the duties each PRT component is expected to fulfill, and the 
specific areas which it has authority over, is a solution to overcome this obstacle. 
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These guidelines will have two positive impacts on the interagency process of US PRTs. 
First, they will eliminate some of the confusion many team members experienced when first 
deployed to PRTs. While it is always somewhat bewildering to work within a new environment, 
especially one as alien and diverse as Afghanistan, having a clear notion of your mission and role 
provides a platform from which to operate. When PRT representatives deployed to their teams 
without understanding their functions, they were, in some cases, marginalized by other PRT 
components. If all agencies provide their representatives with a clearer understanding of their 
team functions, however, the different PRT components are far more likely to coordinate 
effectively.
144
  Even if the changing demands PRTs must meet in the various regions of 
Afghanistan make it necessary to evolve individual missions, it is easier to do so when team 
members have a fundamental understanding of their roles within the PRT. 
Interagency pre-deployment guidance would also inform many of the civilian PRT 
representatives of the authority they possess within the team. From the initial stages of PRT 
development, representatives from the Department of State and USAID were expected to take 
the lead in all matters related to governance and reconstruction. Yet, according to a government 
report, ―very few PRT staff, civilian or military, understood or had seen US national policy 
guidance on their roles within the PRT.‖145 As a result, on several occasions, military personnel 
identified the civilian team components as advisors rather than decision makers. Civilians, 
unaware that US policy put them in charge of reconstruction and governance matters, found it 
difficult to impose their guidance on such issues due to the predominance of military personnel 
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and resources. Disseminating clearer guidelines to all US PRT components prior to their 
deployment would prevent the misinterpretation of team members‘ roles within the civil-military 
group. Civilian representatives would be able to assume responsibilities in their respective areas 
of expertise while working closely with the military commanders; ultimately, developing 
interagency cooperation as individual missions are aligned for a unified team strategy. 
Significant joint pre-deployment training for US PRTs is the third recommendation 
intended to improve interagency coordination among team components. Michael McNerney, 
who worked on Provincial Reconstruction Team policy for the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, states that, ―Military and civilian personnel should be educated, trained, and equipped 
for stabilization and reconstruction missions in tandem, and not six weeks before deployment but 
over their entire careers.‖146  One of the major complaints from former PRT members 
interviewed by USIP involved the lack of training available to them prior to their deployment. 
Both civilian and military personnel stressed the importance of receiving training on the cultural 
background of Afghanistan; instruction on languages such as Pashto, Dari or Farsi; and guidance 
on how to operate within an interagency environment.
147
 Requiring all members to undergo such 
training, especially as a team, provides significant benefits to their ability to coordinate with each 
other once in theater. 
Training together as a team prior to deployment is essential for developing good working 
relationships between team members. It takes time and a concerted effort from all parties to 
develop trust and proper communication between individuals—factors critical to good 
interagency coordination. Expecting these relationships to blossom immediately when PRTs are 
assembled in theater is wishful thinking as well as a waste of time and resources. Requiring that 
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team members train and deploy together allows individuals to gain insight into the capabilities of 
other PRT components, so they know how best to communicate and interact with them prior to 
conducting operations in theater.     
PRT representatives not only need to establish individual bonds with other team 
members, they must gain at least a rudimentary understanding of how agencies other than their 
own operate and are structured. By training alongside the military, civilian PRT representatives 
will gain a basic understanding of the military chain of command, standard operating procedures, 
and lexicon. Military personnel can gain valuable insight into their civilian counterparts‘ 
operational strengths and limitations as well as important interagency work experience. 
Numerous sources point out the British and some ISAF countries as an example to emulate in 
respect to joint pre-deployment training. Prior to the United Kingdom‘s establishment of a PRT 
at Mazar-e-Sharif, both civilian and military members were subjected to joint training before 
being deployed and supported as a team.
148
 According to a US government report, some ISAF 
countries ―identify PRT members as much as a year in advance and have the members undergo 
significant training together.‖149 This critical preparation allowed British and ISAF PRT 
components to attain substantial understanding of the structure and abilities of the different 
agencies involved, resulting in high levels of interagency coordination.
150
 
Joint training and deployment for US PRT members also creates a partial solution to the 
challenges posed by poor tour synchronization. Eliminating the ad hoc manner in which PRTs 
were assembled by sending the team in as a group, and requiring all personnel to undergo pre-
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deployment training, reduces much of the confusion experienced by members when first arriving 
in theater. In order to complement PRT joint deployment, civilian and military tours need to be 
standardized and made uniform as a way to prevent premature rotation of personnel as well as 
gaps in key staffing positions.
151
      
Perito writes that ―at a minimum, State Department and USAID representatives should 
receive pre-deployment introduction in Dari or Pashto, briefings on Afghan society and culture, 
and orientation on the unique requirements of working with the US military.‖152 The availability 
of cultural and language training to more effectively operate in the diverse regions that compose 
Afghanistan will create greater trust in State Department and USAID representatives assigned to 
US PRTs. Making these individuals indispensable to the PRT commanders as well as the Army 
civil affairs component will increase their willingness to actively integrate civilian 
representatives into the team‘s decision-making process, especially in matters related to 
governance and reconstruction.  
Efforts were made by the US military to institute a PRT pre-deployment training regimen 
in late 2004.  PRT commanders began receiving unit-sponsored training and the military, in 
collaboration with the National Defense University, initiated development of a leadership PRT 
instruction program. These efforts need to be emulated and supported by civilian agencies. The 
State Department, USAID, and USDA should strongly consider both creating their own agency-
specific programs, and sending their representatives to military training programs. The 
Department of State‘s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, established 
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in 2004, should make an effort to become the driving force in the integration of civil-military 
training programs for future PRT deployments.
153
 
The fourth and final recommendation demands an increase of civilian involvement and 
support for PRTs. Implementing training programs in addition to staffing and supporting PRT 
operations demands a significant increase of funding and personnel from civilian agencies. 
Undoubtedly, financial and budgetary constraints on the State Department, USAID, and USDA 
make this goal a difficult one, yet increased civilian participation remains essential for the 
continued improvement of interagency coordination within PRTs.
154
 Additionally, the costs of 
training are relatively inexpensive compared to the financial and political costs incurred when 
opportunities are lost and mistakes are made because of dysfunctional PRTs.        
When civilian agencies failed to produce adequate numbers of representatives to staff 
PRTs in Afghanistan, other team components had to fill in the void. A representative from the 
Department of State assigned to the Herat PRT illustrated this problem: 
Every PRT is supposed to have one civilian each from the Department of State, USAID and the 
Department of Agriculture in addition to one Afghan Ministry of Interior representative. My PRT 
didn‘t have any of those people, so USAID, in the absence of any of their employees, would 
delegate their duties to State, so the whole time I was there I was also wearing a USAID hat.
155
 
 
Relegating important duties to representatives who are not specifically trained for such work can 
be unproductive and cause disruptions in interagency coordination. Civilian agencies must make 
an effort to provide sufficient personnel to PRTs so that teams consistently have the correct staff 
to carry out all the roles necessary to fulfill the team‘s mission. 
 In addition to producing enough personnel to staff PRTs, civilian agencies need to 
adequately supply their representatives with ample resources so they are not dependent on the 
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team‘s military component for logistical support or funding for reconstruction projects.156 
Civilian PRT members often found themselves at the mercy of the military staff for 
transportation and other needs that should have been delivered by their respective agencies. This 
resulted in a disproportionate level of military influence within US PRTs. Agricultural specialists 
deployed to PRTs, for example, received no funding whatsoever from the USDA. They were 
relegated to accessing financial resources from the Commanders Emergency Response Program 
Fund (CERP) pending the military commander‘s approval.157  Providing civilian representatives 
with control over the majority of resources assigned for PRT quick impact projects would 
improve interagency cooperation within the military dominated teams.  
The British PRT model illustrates how civilian control of reconstruction funds improves 
team cooperation. While the UK‘s PRT located at Mazar-e-Sharif was under the command of a 
military officer, a civilian representative was in control of the majority of funding resources. 
According to Michael McNerney: 
The UK military relied on its government‘s Department for International Development for funding 
assistance projects. While this limited the military‘s freedom of action, it may well have been a 
blessing in disguise. UK military personnel coordinated closely with their civilian agency 
counterparts in order to access their funding.
158
   
     
In the case of US PRTs, the majority of readily accessible resources dedicated for reconstruction 
projects should be provided or placed under the control of USAID or State Department 
representatives. 
 It is important to mention that USAID staff deployed to PRTs did have access to 
considerable resources from the Quick Impact Program (QIP), a funding mechanism with $137.3 
million designed to support reconstruction projects in the USAID representatives‘ area of 
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operations.
159
  In spite of QIP, projects funded with USAID money were difficult to authorize 
and progressed considerably slower than assistance projects financed through DoD CERP 
funds.
160
  One former PRT member claimed that during his deployment to Afghanistan ―not one 
red cent‖ of USAID money was spent in the entire six months he was present.161  It does little 
good for civilian agencies to provide resources such as those in the QIP when their 
representatives cannot easily access or employ them to achieve their missions.  
These recommendations by no means cover all the efforts that must be made to improve 
cooperation within US PRTs. They do, however, address and suggest solutions to some of the 
major obstacles that hampered interagency coordination within US PRTs operating in 
Afghanistan from 2003 until early 2006. The creation of leadership positions for civilians; 
establishing clear guidance on individual team member roles; requiring joint pre-deployment 
training; increasing civilian participation in PRTs; and assessing best practices from other 
nations‘ PRT models are all realistic and achievable objectives that provide tangible benefits for 
future cooperation within US provincial reconstruction teams. 
Recent PRT Developments 
 The use of PRTs to aid in SSTR operations did not diminish after the 2006 timeframe that 
this case study is based on. In fact, efforts have been made to expand the number of PRTs 
operating in Afghanistan using NATO and Coalition forces. As of 2006, all PRTs supporting 
Operation Enduring Freedom were placed under ISAF command and subject to management by 
NATO and Coalition forces.
162
  PRTs are also being deployed in support of Operation Iraqi 
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Freedom. As of November 2006 there were 10 operational PRTs located throughout Iraq with 
plans for an increase in their numbers.
163
  In January of 2007, President Bush, during his address 
to the nation illustrating ―The New Way Forward‖ in Iraq, called for a doubling of PRTs 
deployed in Iraq.
164
  Due to the increased demand for provincial reconstruction teams in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq, some changes have been made to US PRT structure and deployment 
policy, based on lessons derived from the experience of earlier teams. Reviewing some of these 
key changes provides insight into the US government‘s efforts to improve interagency 
coordination within PRTs. 
 One of the most notable differences between earlier US PRTs in Afghanistan and current 
ones operating in Iraq is the leadership and civil-military composition of the teams. As 
previously outlined, PRTs in Afghanistan had an Army lieutenant colonel commander and were 
predominantly staffed by military personnel. According to a senior program officer at USIP, 
PRTs in Iraq are ―led by a senior State Department official and composed primarily of civilian 
personnel.‖165  The ten new teams sent as part of President Bush‘s expansion of the PRT 
program will be embedded with US Army brigade combat teams (BCT) to provide necessary 
force protection. The military commander of the BCT will assume charge of all matters related to 
security while the PRT‘s civilian leader will have control on all economic and governance 
issues.
166
  
 The restructuring of PRT command and personnel composition shows a genuine attempt 
to integrate civilian agencies and their representatives into the civil-military teams. Providing 
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larger numbers of civilian staff and placing a senior State Department official as commander of 
the PRTs illustrates how attempts have been made to institute a uniform level of influence 
among the team. Under this new structure, interagency cooperation should increase because 
military personnel will have little choice but to coordinate with their civilian commanders while 
civilian agencies must continue to rely on the military for protection. 
 Another major change is the creation of joint training programs for DoD staff, reservists, 
contractors, and other interagency personnel. New PRTs deployed to Iraq will be created in 
stages. Prior to sending the majority of personnel, a ―joint management‖ team of 40 different 
civilian representatives will assess the different needs and environmental conditions of the PRT 
site so the team can be designed to meet regional demands. One author explains these ―teams 
will undergo pre-deployment training together.‖167  
The training is a 16-day pre-deployment training and processing program hosted at three 
different venues. The first five days are spent at the Department of State‘s Foreign Service 
Institute (FIS) in Washington, D.C. training for PRT interagency coordination. This is an 18 
module instructional course designed by the many US agencies with representatives present in 
Iraqi PRTs. During this session PRT members are exposed to lessons from past team 
deployments; Iraqi culture and history; PRT role, mission, and strategy; and additional 
instruction on interagency coordination, including simulation exercises. 
Training at FIS is followed by five days at the Diplomatic Security Training Center 
practicing on the State Department‘s Foreign Affairs Counter-Threat Course (FACT). According 
to the DoD pre-deployment training itinerary, ―This course is expected to meet the needs of 
personnel traveling overseas by featuring practical, hands-on training in surveillance detection, 
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counter-terrorism driving, explosives and weapons familiarization, and emergency medical 
training.‖168  
The final two stops for PRT personnel are the Army Continental United States (CONUS) 
Replacement Center at Fort Bliss, Texas, where Team members are processed, medically 
validated, supplied equipment and given environment and cultural awareness training. The last 
part of pre-deployment training and processing is spent with the National Coordination Team in 
Baghdad. This three to five day orientation session covers assignment responsibilities, debriefing 
of current conditions in the region, and a description of administrative support.
169
 
 This training regimen is a giant leap forward in comparison to what was previously 
available for earlier PRT personnel deployed to Afghanistan. The schedule institutes many of the 
previously recommended training, including instruction on interagency coordination, cultural 
history, and guidance of individual as well as PRT roles and missions. All these factors, if 
executed properly, will aid the interagency process in future US PRTs. 
 The true impact of these changes to PRT structure and deployment policy has not yet 
been felt, making an assessment of their effectiveness difficult. The PRT interagency training 
schedule described above, for example, just received its first candidates in March of 2007. Yet, 
the signs are encouraging. A combination of increased civilian participation, personnel, and 
resources in US PRTs; improved training; leadership positions for non-DoD staff; and more 
efficient deployment policies all suggest that PRT development, related to interagency 
coordination, is headed in the right direction. It is imperative that different agencies continue to 
research how these recent changes affect cooperation among current and future PRTs.   
Conclusion    
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 Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction operations will continue to 
play a prominent role in the future of US foreign policy. The current situations in Afghanistan 
and Iraq demonstrate a need to adapt SSTR operations so they can function in hazardous COIN 
environments which pose multiple threats to civilian and military personnel. Establishing 
seamless and effective interagency cooperation is a key, if not the most important, component to 
adapting SSTR functions for high-risk locations. Identifying and analyzing lessons from previous 
experiences, such as those of US PRTs in Afghanistan, represents a critical tool for improving 
future interagency teams designed to operate in COIN environments. 
 The US PRT experience in Afghanistan from 2003-2006 identifies some important 
obstacles which hampered cooperation between team members. First, the failure to provide 
guidance on the roles and responsibilities individual team members are expected to fulfill creates 
confusion, drains resources, and obstructs team member‘s ability to coordinate with one another. 
Second, giving any one agency, in this case the military, a disproportionate amount of influence 
and resources can lead to a credibility gap and the marginalization of other team representatives. 
Third, assembling teams in theater, deploying team components at different times, and 
misaligning tour lengths impairs relationship-building and causes team disjointedness. Fourth, 
the failure to provide sufficient interagency, language, and cultural training results in some team 
members being unprepared to operate in a multi-agency and culturally diverse environment. 
Finally, poor participation and logistical support on the part of civilian agencies overburdens 
other team members, results in operational gaps, and causes an imbalance within the civil-
military team structure. These factors all negatively impacted US PRTs ability to maximize team 
cooperation; however, they are not terminal and can be resolved through the implementation of 
the four recommendations made earlier. Solving these issues requires considerable time and 
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resources, yet, while it may take a Herculean effort on the part of the United States government 
and individual agencies involved in current and future interagency teams, the benefits will be 
more than worth it. Expending resources to solve the issues that hamper PRT interagency 
cooperation may be expensive, however, these costs are far less than those incurred when the 
duties PRTs are expected to meet are not done correctly and the overall mission fails to be 
completed.    
         
C. An Alternative View: Sri Lanka’s Experience with an Enduring Insurgency 
     Patrick Baetjer 
 
The most obvious question for policymakers is: why should the US government look to 
Sri Lanka for lessons in counterinsurgency warfare?  This report will argue that the Sri Lankan 
experience holds a number of insights for the US on several levels.  The Sri Lankan government 
has battled a pernicious separatist insurgency in the northern part of the country since the 1970s.  
Known as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Tigers, as they are commonly 
known, have claimed to speak for the entire ethnic Tamil community and seek the establishment 
of a distinct Tamil state. 
 The Sri Lankan experience is not one that is widely studied by students of 
counterinsurgency warfare.  The US campaigns in Vietnam and the Philippines are sometimes 
studied, but the British efforts in Malaysia and the French efforts in Algeria are considered 
classic examples of counterinsurgency operations.
170
  Indeed, the Pentagon reportedly has taken 
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to screening the Battle of Algiers for a number of the civilian staffers and military officers 
charged with addressing problems within Iraq.  This focus on Algeria and Malaysia reveals two 
significant points.  First, the US has the tendency to learn counterinsurgency lessons from other 
Western governments, seemingly ignoring the lessons learned by non-Western governments.  
Given that the US has repeatedly stated that the Iraqi insurgency will ultimately be defeated by 
Iraqis, it follows that the US ought to look for lessons from non-Western governments who have 
had to fight insurgencies within their own borders. 
 Secondly, the focus on past Western efforts, especially the French in Algeria, misses one 
key point.  Rarely have Western efforts been successful over the long term.  In Algeria, the 
French were able to dismantle much of the National Liberation Front only by turning to tactics 
such as torture and mass intimidation that ultimately undermined the French position and led to 
their withdrawal.  The French learned that certain tactics that might be effective in the short term 
ultimately alienated the larger population, losing the larger and more significant battle, that for 
―hearts and minds.‖  Likewise, analyses of the US occupation of Iraq have suggested that certain 
US forces used tactics that may have alienated segments of the Iraqi population. 
In part, the French government and colonial administrators fundamentally did not 
understand Algerian culture.  The colonial French sought to turn everyone who fell beneath the 
Tricolor into a Frenchman in both speech and culture, with little regard for the indigenous 
culture.
171
  While the US has not sought to impose US culture on Iraq like the French, it has 
revealed itself to either have an ignorance of Iraqi and Arab culture or a shallow understanding 
of it.  This is where looking at the Sri Lankan experience will be of value.  Though the Tamils 
and the majority Sinhalese often claim disparate histories, they share a common history and 
background and this may be reflected in the various counterinsurgency campaigns. 
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Furthermore, Sri Lanka is extraordinarily complex, both ethnically and socially.  There 
exist multiple ethnic groups beyond the Sinhalese and Tamils, as well as a number of religions, 
from Buddhism to Hinduism to Islam.  Further complicating the social structure is the continued 
existence of the caste system, which provides a further divide beyond ethnicity and religion.  The 
Sri Lankan experience addressing these divides within the insurgency context provides lessons 
for the US, which is engaged in nation-building, support and stability operations, and 
counterinsurgency warfare in a number of places, from Somalia to Afghanistan and Iraq, 
encompassing a number of bewildering social, ethnic, and religious divides.  In Iraq alone, the 
US has encountered divides between Shi‘ites and Sunnis, Arabs and Kurds, various tribes, and 
emerging political forces, with different identities asserting primacy at different points in time. 
 With regard to Iraq, there are other similarities with the Sri Lankan experience that 
provide the US with fresh and different insights into its counterinsurgency efforts.  Like the 
Sunni insurgency based primarily in al Anbar Province, the Tamil Tigers are readily identifiable 
with a particular region of Sri Lanka, and yet both the Sunni insurgents and the Tigers have the 
capability to strike nationwide.  Sunni insurgents have successfully attacked Baghdad while 
Tigers have carried out operations in the heart of Colombo. 
 Both the Tamil insurgency and the Sunni insurgency have an international, albeit opaque, 
component.  There is evidence that both the Tigers and the Sunni insurgents receive funding and 
weapons from abroad, and that sympathetic populations in other countries contribute an 
unknown amount of support.  There is some evidence that both the Tigers and the Sunni 
insurgents may receive funding from front companies or charities that ostensibly advertise 
themselves as relief organizations when in fact some of their funds end up with the insurgents.  
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Each insurgent group also has well-developed networks abroad that serve to disseminate 
information and may act as recruiters. 
 With regard to the counterinsurgency campaigns in both Iraq and Sri Lanka, each has 
been characterized by periods of intense crackdown followed by efforts to wean supporters away 
from the insurgency through various development and aid initiatives.  In Sri Lanka, this was seen 
following the disastrous December 26, 2004 tsunami which largely devastated the Tamil regions 
to the north.  What started off as promising cooperation between government authorities and the 
Tamils eventually disintegrated back into armed conflict.  These efforts, given the intense focus 
of the US in providing aid services and development projects in Iraq and Afghanistan, hold 
important lessons.  Before these lessons can be distilled from the Sri Lankan experience, it is 
necessary to understand Sri Lankan society in a historical context as well as the development of 
Tamil identity. 
Sri Lanka: The Legacy of Colonialism 
 Sri Lanka, formerly known as Ceylon, first encountered Europeans in 1505 when the 
Portuguese arrived.  The Ceylonese had a number of contacts with the Dutch and the Portuguese 
throughout the 1700s.  Originally heavily influenced by the Portuguese traders and explorers, 
Ceylon was a Dutch territory before it was taken over by the British in 1796.  Ceylon was made a 
crown colony in 1802 via the Treaty of Amiens but was not truly considered colonized until 
1815 under the control of the British East India Company.  The British government, however, 
forced a joint administration of the colony upon the company in exchange for a guaranteed 
monopoly of the island‘s cinnamon production.172 
 The year 1815 marked the beginning of a concerted British effort to establish 
unchallenged control of Ceylon.  The kingdom of Kandy, simultaneously both a region and a 
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people within Ceylon, had been co-opted by the British to a certain degree to facilitate British 
commercial interests in the island.  The Kandyan chiefs went before the British colonial 
administrators to ask to have the king, a highly unpopular figure, replaced.  The British exploited 
this opportunity to hold the Kandyan Convention and, despite the seemingly benign title, used 
the opportunity to remove the monarch and assert greater direct British control.  This was hardly 
what the Kandyan chiefs envisioned.  Chaffing under the control of the British, the Disawa of 
Uva, a local ruler named Keppetipola, led a Kandyan rebellion in Vellassa.  While colonial 
rebellions were hardly unique within the British Empire, the Kandyan rebellion of 1818 
represented one of the few revolts that nearly succeeded in beating British forces.  The British 
were able to recover enough to impose martial law and largely end the rebellion.
173
 
 The British instituted the plantation system in Ceylon to exploit the island‘s natural 
resources as efficiently as possible, much as they did in their other colonial possessions.  The 
establishment of the plantation system, however, disrupted the traditional societal structure.  The 
different Ceylonese ethnic groups largely stayed within their own regions, and the allocation of 
land for agriculture was largely informal and concluded through oral agreements.  The plantation 
economy was extraordinarily labor intensive, forcing plantation managers to attract labor from 
other parts of the island.  This led to a large influx of migrant Tamil workers not only from other 
parts of Ceylon, but from India as well.
174
  
 The plantation economy began to break down the barriers dividing Ceylon‘s ethnic 
groups, but these barriers were further challenged by the Royal Commission of 1833.  The 
British, as elsewhere, had exerted control over the Ceylonese in part by playing on the ethnic and 
cultural divides within the island nation, including the divide between the Sinhalese and the 
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Tamils.  These divides existed prior to the arrival of the British, with a vigorous debate over 
which, the Sinhalese or the Tamils, are actually the indigenous people of Sri Lanka, a debate 
which continues to this day.  The Tamils argue that the Sinhalese arrived in the 3
rd
 century BC as 
Buddhism was introduced.
175
   Sinhala history is largely based on the Pali Chronicles, the 
Dipavamsa and Mahavamsa, written by Buddhist monks in the 4
th
 and 6
th
 centuries CE. Despite 
the ongoing debate over the degree to which the monks intended the works as entertainment 
versus serious history, many Sinhalese regard the chronicles as definitive. They describe the 
Tamils as invaders and bandits, not indigenous people.
176
  As early as 1799, the British 
recognized the truly divided nature of Ceylon.  Sir Hugh Cleghorn, the 1
st
 Colonial Secretary of 
Ceylon, wrote: 
Two different nations, from very ancient period, have divided between them the possession of the 
island: the Sinhalese inhabiting the interior in its Southern and Western parts from the river 
Wallouve to that of Chillow, and the Malabars [Tamils] who posses the Northern and Eastern 
Districts. These two nations differ entirely in their religions, language and manners.
177
 
 
Though the divides existed before colonization, the British certainly played the game of ‗divide 
and rule‘ within Ceylon.  Yet in 1833, W.M.G. Colebrooke and C.H. Cameron headed up a 
Royal Commission that examined the British administration over the island. 
 In a bit of unexpected colonial progressiveness, Colebrooke and Cameron came to what 
were regarded as fairly radical conclusions.  Instead of administering the colony along ethnic and 
cultural lines, they divided Ceylon into five provinces.  Further, they suggested that staples of the 
colonial system, mercantilism, monopolistic practices, and discriminatory administrative 
procedures should be eliminated.  According to one historian, ―Many of the proposals were 
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adopted and helped set a pattern of administrative, economic, judicial and educational 
development into the next century.‖178 
 Despite the adoption of a number of Colebrooke and Cameron‘s recommendations, 
British administration of the island could hardly be considered progressive and the colonial 
administrators took a number of steps to further consolidate control of Ceylon.  With the decline 
of cinnamon‘s profitability, coffee became the dominant crop, with a subsequent coffee boom in 
Ceylon from 1839-1847.  Once the British recognized the lucrative nature of coffee, they moved 
to bring greater tracts of land under their control.
179
  In 1840, colonial administrators passed the 
Crown Land Encroachment Ordinance No. 12 which, in effect, claimed the crown‘s right to 
appropriate any land the authorities deemed was being ‗wasted‘ or not cultivated to its full 
capacity.  In affect, this ordinance rendered thousands of Ceylonese landless, as they had to 
prove in writing, English writing, that they owned the land they tended.  As indicated earlier, 
ownership tended to be conveyed orally and certainly not in the English language.  The crown 
thus came into possession of some additional 50,000 acres.
180
 
 Coffee would prove to be a passing fortune.  In 1869, a leaf disease struck the Ceylonese 
coffee industry, destroying it over a period of 15 years.  British entrepreneurs countered this 
setback by moving to tea cultivation.  Growing tea, however, requires even greater amounts of 
labor.  As improbable as it may seem, tea cultivation led to a relative labor shortage and the 
British sought to solve this dilemma by encouraging the emigration of thousands of Indian 
Tamils.  Indeed, the 1911 census found that Indian Tamils comprised some 12% of the 
population, or roughly 500,000 people.
181
  The census proved to be something of a colonial 
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obsession of the British.  They constructed a variety of categories to try and differentiate the 
various ethnicities and religions they saw throughout Ceylon.  Not surprisingly, they saw the 
Indian Tamils as somehow different from indigenous Tamils, thus providing the detailed census 
numbers.  Significantly, Tamils themselves, almost all Hindus, though they saw their community 
divided in different ways, did not make the differentiation between Indian and other Tamils like 
the British.
182
 
 The plantation system had earlier created a vast influx of migrant Tamil workers.  The 
wave of Indian Tamil immigrant workers further swelled the Tamil population, creating 
additional tensions between the Tamil community and the Sinhalese community, which 
competed for the same employment.  The system was not integrated and Tamils and Sinhalese 
apparently grouped in ethnically homogeneous enclaves, maintaining the ethnic divides that had 
existed and that the British had capitalized upon during the first years of colonization.
183
 
 Despite the influx of labor and the No. 12 Ordinance, the British sought greater amounts 
of land to cultivate tea.  The colonial authorities focused on one of the few areas that they had 
unsuccessfully targeted—Ceylon peasant agriculture. While Ordinance 12 allowed for land to be 
seized that was either not used or in the authorities‘ view was underutilized, this had little effect 
on the crops that the Ceylonese grew for themselves.  In the midst of the decline in the 
profitability of coffee, the British imposed grain taxes on the Ceylonese farmers worth between 
1/14
th
 and ½ of the crop‘s total worth.184  A number of the Ceylonese farmers had begun to grow 
coffee upon realizing its value.  As the coffee industry collapsed, these farmers could no longer 
pay the grain tax, enabling the British to seize even more land in the 1880s.  Though the Ceylon 
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elite effectively campaigned to have the law repealed in 1892, the British had successfully 
advanced their land consolidation program even further.
 185
 
 With the English hold on Ceylon increasing, the British began to mandate the institution 
of British laws in some aspects of Ceylon life and to establish at least the appearance of Ceylon 
input in the administration of the colony.  In a move that would have significant repercussions 
later in the country‘s history, the British established the Charter of Justice in 1833 that enshrined 
English as the colony‘s language.186  In a patchwork manner, the British kept some of the Tamil 
laws, the Thesavalamai, but not others, such as those of the Muslim Tamils in Puttalam.  In some 
cases, the supposedly enlightened British enforced laws that were far more retrograde than the 
Ceylonese laws.  For instance, English law mandated women‘s inferior status in marriage and 
property rights whereas Tamil and Sinhala law recognized women as independent and able to 
control their own property.
187
 
 In an effort to give the colonial administration greater representation among the 
indigenous population, the colony‘s ruling body, the Executive Council, appointed the 
Legislative Council with the idea that it would act as an advisory body.  In 1833, three of the 15 
council members were native Ceylonese, representing the low-country Sinhalese, the Burghers, 
and the Tamils.  The attempt to bring more Ceylonese into the colonial administration 
accelerated in 1844 when the Ceylon Civil Service was opened to all Ceylonese who had 
acquired an English education.
188
  Nevertheless, higher education remained forbidden to the 
Ceylonese, with the notable exceptions of law and medicine, and these attempts to co-opt 
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Ceylonese elements into the colonial status quo had little effect on eliminating the continued 
importance of the caste system in indigenous society.
189
 
 As the nineteenth century came to a close, the British colonial efforts had several 
significant effects on Ceylon society.  First, the ability to speak English and the possession of an 
English education were keys to elite membership and to employment within the colonial 
administration.  This emphasis on English would later play a significant role in the complaints of 
the Tamils.  Secondly, the plantation system ossified already existing divides between ethnic 
groups, especially the Sinhalese and the Tamils, which had been exacerbated by earlier British 
divide and rule tactics.  The cultivation of tea led to waves of Indian Tamil immigration that 
would later play a significant role in the Tamil claim that they were not being appropriately 
represented.  As one author noted, ―Rather than gelling identities, the lasting effect of colonial 
rule in the nineteenth century was to propagate the idea that identities were fixed and stable and 
that one could not jump from one to another.‖190  Instead of forming a unified nation, indigenous 
practices coupled with British colonial machinations created a number of lasting disparate 
identities. 
The Move Towards Independence, 1900-1948: Societal Fissures Widen 
 Though an overriding sense of Ceylon nationalism was noticeably absent among the 
populace given the number of disparate identities, the appointment of three Ceylonese members 
to the Legislative Council was a nod to the sentiment that the indigenous populace, at least the 
elite, believed that they should have some say in the colony‘s affairs.  In 1918, Sir William 
Manning was appointed the British governor of Ceylon.  Manning returned to the old system of 
divide and rule, though this time through political manipulation.  The British, and Manning in 
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particular, feared that the emergence of the Ceylon National Congress political party might be 
the harbinger of nationalist aspirations within the country.  In order to head off this perceived 
threat, Manning took steps to form minority political identities among the Kandyan Sinhalese 
and the Tamils while seeking to split the Ceylon elite.  The British, ironically, ended up elevating 
the Kandyan Sinhalese in the colonial administration system, despite the fact that the low-
country Sinhalese were the ones who were Western educated.
191
 
 An even greater irony is the fact that the Ceylon National Congress was hardly a major 
political player and certainly not a source of national unification.  The Congress largely 
represented the Ceylonese elite.  Manning‘s efforts to establish political identities as a way for 
ethnic minorities to combat the Congress was not only unnecessary, it established parties for 
ethnic groups that would claim the right to influence and political power disproportionate to the 
Ceylonese populations they represented. 
 Eventually, the British shifted their support from the Kandyan Sinhalese to the 
Westernized low-country Sinhalese, but Manning‘s efforts to foment political and societal 
divisions by boosting ethnic minority parties bore fruit. As early as 1905, the Tamils had formed 
what would likely be considered a political action committee today, the Jaffna Tamil 
Association, which was open to all Tamils and pushed for greater political power for Tamils.
192
  
Yet Manning‘s efforts contributed to the ethnic minorities‘ perception that they were somehow 
being left out.  The Ceylon Tamils, in complete contradiction to what the British censuses 
showed, claimed until the 1920s that the Tamil population was as large as that of the low-country 
Sinhalese and the Kandyan Sinhalese.
193
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 Manning further sought to play on this ethnic divide, overseeing a reformed Legislative 
Council in 1921 that increased the Sinhalese representation to 13 members while the Tamil 
representation remained at three seats, leading to Tamil protestations.
194
  One Tamil, Sir 
Ponnambalan Ramanathan, submitted a memo to the colonial administrators on April 1, 1922 
requesting that minority views be heard and ethnic representation be respected.  This was exactly 
the vehicle that Manning needed to entrench ethnic minorities within the system as a check to the 
Sinhalese despite the fact that the minorities represented so few people.  The governor backed 
Ramanathan‘s memo, and in 1923 the Legislative Council featured eight Tamil seats and 16 
Sinhalese seats, despite the fact that the Sinhalese comprised some 67% of the population and the 
Tamils 11%.
195
  Manning helped foster a political culture that would endure, helping to 
encourage the at times unrealistic expectations and aspirations of the Tamil community.  One 
scholar noted: 
Although elites of all communities shared a common outlook, from 1931 onwards tensions arose 
about the safeguards and alleged discrimination in the distribution of resources and language.  The 
quest for entitlements through representation, legislation or violence shaped the contours of 
identities in the years that preceded violence.
196
 
 
 Despite Manning‘s best efforts to maintain British dominance over the politics and 
resources of Ceylon, the damage that World War II wrought on the British Empire weakened 
British control. The shock of the fall of Singapore to the Japanese, as well as the anti-colony 
discourse that came out of the conflict, convinced the English that they would have to give 
Ceylon its independence.  Yet Manning‘s patronage of the ethnic minority parties lingered on 
into the political system the British left behind.  The British hoped to ensure the strength of the 
minority parties by allotting seats through a combination of geography and splitting 
constituencies.  Furthermore, a key provision in the constitution held that 2/3 majority of the 
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Ceylon equivalent of the House of Representatives had to vote to amend the constitution.
197
  The 
British were certain that the Sinhalese could not muster that many votes given the prominence of 
the minority parties in the House. 
 In 1946, an English report concluded that English would no longer be the official 
language of the Ceylonese government and that instead the official languages would be the 
Tamil and Sinhala languages.  While perhaps the British understood this as a move towards 
decolonization, they did not understand the significance that the English language had come to 
play in the nation.  Understanding English was key to attaining a government post—the 
Ceylonese elite spoke English and viewed the attempt to discard the language as an attack on 
their status and privilege within society.
198
  The elite continued to use English and the 
importance of the language would have a significant impact on the relations between the Tamils 
and the Sinhala majority population down the road. It was in this context of overly influential 
ethnic minority political parties, a rigid and inflexible set of social identities long reinforced by 
the colonial experience, and a political culture that viewed politics merely as the distribution of 
national resources to narrow constituencies that the British granted Ceylon its freedom on 
February 4, 1948. 
Post-Colonial Flashpoints: Disenfranchisement, Misrepresentation, and the Dominance of 
the Sinhalese 
 
Though the great independence celebrations created a façade of unity among the 
Ceylonese, the society remained divided.  Fractures existed between the Sinhalese, the Tamils, 
and the various other ethnic groups.  As one historian argues: 
The Sinhalese and Tamils are separate and distinct nations. Because of their particular historical 
past, and because of national-ethnic differences and the occupation of separate homelands, each 
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possesses separate and distinct national consciousness and owes its loyalty first to its own 
homeland, and then to Sri Lanka.
199
 
 
Disagreements also arose among Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, and Muslim believers, cutting 
across ethnic communities.  Furthermore, though elites no doubt would have existed with or 
without the British presence, the colonial administration had created Westernized elite that 
favored the Sinhalese.  One of the first acts of independent Ceylon would cause further ruptures 
within society. 
In 1948, the government passed the Ceylon Citizenship Act No. 18, enumerating the 
ways that a person in Ceylon could become a citizen with full rights.  The Ceylon Citizenship 
Act offered two tracks to citizenship: a person either had to show proof that he or she had 
descended from a family who had long been established on Ceylon, or a person had to register 
with the authorities.  The difficulty was that both tracks required documentation as well as the 
candidates to be literate.  With one stroke, this immediately rendered thousands of Indian Tamil 
workers non-citizens since most were unable to read and write.  Without citizenship, these 
workers were unable to vote.
200
 
Effectively, the law cemented within the rules of the political game that political parties 
would strive for narrow ethnic goals at the exclusion of the others.  From the outset of 
independence, rather than refuting the ethnic politics that Governor Manning had introduced, 
Ceylon wholeheartedly embraced them.  One historian noted, ―The laws…had ruptured the 
possibility of stronger interethnic and class alliances by excluding the entire estate Tamil 
population from participating in the polity.‖201 The two dominant Sinhalese parties, the Sri 
Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United National Party (UNP) strove to outdo one another 
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through increasingly inflammatory rhetoric. Ironically, by disenfranchising so many Tamils, the 
Sinhalese inadvertently gave some credence to the Tamils‘ exaggerated claims of discrimination 
and poor representation.  At one point, a Sinhala spokesman announced, ―The Tamil people must 
accept the fact that the Sinhala majority will no longer permit themselves to be cheated of their 
rights.‖202  
Yet the Tamils were also let down by their own supposedly representative bodies and 
officials.  Two trade unions, the Ceylon Workers‘ Congress (CWC) and the Democratic 
Workers‘ Congress (DWC), often spoke up for Tamil rights.  With the establishment of the two-
track system for citizenship and thus voting rights, the unions initially told the Tamil workers to 
boycott the registration system as a form of protest.  Confusingly, however, the unions 
eventually backed registration applications from upper class Tamil merchants.
203
  Thus, the 
working Tamils, primarily those that worked on the plantations, were disenfranchised to a degree 
by listening to the advice of the trade unions who were supposed to be representing them. 
The adoption of the national flag in 1948, seemingly minor compared to the 
disenfranchisement of Tamils, contributed further to their sense of alienation.  Tamil kings had 
often used the image of a bull to represent their kingdom; Sinhalese kings utilized the visage of a 
lion.  The flag that was adopted, which looks nearly the same as today‘s flag, featured a lion 
placed prominently at the center of the flag with two stripes on the periphery.  The two stripes 
represented the Muslim and Tamil communities, practically a visual confirmation of their 
secondary status within the dominant Sinhala society.
204
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Some historians assert that Sinhala colonization of traditionally Tamil homelands 
increased rapidly after 1948.  There is some evidence to suggest that some 200,000 Sinhalese 
families spread out over 3,000 square miles of land in the primarily Tamil district of Batticaloa, 
thus affecting a land grab.  These historians allege that as much as 1/3 of Batticaloa district was 
absorbed into the Amparai district, a largely Sinhalese area.
205
 
The head of the Federalist Party, S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, pushed for working class Tamil 
rights in the late 1950s.  Chelvanayakam‘s campaign, however, was short lived.  Even within the 
Tamil community, there existed social and geographic cleavages.  Chelvanayakam was 
convinced to drop his support for working class Tamil rights in 1957 when the central 
government agreed to several demands levied by the Jaffna Tamils.  The Tamil community 
within Jaffna had asked that the central government recognize the Tamil language, create 
regional governing councils, and promise to forgo aggressive settlement of Sinhalese and other 
ethnicities in traditionally Tamil areas.  With the recognition of these demands, Chelvanayakam 
agreed to drop his campaign on behalf of working Tamils.
206
 
From the outset of independence, the Sinhalese nationalists strove to assert Sinhala 
dominance and to enshrine Buddhism and Sinhala authority within the constitution.  The various 
ethnic minorities sought to block these efforts, and tension between the communities boiled over 
into ethnic riots in 1956, 1958, 1977, 1983, and 1987.  Despite the constitutional efforts of the 
British to protect minorities and Manning‘s legacy of elevating ethnic minorities, the Sinhala 
nationalists finally succeeded in achieving a number of their goals with the 1972 constitution.  
The document, which formally changed the nation‘s name from Ceylon to Sri Lanka, gave 
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Buddhism a special place in Sri Lankan life and recognized the moral authority of the Sinhala 
population.
207
   
More importantly, the 1972 constitution established the Sinhala language as the official 
language of Sri Lanka.  Despite the 1946 report that suggested that the official administrative 
language revert back to the Tamil and Sinhala languages, English had continued to be used by 
the elites and Sri Lankans in the civil service.
208
  The constitution also created the house or 
parliament, which the Sinhalese controlled, the supreme legislative and decision-making body in 
the political system. 
The measures in the 1972 constitution had a dramatic effect on the Tamil population.  
The Tamils, despite the large numbers of illiterate Indian Tamils on the plantations, had been 
overrepresented within the civil service due to their intense efforts to learn the English language.  
No longer would knowledge of English guarantee Tamil jobs and influence within the civil 
service.  Tamils in the civil service were given three years within which to learn Sinhala before 
they would face dismissal. One estimate puts the number of Tamils employed by the government 
at 30% of the 82,000 government employees shortly after independence.  This number had 
shrunk to 6% of 225,000 state employees by 1970.
209
  Further, by making the parliament the 
supreme body, the Tamils felt marginalized within the political system.  The Sinhalese finally 
gained control of 2/3 of the seats in Parliament, meaning that they no longer needed Tamil 
support to legislate.
210
 
The Sinhala government undertook three additional measures that exacerbated tensions 
with the Tamil community.  Sri Lanka nationalized the numerous plantations that were a source 
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of employment for a number of Tamils.  Some within the Tamil community believed that the 
nationalized plantations instituted discriminatory hiring practices to the detriment of the Tamils.  
Second, the Sri Lankan government, in an agreement with India, undertook a program between 
1981-1984 to repatriate people that it did not consider Sri Lankans.  In a case of ―ethnic 
cleansing,‖ 445,580 people, mostly Tamils, were forcibly repatriated to the Indian state of Tamil 
Nadu.
211
  Tens of thousands of additional Tamils fled for Tamil Nadu and Western countries 
following the outbreak of ethnic riots in 1987.  Lastly, it was alleged that in the late 1970s and 
1980s, Colombo instituted a weighted system for admitting students into the universities.  The 
Sinhalese majority, in an effort to combat the overrepresentation of Tamils within the civil 
service, established a system by which Tamils had to score higher, sometimes significantly 
higher, on university entrance exams than their Sinhalese counterparts.  A number of these 
aggrieved students formed the early organization that became the Tamil Tigers.
212
 
In the wake of independence, the Sri Lankan government, especially the majority 
Sinhalese, had the opportunity to reach across religious and ethnic lines to strengthen national 
unity.  Given the relatively peaceful manner in which British colonial administrators handed 
political control over to the Sri Lankan elite, a Sri Lankan national identity formed mostly among 
the elites and not among the greater populace. 
Further, whether it was a combination of the historical separation of ethnic communities 
and the British colonial legacy, or the awakening of Sinhala nationalism, the Sri Lankan 
government took noticeable steps to marginalize the Tamil community.  While it is undeniable 
that the Tamils exercised undue influence in the political system through the British 
constitutional checks, over-representation in the civil service, and Governor Manning‘s efforts to 
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split the phantom Sinhala opposition to British rule, Sinhala actions went too far. The Ceylon 
Citizenship Act, the 1972 constitution, the nationalization of the plantations, and the forced 
repatriation of thousands of Tamils alienated the Tamil community. 
This sense of alienation led to violent opposition from segments of the Tamil community 
as early as the 1970s, particularly in the Jaffna region.  The 1972 constitution and the 1977 
election proved to be catalysts for the formation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam that the 
Sri Lankan government has fought ever since. 
The Rise of the Tigers: The Growth of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
 With the Tamil community extremely dissatisfied with the 1972 constitution, Tamil 
politicians, especially those associated with the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), began 
agitating for the creation of a separate Tamil state in the northern part of Sri Lanka.  
Significantly, the exclusion of Tamils from the education system helped to galvanize the TULF.  
One Sinhalese Sri Lankan professor, C.R. de Silva, acknowledged: 
The Tamils of Sri Lanka have developed feelings of nationalism on their own and the question of 
educational opportunity only aggravated the conflicts that had arisen owing to questions of 
language and employment.  Nevertheless the question of University admissions is clearly one 
which mobilized the youth in Jaffna and prodded the [TULF] leadership to declare in favour of a 
separatist state.
213
 
 
In the 1977 general election, the Tamil United Liberation Front issued its Vaddukoddai 
Resolution declaring that the Front would campaign on secession and wanted to hold a 
referendum on the secession question among the Tamil populace.  TULF candidates won 
overwhelmingly in Tamil areas and proclaimed a fait accompli.  Instead of pushing for some 
kind of referendum on the question of secession, the TULF declared that their electoral victory 
was in and of itself approval of their secession platform.  The official website of the Tigers reads, 
―These elections were effectively a referendum [sic] the Tamil speaking people voted 
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overwhelmingly in favour of secession.‖214  The Sri Lankan government responded by requiring 
all members of parliament to swear an oath that they would not advocate secession.   
The LTTE was formed on May 5, 1976 by Velupillai Prabhakaran from the nucleus of 
the Tamil New Tigers group he had founded in the early 1970s. The group launched its first 
official attack in September 1978 with the bombing of an Air Ceylon passenger jet.
215
  
Prabhakaran, a reportedly charismatic figure who inspires near-worship amongst his followers, 
grew up in the Tamil town of Velvettiturai, long regarded as a smuggler‘s haven.  Prabhakaran 
increased his infamy by personally carrying out a number of killings and bank robberies, 
including the heist of 500,000 rupees and jewelry estimated at 200,000 rupees from the people‘s 
Bank at Puttur in Jaffna in March 1979.
216
 The LTTE engaged in particularly intense periods of 
fighting from 1983-1989, in the mid-1990s, and from 2005 to today. 
 In 1980, the Tigers published a Marxist-Leninist document that sought to cast their 
struggle in terms of class conflict as well as national liberation.  The document, ―Towards a 
Socialist Eelam,‖ appears to have had significance at the time, but since the end of the Cold War, 
the LTTE has largely dropped all communist rhetoric or justifications for their actions in favor of 
self-determination arguments.
217
 
The Tigers also claim: that Tamils were discriminated against in the recruitment of the 
Sri Lankan security services; that the Sinhalese government has undertaken an intense and 
officially sponsored campaign of colonization of Tamil areas much like the conservative Israeli 
settlers movement in Palestinian areas; and that beginning in the late 1970s large numbers of 
Tamil youths were detained, not given legal representation, and tortured under the Prevention of 
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Terrorism Act.
218
  LTTE arguments aside, the Prevention of Terrorism Act has been heavily 
criticized by such groups as Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists. 
 The Tigers seek to establish a separate Tamil state in the northern part of Sri Lanka and 
assert their right to do so under the UN Charter which guarantees the right of a people to political 
independence.  Vital to this claim is the assertion that Tamils are a distinct people with a unique 
cultural heritage and history that differentiate them from the rest of Sri Lanka.  The Tigers also 
claim the right to secede under a concept known as reversion of sovereignty in international law.  
They assert that the British colonial administrators acknowledged until 1833 that the Tamil 
people were a separate nation and that this can be seen in several British documents, including 
the Cleghorn Minute of 1799 and the Arrow Smith Map of 1802.
219
  The Tigers also point out 
that the British kept aspects of Tamil law and instituted measures to prevent discrimination of the 
Tamil people in the constitution in 1948.  To the Tigers, the 1972 constitution claimed 
legitimacy over the whole of Sri Lanka, but violated all of the past precedents that acknowledged 
the distinctiveness of the Tamil people, their laws, and their customs.  In their view, the 
government claim of sovereignty over all of Sri Lanka was flawed from the outset.   
The Tigers seek to bolster a Tamil sense of nationalism and national pride—they can 
provide a source of respect for Tamils who feel alienated by the Sri Lankan government or who 
have experienced heavy-handed tactics by government security services.  The organization seeks 
a Tamil eelam, or homeland, and even features a constitution and manifesto.
220
 Like most 
insurgents and terrorist groups, the LTTE claims that its move toward violent armed struggle was 
necessary because the government illegally prevented the Tigers from achieving their goals 
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within the political process and because the government resorted to attacking the Tamil 
community. 
The Organization and Operation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
 It is widely acknowledged that Prabhakaran rules the LTTE with an iron fist.  He has 
violently suppressed rival violent and non-violent Tamil organizations that have sprung up since 
the Tigers were founded.  Prabhakaran has established strict discipline among the Tiger ranks, 
brutally weeding out the uncommitted and preventing the Sri Lankan government from 
capitalizing on sustained organizational penetrations, greedy fighters, or malcontents.  The LTTE 
has killed dissident Tamils in Canada and France and is not above intimidating a dissident‘s 
family within Sri Lanka. The leader maintains a highly effective central intelligence organization 
which reports regularly on the state and affairs of the organization‘s members.  It is believed that 
there are 8-10,000 LTTE members in Sri Lanka, of which approximately 3-6,000 are trained in 
conventional or asymmetric tactics.
221
 
 Though the Tigers‘ website cites the TULF as its ancestor, the reality is that TULF was 
founded as an organization for moderate Tamils in 1975 and differed greatly in its refusal to use 
violence.  Sensing a rivalry, Prabhakaran launched several devastating attacks on TULF, largely 
eliminating them.  Today, the remnants of the TULF are known as the Tamil National Alliance 
which gained 22 seats in parliament in 2006.  The Tamil National Alliance has little 
independence from the LTTE and operates as its legislative proxy in parliament.
222
  The Tigers 
have repeatedly devastated rival Tamil groups, including killing most of the 300 fighters of the 
Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) and their supporters in 1986, as well as moderate 
Tamil groups. 
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 Like most insurgent organizations, details on the recruitment, indoctrination/training, 
equipment, funding, public relations, and tactics of the Tigers are scarce.  Regarding recruitment, 
it does not appear that the LTTE routinely drafts or dragoons young Tamils as is the case in some 
African conflicts.  In May 1999, the Tigers attempted to establish a Universal People‘s Militia 
comprised of all Tamils over the age of 15 in certain LTTE-held areas
223
, but the unpopularity 
and lack of success of the effort seems to have discouraged further attempts at drafting Tamils.  
The Tigers are adept at using mass gatherings or social events to portray their struggle as just, 
capitalizing on group dynamics to generate enthusiasm for their cause.  The group will hold 
Pongu Thamil festivals in an effort to use the passions of frenzied crowds to recruit new 
members.
224
  
The organization attracts Tamils from all walks of life, but especially seeks to recruit 
young educated Tamils.  Recruits with specific skill sets are put to work in areas where they fit 
best.  For instance, one analyst states that graphic artists have been put to work making maps.  
University students, particularly those in engineering, have been approached to modify or 
improve existing devices for future attacks. Tigers not trained as fighters, however, often join the 
armed units in the field in order to remove the dead LTTE fighters or at least clothe them in 
civilian dress to further undermine the SLA‘s reputation.225  
Tamils as young as 14 have been recruited, but generally those between the ages of 14-16 
are believed to be kept at logistical bases and do not fight until 16-18.
226
  Nevertheless, a variety 
of human rights organizations as well as the Sri Lankan government accuses the Tigers of 
training a number of child soldiers.  At least one expert contends that a special unit, the Leopard 
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Brigade, is comprised entirely of children and is among the more tenacious Tiger elements. 
Some analysts assert that between 1995-1996, ½ of the new Tamil recruits were between the 
ages of 12-16.  According to an SLA intelligence report in 1998, 60% of Tiger recruits were 
younger than 18 and 60% killed since April 1995 were child soldiers.
227
 Regardless of age, new 
recruits sign the constitution and pledge loyalty to the LTTE above family and all others.   
 The LTTE appears to be extraordinarily adept at indoctrinating and training its members.  
It has taken on the appearance of a professional military organization, putting future fighters 
through a rigorous physical training regimen and instructing recruits in the use of a variety of 
weaponry.  Tamil theorists instruct recruits in the Tiger ideology and in the abuses of the Sri 
Lankan government, especially the security services. These sessions are supplemented by the use 
of a specific genre of action movies, like the Rambo series and certain Clint Eastwood movies, as 
one analyst notes, in order to instill the belief that smaller forces can win against all odds.
228
  
Their training camps reportedly resemble college campuses. Male and female members typically 
wear cyanide capsules around their necks, not only as a way to prevent their capture, but as an 
outward sign of their total devotion to the cause.  Curiously, female Tigers often carry two 
cyanide capsules.
229
   
 It is significant to note that in the past, the LTTE has received training from a number of 
international and transnational actors.  From 1976-1986, a limited number of Tigers received 
some training in Tyre, Lebanon from the Palestinian groups Fatah and the PFLP.
230
  India 
provided weapons and training to a variety of Tamil groups, including the LTTE, after the 1983 
Tamil Massacre.  India, in an effort to placate its own Tamil population, reacted to the anti-Tamil 
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Sinhala violence by arming the Tamils until the Indian-Sri Lankan agreement in 1987. India‘s 
Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) brought Tamil militants to India for training in 32 Tamil 
Nadu camps, with the Tigers training at Salem, Madurai, and perhaps some at the high-level 
facility at Dehra Dun.  Indeed, by 1985 the number of Indian-trained Tamils reached parity with 
or exceeded the number of soldiers in the SLA.
231
  While this relationship with the Indian 
government has ceased, the LTTE is believed to be in contact with Sikh separatists, Kashmiri 
fighters, and some 20-plus separatist groups in Tamil Nadu and it is quite possible that training 
and weaponry is exchanged.  In the 1990s, the Tigers received GPS training in Sudan as well as 
political training in South Africa by the African National Congress, and at least one analyst 
suggests that Norwegian naval personnel may have provided training in underwater sabotage 
techniques in Thailand.
232
  Finally, one observer alleges that the LTTE and the Kurdistan 
Worker‘s Party (PKK) have had a relationship, with the Tigers training the PKK in suicide 
operations and the PKK allegedly providing the LTTE with Stinger anti-aircraft missiles.
233
 
 In terms of equipment, analysts conclude that the LTTE has found weapons suppliers in 
South Africa, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, Afghanistan, North 
Korea, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and Lebanon and that the plastic explosives for its bombing and 
suicide bomber campaigns likely comes from the Ukraine.
234
  The Tigers have stolen weaponry 
on several occasions, including 60 tons of explosives destined for Bangladesh‘s armed forces 
that were provided by Ukraine as well as some 324,000 mortars in Mozambique that were 
supposed to go to the SLA in 1997.
235
 Thailand assured the Sri Lankan government that it would 
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crack down on LTTE activity when it discovered in May 2000 that a Thai sympathizer was in the 
middle of having a submarine constructed for the group at the Phuket shipyard.
236
 In late summer 
2006, several Tamils with close ties to the LTTE were arrested in New York for not only trying 
to bribe US officials into removing the State Department‘s terrorist designation, but also for 
trying to buy a variety of weapons, including missile launchers and surface-to-air armaments.
237
 
One expert describes Prabhakaran as a managing director of a corporate organization 
complete with financial offices overseen by the equivalent of a Chief Financial Officer, K.P. 
Kummaruppa, in Thailand.  The official website of the LTTE, the Tamil Eelam homepage, lists 
telephone numbers and addresses in London along with a number of ways parties can contribute 
financially.   
Sources of funding for the LTTE range from legitimate to illegal.  Legitimate business 
enterprises include profits from farming, the cultivation of tea, the operation of bus companies, 
print shops, photo studios, and proceeds from factories that produce jam, soap, soft drinks, and a 
number of other items.
238
  Evidence suggests that the LTTE have invested heavily in legitimate 
shipping enterprises, with ships legally registered and insured.  Some analysts contend that these 
ships, in addition to carrying legal items, act as transportation for contraband to LTTE areas, 
frequently making unscheduled stops en route to their destination. The Tigers receive reportedly 
increasing amounts of funds from overseas, especially from the Tamil diaspora.
239
  Large Tamil 
communities exist in the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, the Nordic countries, and 
Malaysia, though some reports suggest that some Tamil communities are subjected to extortion 
and protection rackets from Tiger associates, and are thus unwilling contributors.  A RAND 
                                                 
236
 Ibid, 40. 
237
 Carin Zissis, ―The Sri Lankan Conflict,‖ Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, 11 September 2006, 
www.cfr.org/publications/11407/sri_lanka_conflict.html, accessed 27 March 2007. 
238
 Mackinlay, 70. 
239
 Ibid, 70. 
  
 
108 
report indicated that the LTTE may raise as much as $650,000 a month in Switzerland, $1 
million (Canadian) a month in Canada, and $350,000 a month in the UK.  Prior to the Tigers‘ 
designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, there were several serious US-based 
contributors, including one California doctor who reportedly gave up to $100,000 at a time.
240
  
Analysts disagree over how much of the LTTE‘s funding comes from abroad, but the group has 
an estimated annual budget of $100 million with somewhere between 60-90% coming from 
overseas donors.  What analysts do agree on is that in the wake of the September 11
th
 2001 
terrorist attacks, countries around the globe were more willing to clamp down on LTTE 
fundraising activities, making it more difficult for the group to gather funds. 
As far as illegal sources of funding, the Sri Lankan government claims that 75% of 
Tamils carrying drugs do so on behalf of the Tigers.  In May 2003, the US Drug Enforcement 
Administration intelligence chief, Steven W. Casteel, contradicted the traditional US line that 
stated that Tamils were not involved in the drug trade.  Citing new evidence, Casteel asserted 
that Tamils had been involved in narcotrafficking as early as the 1980s.  Reportedly, the Tigers 
sponsor two Toronto-area gangs, VVT and AK Kannan, who act as narcotics distributors and 
local muscle.  There is some evidence to suggest that the LTTE may be involved in human 
smuggling, which can net up to $32,000 per person—if the individuals cannot pay, they are often 
forced to work for the LTTE wherever they have been transported, often Europe or Canada.
241
 
Within Sri Lanka, the LTTE robs banks to fund their operations and they impose ‗taxes‘ on items 
like cigarettes imported into their areas of control. 
The LTTE public relations campaign is well-honed for foreign audiences.  The Tamil 
Eelam website intentionally utilizes language like ―self-determination‖ and ―human rights‖ in 
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order to garner foreign sympathy.  They have created multiple webpages, most likely in an effort 
to avoid being completely shut down by Sri Lankan efforts and to try and convey greater 
popularity than they actually have. The Tigers operate a domestic radio station, the Voice of the 
Tigers, as well as a satellite television station. Within Sri Lanka, the Tigers have, at times, been 
too dogmatic and repressive in areas that they control or have controlled.  For instance, when the 
LTTE controlled the city of Jaffna, public outcry in the Tamil population led Prabhakaran to 
establish special envoys not only to propagate the LTTE‘s message, but to also provide a means 
of redress amongst Tamils for LTTE excesses in 2000.  While the Tigers have no problem with 
utterly ruthless tactics in Sinhala areas, in Tamil communities the LTTE visits the families of 
Tamils killed by security services, publishes obituaries, and provides compensation to Tamils 
who had property confiscated by the LTTE.
242
 
The Tigers have targeted the SLA, and especially the officer corps, in some of their 
propaganda.  Occasionally the LTTE will distribute leaflets or bulletins that are directly 
addressed to members of the SLA.  One such letter reads: 
As we walk the path of national liberation, our death will acquire dignity and meaning.  But 
yours will become insignificant….Do not die labouring for the foul campaigns of the ruling 
class.  Do not lose your integrity and your humanity, so that those who rule us may prosper. It is 
only when you take up arms on the side of the oppressed Sinhala workers and peasants against 
the state of Sri Lanka that we could speak the language of friendship.
243
 
 
RAND interviews with the US Embassy indicate that the SLA suffers from a severe officer 
shortage, most likely the result of a combination of LTTE propaganda campaigns and targeted 
assassinations of officers. 
Tiger tactics are varied and complex.  They will engage the Sri Lankan military 
conventionally, with infantry, the Air Tigers or the Sea Tigers, when they are confident of the 
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outcome or are provoked.  The Sea Tigers are believed to have some 3-4,000 members with six 
ships, primarily smaller, fast attack craft. It is believed that the Air Tigers were originally formed 
by a former Air Canada employee, Vythilingam Sornalingam, now deceased, with the intention 
of launching suicide operations against buildings with microlight aircraft packed with explosives, 
though they have yet to attempt such attacks.
244
  The Air Tigers have exhibited a conventional 
capability, raiding the Colombo airport with two aircraft believed to have taken off from airstrips 
built in the Mullaitivu jungle near Trincomalee.   
In terms of asymmetric warfare, the LTTE engages in shootings, bombings, and suicide 
operations across the country, even in the capital city of Colombo.  The Black Tigers are the 
dedicated suicide bomber contingent of the LTTE. Suicide bombings are an integral component 
of Tiger campaigns, and future bombers are revered among recruits and typically recruited from 
populations that have been physically harmed by the Sri Lankan security services.
245
  Evidence 
indicates that the Tigers have relied heavily on female suicide bombers who frequently face less 
scrutiny by security services or who may pretend to be pregnant to hide explosive devices. 
Members of the Black Tigers who undertake attacks are remembered annually in the Maaveerar 
Thinam, or Great Hero‘s Day celebration.  Notable assassinations by the Black Tigers include 
Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Sri Lankan Defense Minister Ranjan Wijeratne, Naval 
commander Vice Admiral W.W.E.C. Fernando, and Minister of Industries and Industrial 
Development C.V. Gooneratne.  Since July 1987, the Black Tigers have carried out an estimated 
200 suicide attacks in India and Sri Lanka, dwarfing the number of attacks carried out by better-
known groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah.
246
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As one Sri Lankan Ministry of Defense Official noted, ―Attacking Colombo has rich 
dividends.  It makes leaders question the value of countering the LTTE. A single blast in 
Colombo has more value psychologically than full-scale conflict in the north and northeast.‖247  
The Tigers often scout targets for weeks and have shown the capacity to mount complicated 
operations using communications equipment, mine fields, and indirect fire.
248
 
Major LTTE Attacks and Sri Lankan Counterinsurgency Operations 
 Almost all LTTE attacks and Sri Lankan government counterinsurgency operations can 
be generally characterized as indiscriminate and brutal.  The war has killed an estimated 70,000 
people with thousands of Sri Lankans internally displaced.  According to Human Rights Watch, 
the long-simmering conflict has forced 800,000 Tamils to flee the country, dramatically 
increasing the diaspora in Australia and the US, but especially in India, Canada, and the UK.
249
 
 The Tigers emerged as a serious insurgent or terrorist group in 1983.  In July, the LTTE 
killed 13 policemen in Jaffna, spawning Sinhalese riots in Colombo.  The Sinhala marauders 
targeted Tamils, killing an estimated 1,000 people, while the government watched.  Known as 
‗Black July‘ in the Tamil community, the riots enabled the LTTE, previously relegated to the 
fringes, to play a larger role and, more importantly, to attract recruits.  They received additional 
material support from India whose population includes some 60-million Tamils, many of whom 
reside in the state of Tamil Nadu, the ancestral home for thousands of Sri Lanka‘s Tamils.250 
 India, however, grew alarmed as the violence intensified throughout the 1980s and 
reached a particularly bloody point in 1987.  India sent a peace-keeping force (IPKF) to quell the 
violence and compel the Sri Lankan government to offer some kind of concession to the Tamils.  
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Patrolling in mostly Tamil areas, the Indian presence managed to wrangle constitutional 
amendments from Colombo that offered some Tamil autonomy.  The Indian presence, however, 
caused a great deal of friction within Sri Lankan society, sparking an additional rebellion of 
Sinhalese nationalists in the south of the country.  The government thus faced a Sinhala 
nationalist rebellion in the south and a separatist Tamil rebellion in the north and east.   
The IPKF found itself fighting the LTTE, one of India‘s former clients, instead of 
peacekeeping.  While the IPKF eventually dislodged the LTTE from Jaffna, depriving the Tigers 
of their headquarters, training facilities, munitions factories and weapon stores, the Indians 
suffered considerable losses.  Severely undercapitalized, Indian communication gear and guns 
were outclassed by the LTTE‘s more modern gear and AK-47s.  Further, many Indian units were 
undermanned by as much as 50%.
251
 
IPKF quickly discovered why the SLA had had so many problems stamping out the 
Tigers.  The LTTE quickly adapted its tactics following the loss of its base in Jaffna, striking the 
Indians whenever it proved most profitable for the Tigers.  For instance, the Indians were forced 
to traverse the narrow Elephant Pass in order to get from the nearby port to Jaffna City, 
providing the LTTE with an inviting target.  When the IPKF learned to identify and disable Tiger 
roadside or semi-concealed improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the LTTE buried high 
explosives beneath the blacktop, making it nearly impossible to detect the makeshift mines.
252
 
The Sri Lankan president, Ranasinghe Premadasa, believing that the unpopular Indian 
intervention had inadvertently unified Tamils and Sinhalese, asked the IPKF to leave.  When the 
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Indians left, the LTTE filled the power vacuum in the eastern regions and was actually able to 
take control of some of the weaponry left by the IPKF.
253
 
 Following the failed intervention, the Tigers were able to mount some of their most 
successful operations, earning their reputation as adept suicide bombers.  In May 1991, an LTTE 
suicide bomber killed the Indian Prime Minister responsible for the intervention, Rajiv Gandhi.  
Two years later, another suicide bomber killed President Premadasa.  His successor, Chandrika 
Kumaratunga first unsuccessfully sought a negotiated settlement.  When the effort flagged, 
Kumaratunga shifted strategies, still seeking a negotiated settlement with the Tamil people while 
attacking the Tigers.  Though the LTTE succeeded in sinking two Sri Lankan Navy vessels 
during the intensified fighting, the government was able to reassert its control over Jaffna.
254
 
 Between 1996 and 1999, the Tigers launched a series of attacks, both conventional and 
asymmetric. In early 1996, the LTTE bombed the Central Bank in Colombo, causing hundreds of 
casualties.  Another significant bombing took place in February 1998 when the Tigers hit the 
important Buddhist Temple of the Tooth in Kandy.  1999 was a pivotal year; the LTTE killed a 
moderate Tamil parliamentarian, tried to kill President Kumaratunga, and launched a massive 
conventional attack that recaptured the all-important Elephant Pass, killing an estimated 1,000 
Sri Lankan soldiers.  The attack on the president, however, had the unintended consequence of 
boosting her popularity, enabling her to win the 1999 election.
255
 
 In 2001, the LTTE seized Sri Lanka‘s international airport, a particularly galling attack in 
the eyes of the Sri Lankan government given its proximity to Colombo. The airport attack is 
regarded by some as the worst act of terrorism in aviation history.  The same month, India‘s 
External Affairs Minister Jeswant Singh pledged a $100 million loan to Sri Lanka to try and 
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offset the economic impact of the conflict.
256
 It is perhaps not surprising that the president‘s 
party failed to win the December 2001 elections, with the UNP‘s candidate, Ramil 
Wickeremesinghe, winning the post of prime minister.   
The new prime minister sought a ceasefire which eventually went into effect on February 
22, 2002, leaving the government in control of major towns while the LTTE controlled rural 
areas in the east.  The agreement, however, allowed the Tigers to open political offices all around 
the country, a caveat they exploited to the fullest—they continued to recruit, establish protection 
rackets, and kill moderate Tamils.  Furthermore, the agreement was heavily opposed by Sinhala 
nationalists who believed that it was one step on the road to granting Tamil independence—and 
it failed to give president Kumaratunga a role in the peace process.
257
 
 The ceasefire, overseen by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) comprised of 60-
70 representatives from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland, was able to halt major 
attacks until 2005.  The peace talks began in Thailand in 2002, later continuing in Oslo, and 
consisted of six rounds of peace talks but soon highlighted the unwillingness of both sides to 
reach a compromise.  The Tigers essentially wanted to establish their rule over the north and east 
before engaging in substantive talks.  In addition, the LTTE demanded that the government close 
down its high security zones and allow free passage of Tamil ships.  Sri Lanka flatly refused to 
budge on these two issues. The only substantive agreement reached by the two sides existed over 
human rights—neither wanted alleged violations on both sides investigated. 
 Despite the underlying unwillingness of either side to compromise, Prabhakaran 
indicated in late 2002 that the Tigers might be willing to give up their goal of an independent 
state.  He stated: 
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We are prepared to consider favourably a political framework that offers substantial regional 
autonomy and self government in our homeland on the basis of our right to internal self-
determination…[but if our] demand for regional self-rule is rejected we have no alternative other 
than to secede and form an independent state.
258
 
 
While the statement appears to look favorably on some form of federalism, it was never clear 
that what Prabhakaran envisioned would have been acceptable to the central government, much 
less the Sinhalese nationalists.  In any case, the LTTE pulled out of the talks in 2003, demanding 
the establishment of an interim administration it called the Interim Self-Governing 
Administration (ISGA).  The ISGA would have enabled the Tigers to set up a quasi-government 
in the north and east with negotiations to resume after five years. This proved more than the 
Sinhalese majority and President Kumaratunga could stomach.  She accused Wickremesinghe of 
endangering Sri Lanka‘s national security, dissolved parliament, seized control of the defense 
and security apparatuses, and called for new elections.
259
 
 The Tigers were unable to capitalize on the disorder within the government due to their 
own internal problems.  Long known for extreme internal discipline, rivalry between the LTTE 
intelligence head, Pottu Amman, and an eastern commander, Colonel Karuna, led to Karuna 
establishing his own Tamil group.  Prabhakaran resorted once more to force to try and destroy 
Karuna, pushing the colonel into the arms of the Sri Lankan government in 2006.  The loss 
proved to be a significant one—Karuna provided extremely valuable intelligence to his former 
enemy.  Despite the turmoil in both camps, an unexpected and catastrophic event momentarily 
cooled hostilities. 
An Opening?  The December 2004 Tsunami  
 On December 26, 2004, a massive tsunami caused by the subduction of a tectonic plate 
under the ocean floor swept across Southeast Asia.  The tsunami inundated coastal areas, killing 
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approximately 35,000 Sri Lankans and devastating Tamil areas.  For arguably the first time since 
independence, the government did not stand idly by while the Tamil population suffered.  The 
Sri Lankan military played a large role in delivering relief supplies to affected Tamil areas and 
undertook a number of rescue missions as well. 
 Though the Tigers attempted to downplay the government‘s efforts and sought to control 
the flow of all aid into their areas through the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO), a 
cooperative body comprised of both Tamils and Sinhalese was designed to oversee and 
coordinate relief efforts.  The Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) 
represented a real opportunity for the government to work collectively with the Tamil people.  
Joint committees comprised of government representatives, Muslims, Tamils, and the LTTE 
would oversee the relief efforts and provide feedback, oversight, and would recommend priority 
projects.
260
 
This promising initiative was short-lived, however, as the powerful Sinhalese nationalists 
once again stressed their concern that such cooperative efforts ran the risk of establishing a de 
facto Tamil state.  The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party quit the coalition government 
with the UNP in June 2005 because of such fears.  The Sri Lankan Supreme Court sounded P-
TOMS death knell by ruling that aspects of the proposed administration were inconsistent with 
the Sri Lankan constitution.
261
 
The efforts of the Sinhalese nationalists and the court ruling were poorly timed and 
unfortunate. Had it not been struck down, it would have forced the Tigers‘ hand.  They would 
have faced an organization with greater international legitimacy than their own TRO and would 
have had to decide whether to join it or possibly be marginalized.  Further, the joint 
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administration envisioned by P-TOMS was exactly the kind of cooperative effort that many 
within the Tamil community wanted out of the government.  Eviscerating it before it even got off 
the ground likely strengthened the position of the Tigers and eliminated a cooperative effort that 
might have proven to be a model for further initiatives. 
Major Attacks and Counterinsurgency Operations after the Tsunami 
 The election of Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse on November 25, 2005 led 
some to believe that a breakthrough in the peace process was possible.  The president seemed 
committed to bringing about an end to the conflict in his campaign rhetoric. Yet Rajapakse owed 
his political success to Sinhala nationalists in the city of Hambantota and to an understanding 
with the ultranationalist JHU (Jatika Hele Urumaya) and JVP (Janata Vimukti Peramuna) 
parties.
262
 These forces would not tolerate the kind of peace process the LTTE would agree to 
and it is likely that the combination of the devastation wrought by the tsunami and Colonel 
Karuna led these nationalist forces to believe that the Tigers were vulnerable and that an 
intensified campaign might finally quell them.  Though the two sides continued to talk 
throughout late 2005 and early 2006, the violence gradually escalated.   
 In December 2005, two LTTE activists were killed, followed by the death of 14 soldiers 
and 16 sailors in separate attacks.  Gunmen killed a parliamentarian from the Tamil National 
Alliance in Batticaloa and then five Tamil students in early January 2006.  In April, the LTTE 
bombed a market in Trincomalee and a female suicide bomber attacked the army headquarters in 
Colombo, nearly killing the army commander.  Sinhalese riots broke out following the 
Trincomalee and the Sri Lankan government reverted to its past behavior of being slow to act in 
the face of Sinhala violence.  May saw a huge conventional battle when the LTTE seized control 
                                                 
262
 Teresita Schaffer and Aneesh Deshpande, ―Can Sri Lanka Turn Away from War?,‖ South Asia Monitor no. 96 
(July 2006). 
  
 
118 
of a water control point in the town of Mavil Aru.  The government responded with massive 
force and the LTTE unsuccessfully counterattacked at Mutur.  A massacre of all of the 
indigenous employees of a French aid organization took place in Mutur, with SLMM accusing 
the government of having perpetrated the killings.
263
 
 The next significant conventional battle took place in August 2006, when LTTE forces 
were able to defeat government forces and seize Jaffna.  An October counterattack on Jaffna by 
the government failed miserably—not only were the government forces thrown back, they 
suffered 133 killed and some 200 wounded.  The Tigers answered both unconventionally and 
conventionally, with a suicide bomber hitting a bus of naval personnel and LTTE ships firing on 
Sri Lankan naval vessels in Galle Harbor.  It is believed that since mid-2006, some 1,000 LTTE 
fighters were killed, with an unclear number of SLA casualties.  The Sri Lankan military 
estimated that defense spending in 2007 would reach $1.29 billion.
264
 
 In early 2007, hostilities continued to intensify.  On March 26, the Air Tigers utilized 
small aircraft to bomb the Katunayake Air Force Base.  The Sri Lankan Navy engaged a 
component of the Sea Tigers on March 29, allegedly sinking a number of their vessels. The 
LTTE responded a day later with a mortar and artillery attack on Batticaloa.  On April 4, the Sri 
Lankan Air Force bombed a Sea Tiger base in Puthukkudiyiruppu.  
Problems with the Sri Lanka’s Counterinsurgency Efforts  
 As the events described above make quite clear, Sri Lanka has been overly reliant on a 
military solution to the LTTE insurgency.  In its military operations, it has often caused 
excessive civilian casualties, enabling the LTTE to capitalize on the deaths by utilizing its 
advanced and responsive public relations arm to effectively tar the central government.  In one 
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incident in November 2006, SLA artillery batteries hit a camp for internally displaced people in 
the Batticaloa district, killing 47 and injuring approximately 100.
265
  As a result, such groups as 
the Asian Human Rights Commission have repeatedly criticized the Sri Lankan government for 
military and police operations that violate the 1994 Sri Lankan Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Acts, No. 22.
266
 
 Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists also have criticized 
the Prevention of Terrorism Act for leading to the mistreatment of suspects and captured 
insurgents.  Amnesty detailed that Sri Lankan security services have beaten suspects, suspended 
them upside down from the ceiling, forced pins under detainees‘ fingernails, and applied ants and 
chilies to parts of the body.
267
  The International Commission of Jurists released perhaps the 
most strident condemnation, stating: 
The provisions of the Sri Lankan Terrorism Act are not only objectionable from the human rights 
point of view but it is doubtful that the Act is effective in controlling terrorism….since 1979, 
when the Act was adopted, terrorism had not declined but rather increased in the Northern Tamil 
area. Increased police and army surveillance of the population have not curtailed violence but 
seemingly stimulated it. This experience is similar to that of some other countries which have 
attempted to control terrorism by armed force rather than dealing with the fundamental factors 
contributing to the recourse to violence.
268
 
 
Interviews of former and current Tamil insurgents indicate that the indiscriminate brutality of the 
SLA does as much to recruit for the LTTE as anything else.  In some cases, fighters from former 
rival Tamil organizations ended up fighting for the LTTE despite Prabhakaran‘s brutal 
destruction of these rival groups.  One fighter, only 22 years old, fought for the LTTE despite the 
fact that the Tigers imprisoned him and brutally eradicated TELO, the rival Tamil organization 
he originally belonged to.  When queried about why he joined the Tigers, he responded, ―The 
                                                 
265
 Ibid, 21. 
266
 Van de Voorde, 190. 
267
 Ponnambalam, 203. 
268
 Quoted in Ponnambalam, 205. 
  
 
120 
reason I fought for the LTTE was not because of any love for the Tigers.  In fact I hate them.  
But we—I and my friends—did not want Tamil people to suffer at the hands of the SLA.‖269 
While large military operations and brutal interrogations have negatively impacted the 
civilian populace in the northern and eastern regions, the everyday actions of the SLA do much 
to anger the Tamil people and turn them against the central government.  Daily measures such as 
roadblocks exacerbate tensions and contribute to the Tamil sense that the Sinhalese government 
is besieging their community.  As C. Christine Fair, a RAND area expert argues, ―These blunt 
instruments have proved counterproductive. They have alienated the Tamils and have provided 
fuel for the LTTE assertions that Colombo is anti-Tamil.  Moreover, in the view of [a Ministry of 
Defense official] these actions have been so provocative that some Tamils may have become 
anti-state as a consequence.‖270 
Some scholars and analysts point to the periods of negotiation between the LTTE and the 
central government as positive steps toward decreasing the animosity between the Sinhala and 
Tamil communities.  Yet even these negotiations have proved problematic.  The Norwegian-led 
negotiations had the unintended consequence of legitimizing the Tigers as the representatives of 
the Tamil community at the exclusion of other Tamil groups.
271
   
Periods of negotiation, particularly from 1989-1990 and 1994-1995, led to a mystifying 
relaxation in security measures by the Sri Lankan government.  While the LTTE has often 
argued for the removal of some measures during negotiations, the government eased security 
measures to such a degree so as to allow for LTTE infiltration throughout the southern portion of 
the country, including Colombo.  Once more, whenever there is a lull in Tiger attacks, there is a 
tendency on the part of the government to assume that the ability of the LTTE has been degraded 
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and that the threat has been reduced.
272
  Thus, it appears that the Sri Lankan counterinsurgency 
campaign can swing wildly from one extreme to another, from heavy-handed indiscriminate 
military operations to a shockingly minimal security presence.  As one analyst noted, ―Sri 
Lanka‘s maladaptive response to the LTTE‘s guerilla and terrorist campaign has contributed to 
the strengthening of the LTTE both on the island and overseas.‖273 
Even when the Sri Lankan government has offered a measured response, Sri Lanka‘s 
understanding of security remains overly reliant on soldiers as opposed to adaptive procedures, 
tactics, and good intelligence.  As one observer notes, ―In Sri Lanka, the notion of security is 
highly correlated with the presence of men with guns rather than enhanced security practices and 
procedures.‖274  More soldiers standing around a potential target is viewed as an effective 
response to LTTE activity, despite the fact that this does little to interdict Tiger operations and 
may present them with an inviting target. 
Furthermore, there is little evidence that the Tamils trust the government either in the 
negotiations or other efforts to integrate the Tamil community.  As Dr. Peter Chalk, another 
RAND expert on Sri Lanka, observes: 
There is still a large sense of grievance amongst the Tamil community, and there‘s still a 
perception even amongst members of the Tamil groups that have now made peace with the 
government, but the government‘s really not sincere in what its doing and trying to 
address…perceptions of alienation…perceptions of discrimination.275 
 
This lack of trust and perception of an anti-Tamil bias within the government, coupled with past 
incidents of military abuse or killing of Tamils, has created a shortfall in the number of Tamils 
that are recruited to the security services.  The SLA has had little success in penetrating the 
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LTTE or in recruiting intelligence assets, in part due to this lack of Tamils sympathetic to the 
central government.
276
 
 Much like the US efforts in support and stability operations, Sri Lanka is plagued by a 
lack of coordination between the military and the civilian components of the government in its 
fight against the LTTE.  Sri Lanka‘s approach has often been described as ‗ad hoc,‘ with one 
former Deputy Inspector General of Colombo stressing the need for integrated psychological 
operations and civil affairs teams in order to combat the effective Tiger propaganda campaign 
and to provide some kind of development to the local community.  Overall, ―there is a need for 
multi-institutional cooperation and coordination.‖277 
 Similar to the US, Sri Lanka has had difficulties maximizing its intelligence services and 
in providing the appropriate intelligence consumers with what they need in a timely fashion.  
There is evidence that the police and the military units in LTTE areas that most require 
actionable intelligence often do not get what they need from the central agencies in Colombo.  
The agencies appear reticent or incapable of providing the field units with what they need 
quickly.
278
   
 International pressure is another important component in the struggle against the LTTE.  
As has been documented, the Tigers acquire much of their funding and weaponry from abroad, 
and much of the international efforts against the LTTE have focused on cutting the inflow of 
both.  Yet international actors have ignored the underlying ethnic tensions in Sri Lanka, failing to 
acknowledge that long-term peace will only be achieved if the grievances of the Tamil 
community are assuaged within the political system.
279
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Lessons for the US in Support and Stability Operations 
Sri Lanka‘s counterinsurgency efforts since the 1970s reveal several important lessons 
that can be applied to US interagency efforts in support and stability operations.  Three broad 
lessons are that: (1) understanding a nation‘s history and culture; (2) implementing joint 
administration of relief and development efforts to build trust between a central authority and 
minority populations; and (3) engaging in security operations that are less kinetic and more 
focused on cementing personal relationships between security forces and local populations are 
likely to dramatically increase the effectiveness of support and stability operations.
280
   
The importance of understanding a country, a region, a people‘s culture and history can 
do much to prevent missteps in support and stability operations.  The Sri Lankan case reveals 
how this can occur even within a country. Despite being cohabitants on the same island since the 
3
rd
 century B.C., the Sinhalese and Tamil communities subscribe to different accounts of their 
shared history and are often ignorant of one another‘s culture.  The 1972 constitution and the 
national flag are but two examples of measures implemented by the Sinhala majority government 
that inevitably led to clashes with the Tamil minority.  While these policies, as well as others 
cited not only by the Tamils but minorities like the Muslim community, were implemented by 
extreme Sinhala nationalists intentionally to subvert minority identity and culture, these policies 
required the tacit or outright support of less extreme Sinhala parties and members of parliament.  
Had these Sinhala elements had a better understanding of Tamil history and culture, they may 
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have curbed or blunted the efforts of the extreme nationalists, minimizing or eliminating the 
grievances that led to a violent Tamil reaction. 
The US can see the missteps that it has made in Iraq and Afghanistan due to a lack of 
understanding of culture and history.  In Afghanistan, certain tribes have proved willing to 
harbor the Taliban and have frustrated US and coalition efforts to build widespread support of 
the Karzai government outside of Kabul.  Yet Afghan history shows that the central government 
has usually exerted little if any control on distant provinces, where warlords and strongmen 
asserted their authority.  
In Iraq, a number of US military and civilian missteps might have been avoided with a 
better understanding of Iraqi culture and history.  De-Ba‘athification by the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) went too far and too deep, firing hundreds if not thousands of bureaucrats that 
could have been used to staff the retooled ministries.  The policy removed many Sunnis, fueling 
the perception that the government was biased in favor of the Shi‘ites.  A proper understanding 
of the nation‘s political history would have revealed that belonging to the Ba‘ath was often a 
requirement for government employment and that thousands joined simply to try and survive 
within Saddam Hussein‘s Iraq.  The mass-firings coupled with little hope of finding alternative 
employment contributed to the resentment within the Sunni community that led to the rise of the 
insurgency.  In terms of culture, the reliance by the US military on mass detentions and nighttime 
raids on suspects‘ homes, frequently resulting in the males in a household being flexi cuffed, 
searched, and questioned in front of their families, showed a lack of regard for the significance of 
honor within Arab culture.  Such activities humiliated an untold number of Iraqi males, building 
resentment to the US presence and turning an unknown number to the insurgency or Shi‘ite 
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militias.  A better understanding of Arab culture likely would have led to modified tactics that 
would have bolstered the US mission in Iraq instead of undermining it. 
This does not mean that every US military commander or agency official needs to seek a 
Ph.D. in Afghan or Iraqi history but at least an understanding of the major events and cultural 
norms that have a significant impact on the two societies.  Anecdotal stories suggest that some 
officials within the civilian agencies and military have recommended that their subordinates read 
T.E. Lawrence‘s Seven Pillars of Wisdom, A Triumph as a means to gain a better understanding 
of Iraqi culture. These subordinates would be better served reading the works of subject area 
experts and talking with Arabs and Afghans, preferably prior to deployment. Such knowledge 
would allow officials, soldiers, and policymakers at all levels to ensure that their day to day 
actions do not alienate the population and enable them to question operations or programs that 
might do so as well.  
The second lesson for US support and stability operations is the importance of joint relief 
and development projects as a means to establish trust between minority populations and the 
central authority.  In Sri Lanka, the Post-Tsunami Operational Management System, P-TOMS, 
fashioned a role for not only the Tamils, but the other minority communities in overseeing relief 
efforts in conjunction with Colombo following the December 2004 tsunami.  P-TOMS promised 
to empower members of the Tamil community outside of the LTTE, undercut the Tigers‘ own 
relief organization that sought to monopolize the distribution of aid in Tamil areas, and give 
other minorities a voice, thereby building a foundation of trust between the central government 
and the minority communities.  Unfortunately, the short-sighted Sinhalese nationalists 
inadvertently torpedoed what would have been a significant challenge to the LTTE by 
undercutting P-TOMS.  Sri Lanka‘s president, Mahinda Rajapaksa, may be grasping the 
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importance of joint relief and development projects—in May 2007, he announced that 12,000 Sri 
Lankan villages would receive massive allocations of funds for development and would be 
overseen by Provincial Councils in coordination with the central government.  
In Iraq and Afghanistan, most of the relief and development projects have been 
undertaken either by US military provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), commanders utilizing 
Commander‘s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds, and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) where possible.  In the short-term, this is vital for establishing credibility 
within the local populace for the efforts of the international community and the Iraqi and Afghan 
governments.  In the mid to long-term, if these efforts do not gradually acquire an Iraqi or 
Afghan face, especially following the much-lauded elections and transfer of sovereignty, these 
efforts may actually undermine the credibility of the central government.  Continued aid from 
outside sources undermines one of the central purposes of national government, thereby 
undermining its legitimacy and the longer-term goals of US support and stability operations. 
The third lesson from the Sri Lankan experience is the impact that personal relationships 
have in counterinsurgency and support and stability operations.  Sri Lanka‘s best efforts at 
countering the LTTE were less kinetic, focusing instead on having the security services establish 
a lower profile but better relations within the local population.   The former Senior Deputy 
Inspector General of Colombo, Merril Gunaratne, introduced vigilance committees (VCs) during 
his tenure.  Essentially, Gunaratne divided the city into 75-100 household units and appointed a 
Sri Lankan police unit as a liaison with these households.  The households formed a 
representative body, somewhat reminiscent of a neighborhood watch, who would meet with the 
police on a regular basis.  Two to three police units formed a subsector and reported to a 
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subsector chief.  Several sectors made up a zone which reported to a head of a zone.  These zone 
heads then reported directly to the Deputy Inspector.
281
 
Over time, the police units, who remained the same and were not rotated out, and VCs 
developed trust and the households began to provide the police with local intelligence and 
reported the appearance of suspicious figures.  Admittedly, the VC program was plagued by 
problems, but these were largely the result of both police units receiving rudimentary, if any, 
training in such basic intelligence activities such as surveillance and the central intelligence 
agencies withholding intelligence from the police units.  Overall, in the words of RAND analyst 
C. Christine Fair, ―Sri Lanka‘s brief experience with integrating [the central intelligence 
agencies] as well as with community policing (i.e. vigilance committees) appeared to enhance 
Colombo‘s ability to interdict LTTE operations.‖282  Sri Lanka re-started the vigilance 
committees concept on January 8, 2007. 
 In US support and stability operations, the rotation systems in place both in the civilian 
agencies and the military make establishing trust within the local populations difficult.  There are 
countless stories in Iraq and Afghanistan of military leaders who established good relations with 
the local loya jirga, village leaders, or community elders, working with these men and 
institutions who were more than willing to bring grievances forward that otherwise might fester 
and to report on insurgent movements.  Yet when these agencies and units rotated out, in some 
cases while the local populace pleaded that they stay, these relationships were lost, frequently not 
established with the new personnel, and formerly placated areas became dangerous.  These 
relationships take a long time to cement but are invaluable in pacifying an area and gathering 
intelligence.  Civilians rotate out after 90 days and military personnel leave anywhere from a 
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couple of months to a year,  breaking the bonds of trust with the local population and giving 
them little reason to work with their replacements.  Fair, commenting on VCs, wrote, ―It also 
requires that officers not be transferred (transferring personnel would forfeit the accumulated 
local intelligence and undercut the entire effort).‖283  The same can be said for US support and 
stability operations.  Longer rotations are certainly not popular, but if the US is to be successful 
in such operations, maintaining relationship continuity between the civilian and military 
components with the local population is essential. 
Sri Lanka‘s experience fighting the LTTE is typically studied through the lens of 
counterterrorism instead of counterinsurgency.  Yet it is clear that there are a number of lessons 
that can be applied to US support and stability operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond.  The 
US, its allies, and the local governments it attempts to rebuild, must be cognizant of the history 
and culture of the population, seek to establish joint relief and development projects between the 
central authority and minority populations to establish trust and legitimacy, and must be willing 
to deploy the same personnel for an extended period of time to build trust in the local 
community. Such efforts are difficult and cannot be completed overnight—but they hold the 
promise of increasing the effectiveness of interagency efforts in support and stability operations. 
 
III. Leadership: Education, Training and Development 
 
A.  Strategic Communication:  Interagency Rhetoric and Consistent Interpretation 
     Amanda Smith 
 
 The importance of civil-military communication and coordination is widely 
acknowledged and vigorously pursued.  But is it effective and functioning as intended?  The new 
counterinsurgency (COIN) field manual, FM 3-24, states, ―[T]he integration of civilian and 
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military efforts is crucial, and calls for ‗a formal command and control system.‘‖284  However, is 
the rhetoric which outlines the systems for such integration articulated in a clear manner and 
implemented as intended?   
In the past fifteen years the United States Government (USG) has had the opportunity to 
test these questions on several occasions.  Conflicts of a dynamic nature such as those in Somalia 
and the current conflict in Iraq have demanded that prompt and adaptive strategies be 
communicated from the interagency to the military in an effective and consistent manner.  Policy 
directives, such as Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56) and National Security 
Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD 44), have attempted to outline and streamline this very issue, 
but have proven to be reactionary and, at times, ambiguous and contradictory.  This analysis 
examines leadership theory and practice by assessing theories of communication and assessment, 
as well as the conflicts that have influenced the formation of these two key documents. The 
purpose of this research is to understand communications theory and practice; review relevant 
case studies of lessons learned; and offer recommendations for improving interagency 
effectiveness.  As one senior US government official stated, ―good interagency won‘t save bad 
strategy.‖285  This analysis suggests that no matter how good or bad the strategy, there is no hope 
for successful implementation if the strategy and policy are not clearly communicated.  Clear 
policy rhetoric is essential for an effective interagency process. 
Government-wide involvement in stability operations (SASO) stresses that interagency 
coordination and cooperation is of utmost importance.  The multi-dimensional nature of support 
and stability operations (SASO) demonstrates what is referred to as ―marble-cake governance.‖  
According to authors Klitgaard and Treverton, the USG is experiencing a transition ―from layer-
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cake governance, where different tasks are taken on separately by different sectors (public, 
private, nonprofit) to marble-cake governance, with new forms of partnerships across sectors at 
all levels.‖286  This transition is not seamless; however, the challenges of this transition are 
manifested in the current tensions between the Departments of Defense and State.
287
  The 
demands of SASO require that interagency rhetoric and communication aid in clearly outlining 
the coordination necessary for successful interagency policymaking processes. 
Theory In Action 
 It is not surprising that Washington policymakers often lack the time to analyze the 
theoretical basis for rhetoric and policy.  Nevertheless, a large body of literature that addresses 
the theories of communication, coordination and networking is available to guide policymakers.  
Organizational, rhetorical and communications theory offer the opportunity to examine political 
communications processes at a fundamental level.  Bureaucracy and interagency politics usually 
influence the communication and coordination processes, which are outlined in official 
documents.  However, it is valuable to separate these influences from what the theories 
themselves have to offer in order to best determine how official rhetoric for communication and 
coordination can best be implemented to achieve effective results.    
 For instance, complexity theory provides a fresh way to look at how an organization 
conducts self-assessments.  The strength of the theory, when applied to government 
organizations, is that it takes into account the inevitable change and adaptation which is 
demanded of and characterizes government organizations.  According to Philip Salem, 
―Complexity theory describes the interactive and evolutionary processes of organizational 
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development.‖288  While the theory addresses change within an organization, it does so without 
making the subjective determination of whether the change is good or bad.
289
   When applied to a 
dynamic interagency process, this theory allows an organization to institutionalize change rather 
than fear it. 
 While complexity theory stands apart from other theories due to its focus on change, it 
also builds upon other forms of assessment which may be used in an organization.  Structural 
assessment assumes that analysis within an organization can be taken at a ―point-in-time‖ and 
will produce reoccurring and repeating assessments due to the natural structure of the 
organization.  Functional assessment ties activity to outcome in a manner which links 
communication with its psychological impact.  Functional assessment does not take into account 
variables such as quality or quantity, only psychological impacts and perception.  Finally, 
process assessment is based on information gathered over time and may include analysis of 
structural and functional areas, but often strongly prioritizes stability.
290
  
While these theories address key elements of assessment, Salem feels that they do not 
adequately account for the dynamic nature which characterizes organizations of today.
 291
  The 
undeniable dynamic nature of SASO and complexity of the interagency process demand a theory 
that can be applied in times of change and adaptation.  The assessment today may be 
dramatically different tomorrow.  Therefore, Salem‘s complexity model posits that change and 
adaptation are no longer exceptions or events which dramatically change the manner in which an 
organization assesses itself.  Rather, change is a norm which is addressed in a cyclical fashion 
                                                 
288
 Philip Salem, ―Assessment, Change and Complexity,‖  Management Communication Quarterly  15 (2002):  448. 
289
 Philip Salem, ―Assessment, Change and Complexity,‖ Management Communication Quarterly 15 (2002):  443-
444. 
290
 Philip Salem, ―Assessment, Change and Complexity,‖ Management Communication Quarterly 15 (2002):  443-
44. 
291
 Philip Salem, ―Assessment, Change and Complexity,‖ Management Communication Quarterly 15 (2002):  444. 
 
  
 
132 
and represents only ―points in the flow.‖292  Essentially, change becomes a repeated and 
anticipated byproduct of the organization‘s activity.    
In Salem‘s complexity model, differences in perception and assessment are embraced.  No 
two evaluations of the situation are the same.  Therefore, evaluations are only used as a tool by 
which to further assess the point at which events occur because these points are more useful for 
understanding than the event itself.  Noting the point in which the change occurred allows for 
assessment in communication from a top-down and bottom-up manner because change can occur 
at anytime and at any point in the hierarchy.
293
     
Salem‘s theory is useful for understanding interagency communication and coordination 
because it addresses two key elements of governmental coordination:  change and adaptation.  
These two elements are the norm, not the exception, and events occur at different levels of the 
hierarchy.  The rhetoric of USG official documents needs to embody a flexibility which reflects 
the evolving nature of the organizations involved and addresses the fact that flexibility is 
demanded at all levels, not just in Washington and not just in the field.  Whether or not current 
official documents reflect this need will be addressed later in this analysis.   
While adaptive assessment is necessary to meet the needs of SASO, it is not sufficient 
only to tailor communications in a manner that adapts itself to change.  Communication must 
also be used in a manner which takes into account its audience.  Institutional policy and 
procedure often make it difficult for an organization to do so.  Policies such as these are 
criticized by those who write that the historical manner in which rhetoric is presented is faulty 
and does not take into account the needs of an audience.  In fact, they state, ―The traditional 
communication texts rely on social psychology to the neglect of cognitive psychology, and they 
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emphasize matters of style and format over considerations of audience, context, purpose 
(particularly when there are multiple or tacit objectives for a given document)‖ and seek to reach 
an audience that is ―influenced, manipulated, or informed according to design.‖294 
In government agencies, bureaucratic policy and procedure often dictate the form and 
manner in which rhetoric is presented.  Style and format are, of course, useful and necessary, but 
should not be given priority over a presentation which takes into consideration the characteristics 
of the time and the audience.
295
  Communication should be tailored not in an effort to meet rules 
and guidelines, but in an attempt to be relayed effectively and accurately, as intended.  These 
requirements necessitate a different approach to rhetoric that take into account the concept of 
social knowledge.  
Social knowledge refers to a ―zone of relevance‖ which addresses the fact that different 
groups will react to rhetoric in different manners based upon the experiences and knowledge of 
that specific group.
296
  This principle can be applied to the interagency process where it is 
important to ensure that communication and rhetoric are designed in a manner which takes into 
account the varying social knowledge of the agencies involved.  If interpretation within an 
organization can vary, it most certainly can vary between agencies with different missions and 
social knowledge.   
Interagency Communication and Decision Processes 
Building upon communication and assessment theory are other approaches that address 
the intricacies of communication and coordination within the interagency itself.  These views 
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represent an understanding of the dynamics at work within the government and seek to address 
communication issues and challenges without taking a specific event or issue into consideration.  
No value judgment is made regarding the quality of the strategy or policy. 
Although shared interpretation between agencies arguably improves over time, there are 
still challenges to interpreting mission and objectives
297
 given the inherently different cultures 
and social knowledge of the agencies.  When interagency officials gather, whether it be to 
discuss the drafting of policy documents or strategy, gaining consensus, across the board 
participation, and understanding are often quite difficult.  Also, each agency brings to the table 
different views, perceptions and understanding which create a difficult situation for the 
development of rhetoric that creates common interpretation. 
Varying social knowledge among agencies hinders coordination efforts.
298
  Social 
knowledge manifests itself in preferences, interpretation differences and strategic outlook.  
Despite that fact that communication ―patterns tend to change over the life cycle of a crisis, 
becoming more structured over time as formalized, issue-specific chains of command (within 
both [State and Defense] departments) are clarified,‖299 the goal should be to structure command 
documents for the interagency team as efficiently as possible from the beginning.  The first, and 
perhaps most important aspect, of differing social knowledge is the issue of differing vocabulary 
interpretation.  Rhetoric varies among agencies and creates a situation in which meanings vary 
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due to variations in organizational culture.
300
  This variation can potentially create a climate in 
which document rhetoric is agreed upon but interpreted differently.  For example, the DoD may 
interpret the phrase ―by all means necessary‖ differently from the State Department.   
Social knowledge is a symptom of the inherent difference in mission between agencies.  
―To overcome significant differences...collaborating agencies must have a clear and compelling 
rationale to work together.‖301  Clearly the State Department and DoD have very different 
missions which translate into different approaches to rhetoric formation.  Even if strategic goals 
are understood, agreement upon rhetoric which reflects that strategy may not be possible.  Rask 
points out this disconnect when she speaks of the ―State Department‘s and the NSC Staff‘s 
implicit demand for ambiguity and flexibility [which] clashes with Defense‘s explicit drive for 
clarity and precision.‖302  This organizational difference leads Defense officials to express 
outrage at the perceived indecisiveness of the State Department and frustration on the part of the 
State Department at Defense‘s demand for precision and its ―unyielding‖ attitude.303  
Disagreements such as these lead to frustration and squash debate. 
The struggle between the cultures of the State Department and the Defense Department 
do not exist only in Washington.  As the President‘s personal representative, the in-theatre 
ambassador is responsible for ―exercise[ing] full responsibility for the direction, coordination, 
and supervision of all executive branch officers in [the country], except for personnel under the 
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command of a U.S. area military commander…..‖304  Coordination efforts between agencies in 
the field requires understanding the objective and mission as well as the culture of the other 
organizations.  Below is an adaptation of a chart presented by Gabriel Marcella in the U.S. Army 
War College Guide to National Security Policy, which highlights some of these key differences 
and how they affect the military and civil agencies‘ perception of each other.   
 
Military Officers Foreign Service Officers 
Physical action more important than written 
word 
Written word essential for diplomacy 
Doctrine is important Doctrine is not important 
Focus on end states, plans, and courses of 
action 
Focus on the process without a specific end 
state expected 
Core functions conducted by lower level 
officials (i.e. enlisted personnel and NCOs) 
Core functions conducted by officers 
Dislike of ambiguity Ambiguity is ok 
Leadership is composed of career military 
officials 
Leadership is a mixture of career F.S. 
officers, politicians, academics, etc. 
Diverse aspects of SASO are of growing 
importance 
Diverse aspects of SASO are of growing 
importance 
Focus on training Training is not the focus 
Officers oversee large numbers of personnel Officers oversee others in their core area (i.e. 
political, economic, etc.) 
 
 
―Comparing Military Officers and Foreign Service Officers.‖ Adapted from Gabriel Marcella, ―National Security 
and the Interagency Process,‖  in U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, edited by 
J. Boone Bartholomes, Jr. Editor, (2004), 252-53,  http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-
usawc/strategy2004/front.pdf (accessed March 31, 2007). 
 
When agencies are wary of characteristics and views which are inherent in each other‘s 
culture, not only will debate be minimized due to frustrations, but also unhealthy practices may 
be implemented which minimize the flow of information.  The Iraq Study Group Report 
recognized the need for free flow of information and opinions and called for ―an environment in 
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which the senior military feel free to offer independent advice not only to the civilian leadership 
in the Pentagon but also to the President and the National Security Counsel, as envisioned in the 
Goldwater-Nichols legislation.‖305  When practices such as these are not encouraged and adhered 
to, then this situation can lead to the hoarding of information where ―expertise [and dialogue] is 
traded for secrecy,‖ and information may not be shared because other agency representatives 
lack the ―need to know.‖306   
These practices can lead to disastrous and incomplete information which, in turn, causes 
inadequate understanding when it comes time to put strategy and rhetoric into action.  A senior 
DoD official states, ―[The] key is for all the principals to have the perspective across the board 
and to understand the whole issue.‖307  This is easier said than done.  If there is a lack of 
coordination at the principal level, then leaders cannot understand the whole issue and 
communication with lower ranks becomes impossible.  And, if it is impossible for leaders to 
communicate clearly within their own organizations, there is certainly no hope of clear 
communication at the operational level among organizations.  A lack of clear communication 
will destroy the coordination objectives and missions of SASO. 
A final challenge to interagency cooperation is the memory of past action.  A State 
Department official said, ―For everyone who wishes to walk through the gates of the future, the 
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path is blocked by 10,000 guardians of the past.‖308  The US Government is urgently trying to 
adjust to the demands of SASO but finds itself struggling.  Since combat operations are 
historically run by the military, it is easy to default to the military when combat is a possibility.  
The very nature of the Defense Department‘s mission in counterinsurgency warfare makes the 
military ill-equipped to handle all of the challenges of SASO.  
The interagency must constantly battle the desire to default to military plans and simply 
―adapt‖ old plans to fit new challenges.  This is a classic example of a situation in which ―an 
agency‘s prior experience with a situation has prompted it to develop contingency plans to deal 
with future occurrences or even a ‗folk memory‘ of what worked and did not work the ‗last 
time.‘‖309  This phenomenon is destructive to the needs of SASO as there is a tendency to rely 
upon the military ―because they‘ve done this before‖ while at the same time acknowledging that 
what has been done in SASO has not always been effective.   
In a results-oriented agency like the military, contingency plans abound and may often be 
deferred to in time of crisis simply due to their existence.  This default reliance destroys any 
effort to develop firm coordination based upon a commonly understood strategy and to develop 
clear rhetoric which will allow those strategies to be implemented at the operational level.   
The challenges posed by SASO are difficult enough, but interagency teams must also 
deal with differing social knowledge and stifled interaction.  This analysis has examined the 
theories which apply to these situations as well as the internal challenges the interagency faces.  
However, before moving on to an analysis of the current official documents which represent the 
method by which the interagency must function and communicate in SASO, it is beneficial to 
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examine key historical cases of events and developments which have helped to bring the 
interagency process to where it is today. 
The United States in Support and Stability Operations:  An Historical Perspective 
 Historically, SASO is relatively new.  After World War II (WWII) the US began its 
involvement in what is widely considered its first attempt at SASO when it occupied and rebuilt 
Germany and Japan.  Since 1945, there have been 55 ―peace operations,‖ 41 of which began 
after the end of the Cold War.
310
  These conflicts, or operations, have been called many things, to 
include peace operations, nation-building and support and stability operations.  US participation 
had been a constant and will likely continue to be a factor for this nation for many years to come.  
In fact, according to James Dobbins, et al., ―Nation-building, it appears, is the inescapable 
responsibility of the world‘s only superpower.‖311   
 In post WWII Germany the US assumed the role of ―stabilizer‖ and ―rebuilder.‖  
Historical documents reflect the challenges of this role from the start.  The Office of the 
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, established on 1 April 1946, was tasked with a variety of 
coordination and oversight functions.
312
  Soon after, the office realized the complexity of its task.  
In response to shifting organizational frameworks, the G-5 sent a note on 29 August 1945 stating 
that the dynamics of the situation in Germany were new and challenging for a conflict-focused 
military.  The note read, ―certain matters will continue to require combined coordination by some 
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other agency….Displaced Persons operations should not be considered as peculiarly Military 
Government function.‖313    
In an organization which had spent the last several years focused on military victory, the 
new objective of stability through rebuilding, humanitarian assistance and reestablishing 
governments proved difficult.  In fact, a working paper prepared during the Clinton 
administration acknowledged, ―No civilian organization, however, could match the Army‘s 
ability to organize and impose stability in an environment as desperate as that of postwar 
Germany.‖314  The United States realized that it was involved in a new type of operation; one 
which demanded coordination and clear communication among agencies to achieve the common 
objective of stability in Germany.  Despite great efforts over the years, the process by which the 
interagency coordinates is still a challenge, as evidence by the many SASO operations since 
World War II and the current conflict in Iraq.   
Postwar Germany demonstrates the challenges of interagency coordination in its infancy.  
However, this model varies from many of the operations in which the US has participated, in that 
the US was the occupier and temporary government in Germany.  Subsequently, the US has had 
to operate as an outside force with a more short-term mission.  Somalia is evidence of such a 
situation, which represents a more current case for understanding the needs which SASO pose 
and which must be overcome to fully succeed.  Likewise, Somalia is a learning experience 
because it occurred prior to the formation of Presidential Decision Directive 56, the document 
that attempted to establish the lines of communication and control to be used by the interagency 
in future support operations. 
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Civilian/Military Communication Prior to PDD 56:  Lessons from Somalia 
 Somalia was an eye-opening experience for the United States and the world.
315
  The 
United States was forced to move beyond its battle-driven strategies of the past and confront a 
new kind of conflict head-on.  What the US learned and experienced in Somalia in those early 
years of the 1990s has deeply impacted the manner in which the US government looks at 
conflict.  The various phases of the conflict demonstrated repeated attempts to ―get it right‖ and 
―wrap it up‖ as quickly as possible.  The failure of this attempt is enshrined in the minds of many 
Americans with the brutal images represented in the film and book Black Hawk Down.  Somalia 
taught the US the dangers of ―peacekeeping‖ which, in turn, has created a short fuse for tolerance 
from the American people for SASO.  This further creates a demand that the US get in, get it 
done right and get out.  
Brief History of the Conflict/The role of the Interagency in the Somalia Conflict  
 In 1991, a competition for power erupted in conflict in the African nation of Somalia.  
Major General Muhammad Said Barre was overthrown, which resulted in a struggle for power 
among clans.  In the midst of the chaos and conflict, two prominent figures rose to the top and 
competed for power:  General Mohamed Farah and Ali Mahdi Mohamed.
316
   
Food and water shortages compounded the suffering created by the conflict. Somalia 
typically receives less than 20 inches of rain annually.  However, incredibly low levels of rainfall 
for many years created a drought in much of East Africa in the early 1990s.  This drought 
plagued Somalia and left the nation with little food and water.  In fact, in some areas these basic 
                                                 
315
 Since the focus of this monograph is the civil-military communication processes of the USG, this analysis will 
focus on the involvement, communication and strategy of the US and will only address the international community 
when necessary for clarification or explanation. 
316
 James Dobbins et al, America’s Role In Nation-Building:  From Iraq to Germany (Santa Monica, CA:  RAND, 
2003), 55. 
  
 
142 
necessities did not exist at all.
317
  By the early months of 1992, some 500,000 Somalis had died 
from starvation and hundreds of thousands more were in danger of the same.
318
 
In April of 1992, the world responded to the humanitarian crisis in East Africa.  The 
United Nations (UN) Security Council approved Resolution 751 which established UNOSOM, 
the United Nations Operation in Somalia.
319
  Fifty observers and 500 light infantry soldiers were 
sent to Somalia, but failed to stave off famine.  In response, President George H.W. Bush 
ordered the US military to support UNOSOM I‘s mission through Operation Provide Relief 
which commenced on 15 August 1992.  This Central Command (CENTCOM)-organized 
response was commanded by Brigadier General Frank Libutti, United States Marine Corps, and 
had the mission of ―provid[ing] military assistance in support of emergency humanitarian relief 
to Kenya and Somalia.‖  Its objectives included ―deploy[ing] a Humanitarian Assistance Survey 
Team (HAST) to assess relief requirements in Kenya and Somalia; activate[ing] a Joint Task 
Force (JTF) to conduct an emergency airlift of food and supplies into Somalia and Northern 
Kenya; and deploy[ing] (4) C-141 aircraft and (8) C-130 aircraft to Mombasa and Wajir, Kenya 
to provide daily relief sources into Somalia to locations that provided a permissive and safe 
environment.‖320  It was an expansive mission from the start.  
UNOSOM I and Operation Provide Relief failed and on 4 December 1992, with the 
mandate of UN Security Council Resolution 794, President George H.W. Bush announced the 
beginning of Operation Restore Hope under the command of LTG Robert B. Johnston, USMC.  
The US‘s role in the conflict expanded dramatically at this point as it would lead and provide 
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military support to the multilateral United Task Force (UNITAF).
321
  While the overall strategic 
objectives of this new operation remained humanitarian and stabilization, the CENTCOM 
mission statement was revised and expanded to read:  
When directed by the NCA, USCINCCENT will conduct joint/combined military operations in 
Somalia to secure the major air and sea ports, key installations and food distribution points, to 
provide open and free passage of relief supplies, provide security for convoys and relief 
organization operations, and assist UN/NGOs in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices.  
Upon establishing a secure environment for uninterrupted relief operations, USCINCCENT 
terminates and transfers relief operations to UN peacekeeping forces.
322
   
 
The operation proved to be relatively successful as the 38,000 troops, of which 28,000 
were American forces, were able to increase stability and security and mitigate starvation in 
many areas.
323
  However, despite the US‘s continued emphasize on the importance of fulfilling 
the operational mission, which included the handoff of the effort from US command to UN-led 
peacekeeping forces,
324
 the initiation of UNOSOM II was repeatedly postponed.  Opposition 
from UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, who desired a complete demilitarization of the rival 
clans operating in the area and a ―from the top down‖ rebuilding of the nation‘s infrastructure 
prior to transition from a US to UN led operation, slowed the progress of the transition.
325
 
Many of Secretary General Boutros-Ghali‘s concerns were addressed in the third phase of 
combat which commenced on 26 March 1993 with UN Security Council Resolution 814.  
UNOSOM II‘s mandate expanded again to include many of the objectives which Boutros-Ghali 
wished for the US-led UNITAF to address.  Under UNOSOM II the objectives included, ―[T]he 
requirement for UNOMOSM II to disarm the Somali clans; …rehabilitating the political 
institutions and economy of a member state; and…building a secure environment throughout the 
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country.‖326  Also, whereas UNITAF focused on the southern region of Somalia, UNOSOM II 
was focused on the entire country.
327
   
Most importantly, the expanded objectives included many that the international 
community wanted the US to lead in the previous phase.  The US, however, was not the lead 
nation in the third phase.  A UN peacekeeping structure under US Navy Admiral Jonathan 
Howe, who functioned as the representative of the Secretary General, was established in Somalia 
and the US provided only logistical support.
328
  According to Yates, ―Combat operations of a 
limited or irregular nature may be necessary at some point after stability operations are well 
under way.‖329  This proved to be true, as threatened warlords responded to coalition efforts with 
attacks.  The deaths of 24 Pakistani soldiers on 5 June 1993 and the deaths of 18 American 
soldiers on 3 October 1993 weakened the resolve of the US and led to President Clinton‘s 
decision to remove the US forces in Somalia by 31 March 1994.
330
   
Communication between Civilian Agencies/Military:  The Transfer of Strategic Objectives  
 
Communication was a severe problem in the Somalia conflict.  In fact, one senior official 
referred to the conflict in Somalia simply as a strategic communication problem.
331
  The conflict 
was the impetus for a new transition.  Jennifer Morrison Taw states, ―U.S. military commanders 
have also attempted since Operation Restore Hope to limit the extent of their involvement in 
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such activities [humanitarian and civic action] to the absolute minimum.‖332  Clearly Somalia 
was a learning experience for the agencies involved.   
The above brief summary demonstrates that Somalia was indeed a ―learn as you go‖ 
situation.  Toward the end of the US-led UNITAF mission, the interagency representatives had 
the opportunity to assess the situation and determine the way ahead.  When Boutros-Ghali, 
pushed for the US to disarm the violent clans and begin infrastructure reconstruction, the US was 
wary of doing so.  The US recognized the success that was occurring and the potentially volatile 
situation, which could ensue should unity of command be lost.  Therefore, as the interagency 
players determined their future strategy, they needed to find a manner to inform the UN that the 
US was successfully meeting the mission of UNITAF and that a hasty transition was not 
beneficial.  By allowing UNOSOM II to be enacted, the US forfeited both the progress that was 
being made and compounded the difficulties of the situation by allowing the mandate to be 
unrealistically expanded.  If the situation were tenuous enough to cause the US to question the 
readiness of transition, it certainly was not stable enough to expand the mission.    
This decision provides evidence of a common problem which Jennifer Morrison Taw 
highlights.  She states, ―[C]ivil-military and civic action operations are often considered implied 
tasks, required for establishing a stable and secure environment as well as valuable for force 
protection.‖333  Under UNITAF/Operation Restore Hope the US military was only to provide a 
secure environment and assist UN/NGO‘s in humanitarian efforts.  The language of the mission 
itself was confusing, and stated that direction would come from NCA and USCINCENT but that 
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assistance in humanitarian efforts would be conducted ―under UN auspices.‖334 Did this 
language imply that the US forces were to provide security while assisting the UN/NGOs with 
the help of the UN?  It is very unclear who was helping whom.  The military naturally wants to 
do what it does best: combat, security, etc.  In the case of Somalia, there was a very ambiguous 
line between where the US effort ended and the outside and UN humanitarian assistance began.   
As the objectives were met, the US military undoubtedly began to feel the pressure of the 
UN to expand its mission to state-building and other activities outside of its mandate (―mission 
creep‖).  Without further instruction, the US Army was left with a disconnect concerning what 
exactly it was to provide.  It appears that in the case of Operation Restore Hope, the issue was 
that of ambiguous language and a lack of direct instruction from the US government.  
If the US military is to lead, it needs to be clearly communicated what exactly is to be 
led.  This problem appears to be widespread.  An anonymous UN Commander said, ―None of the 
political leadership can tell me what they want me to accomplish.  That fact, however, does not 
stop them from continually asking me when I will be done.‖335  As Morrison Taw states, ―For the 
Army, this tension between short-term and long-term goals is mirrored in the internal debate 
over how much humanitarian assistance the Army should provide.‖336   
In situations of multilateral effort, the US government needs to clearly state what 
missions and tasks are expected of the US military.  Civil-military communication must be at an 
all time high when cooperating with other nations because outside input and coordination will 
serve only to further cloud an unclear US strategic picture.  Clear delineation of responsibility is 
essential and presents another challenge for the interagency process.  However, even if lines of 
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responsibility are drawn, ambiguous rhetoric can seriously impede clear and correct 
interpretation of strategy and responsibility.  Just as the mission of US forces in Somalia was 
unclear due to cloudy instructions, US forces today face the same challenges in the Iraq and 
Afghanistan conflicts.   
Ambiguous and unclear rhetoric can be a challenge at all levels and in all situations.  
Most importantly, change and reform must start at the top.  In Washington, where top-level 
officials are involved in interagency coordination, the effort for clear understanding must be a 
priority.  After Somalia and subsequent conflicts of a similar nature, such as those in Haiti and 
Kosovo, the USG realized the need for a comprehensive document that outlined the manner in 
which support and stability operations would be conducted.  This document, Presidential 
Decision Directive 56 and its successor, National Security Presidential Directive 44, provides a 
prime example of how rhetoric and poorly coordinated language can produce varying 
interpretations and subsequently varying methods by which to proceed in an operation.   
The use of the written word is invaluable in large bureaucratic endeavors such as those 
involved in interagency coordination.  Documents must be clear and easily understood to 
produce the intended effect:  effective coordination and communication within the interagency in 
support and stability operations.  Perhaps it was a new realization or perhaps it was merely the 
frustration of Somalia;
337
 nevertheless, PDD 56 attempted to meet this challenge and repair the 
many communication challenges which had plagued the USG up to that point. 
The Drafting of PDD 56  
According to the Interagency Management of Complex Crisis Operations Handbook, 
―‗Success‘ in complex foreign crises requires that the interagency simultaneously address all 
aspects of a crisis -- diplomatic, political, military, humanitarian, and social – in a coordinated 
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fashion.‖338  Intricate coordination such as this demands that all involved agencies have an 
understanding of the strategic objective of the situation.  Official documents for communication 
are perhaps the most central and tangible representation of that understanding.   
In May 1997, PDD 56 attempted to establish clear lines of interagency coordination,
339
 
supervision and communication for the new type of conflict in the post Cold War security 
environment.  Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56) attempted to explain ―key elements 
of the Clinton Administration‘s policy on managing contingency operations.‖340  It was PDD 56 
that first attempted to institutionalize many of the policies and procedures and incorporate 
lessons learned from within Washington and from the field.
341
 
Key Assumptions and Efforts to Limit Military Involvement  
 Several key assumptions affect the interpretation of PDD 56.  First, the document 
assumes that complex contingency operations will continue in the future.  The document, 
however, was drawn up as a reaction to the experiences of recent conflicts such as Somalia.  
Nevertheless, the document tries to strike a balance between the past and the future with a 
second goal that future operations will be conducted in coalitions if at all possible.
342
  By default, 
this assumption requires a heightened level of diplomatic involvement. 
 Considering the stinging experience of Somalia, it is not surprising to see the attention 
that PDD 56 gives to limiting military involvement when necessary.  PDD 56 presents the view 
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that ―In many complex emergencies the appropriate U.S. Government response will incur the 
involvement of only non-military assets‖ and ―U.S. forces should not be deployed in an 
operation indefinitely.‖343  These statements, as a whole, appeal both to the civilian and military.  
The first statement demonstrates a clear plan-oriented goal, which appeals to the planning needs 
of the military.  The second statement acknowledges the process aspects which are favorable to 
the State Department.   
While the policy may be relatively clear, the connotations of words such as ―response‖ 
can be interpreted very differently and may be taken to mean operations by the military and 
negotiations by the State Department.  This dual interpretation can lead to an unintended reliance 
upon the military during crisis when time is limited because the military is often more likely to 
have contingency plans prepared for a variety of situations.  However, the document appears to 
acknowledge this tendency with its effort to ―reduce pressure on the military to expand its 
involvement in unplanned ways.‖344     
Focus on Integration and Functional Management  
 The document attempts to limit military involvement in complex contingency operations 
whenever possible; nevertheless, it likewise acknowledges the importance of integration and 
coordination during the planning processes of the conflict.  Integration helps ―identify 
appropriate missions and tasks,…develop strategies for early resolution of crises,…accelerate 
planning and implementation of the civilian aspects of the operation, [and] integrate all 
components of a U.S. response (civilian, military, police, etc.) at the policy level and facilitate 
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the creation of coordination mechanisms at the operational level.‖345  As the document 
progresses, the usage of military terms such as ―operations‖ and ―mission‖ become more 
prevalent almost to the point of loosing the dual interpretation found at the beginning of the 
document.  This creates an unclear and inconsistent interpretation.   
 The ambiguity of terms is once again corrected when the document addresses the role of 
functional management.  PDD 56 establishes the role of Executive Committees (ExComms) that 
are formed out of the Deputies Committee but may include more organizations that are not 
typically included in the NSC structure.  ExComm, in turn, acts as ―functional managers for 
specific elements of the U.S. Government response (e.g., refugees, demobilization, elections, 
economic assistance, police reform, public information, etc.).‖346  While the document calls for 
this concept of functional management to be used in future operations, it is difficult to discern 
what method will be used in the delegation process.  PDD 56 requires that the Deputies 
Committee make these assignments, but does not discuss how these determinations are made.  
This adds an element of confusion to political-military (pol-mil) planning. 
Pol-Mil Implementation Plan and Rehearsal  
 PDD 56 calls for a pol-mil plan to be developed through an integrated process.  The goal 
of the plan is ―to centralize planning and decentralize execution during the operation.‖347  The 
plan is to first designate the functional roles of ExComm (through a process undefined), who 
will, in turn, develop their specific parts of the plan.  The sections will then be analyzed and 
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coordinated ―among all relevant agencies‖ and finally developed into a final product.348  
Although there are many requirements of the pol-mil plan, the basic concept of delegation, 
decentralized drafts followed by coordinated discussions, and finally decentralized execution 
creates a situation in which each agency can focus on its functional role. 
 This method has benefits and shortcomings.  The greatest potential benefit is that each 
agency, if delegated with agency-appropriate tasks, is able to develop its section of the plan in a 
language that reflects the social knowledge and culture of that specific agency.  However, the 
shortcoming is that much of the detailed understanding runs the risk of being lost in debate and 
later formed into unclear language.   Conversely, the fruitfulness of the debate may be minimized 
due to a perception of ―areas of specialization.‖  If one agency has been dedicated to forming the 
plan for a certain area, then the perception is that they must be the authority on that topic area.
349
   
 After the plan is developed, PDD 56 calls for a period for plan rehearsal.  The goal of this 
period is ―simultaneously rehearsal/reviewing [of] all elements of the plan.‖350  The ExComm is 
to present the various elements of the plan before the operation is launched or as soon as possible 
after its initiation, ―before subsequent critical phase[s] during the operation, as major changes in 
the mission occur, prior to an operation‘s termination‖ and then with an after-action review.351  
While this incremental review process is conceptually beneficial, it becomes unrealistic during 
support and stability operations, which may occur with little or no prior notice.     
Training 
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 Emphasis on training is a key strength of PDD 56.  The document calls for yearly training 
(if not more frequently) of mid-level managers.  During the training, the officials are given the 
opportunity to better understand the process of the pol-mil plan development, implementation 
and experiences.
352
  To be successful, training requires forums for open discussion and 
reflection, and clarification of the ―intentions‖ for missions, tasks, coordination, delegation, and 
responsibilities and accountability.  Also, there should remain some continuity and progression 
in training if at all possible.  The goal of the training should be to continually build a foundation 
of managers who are well equipped and knowledgeable of the plan‘s intentions.  If different 
managers are trained each year, the project runs the risk of losing its key strengths of consistency 
and development .  The process should ensure that trained leaders are continually ―brought up to 
speed‖ and re-trained on the strategies and intentions of the ExComm, while also introducing 
new mid-levels leaders to the training process.  This process will help to ensure consistency of 
understanding which is absolutely critical in SASO. 
Expected/Intended Outcomes  
 As a comprehensive document, PDD 56 faced many challenges.  The Clinton 
Administration needed to institutionalize key policies that would reflect the challenges 
encountered in conflicts like Somalia.  As a ―first shot‖ at developing methods for assessing and 
responding to conflicts, the document was quite effective.  Ambiguous terms such as ―response,‖ 
―mission,‖ and ―operation‖ had value because they allowed the document to appeal to the 
different agencies by presenting phraseology which was conducive to the different social 
climates of the organizations; however, it also presented an ambiguous intention.  Also, while the 
division of elements of the plan to different agencies allowed for specialization to be developed, 
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it can also stifle debate.  Overall, the key strengths of PDD 56 were also its greatest weaknesses; 
diversity allows for broad appeal but diminishes consistent understanding.  For some reason, 
PDD 56 was never really implemented
353
 as written;  therefore, with a new administration came 
another attempt at remedying the communication challenges which still plagued the US 
government.  The development of NSPD 44 attempted to modify the policies of PDD 56 and 
presented a new method by which to approach the challenges of SASO. 
NSPD 44:  Transformation of Communication  
 PDD 56 represents the US Government‘s first attempt to manage and coordinate the 
efforts of various government agencies in support and stability operations through a policy 
directive.  Admittedly the world in which NSPD 44 (2005) was drafted was far different from the 
pre-911 world in which PDD 56 (1997) was drafted, which perhaps highlights the key 
distinctions evident when comparing the two documents:  NSPD 44s focuses on security and 
PDD 56s focused on managing conflict.  Under NSPD 44, the US Government not only had to 
address the challenges of support and stability operations, but also it had to address new 
challenges for US security.  However, the scrapping of PDD 56 in favor of a new document may 
exemplify common critiques that with each administration comes the attitude of ―we are the first 
to deal with this‖ and ―this is a new challenge.‖  Nevertheless, NSPD 44 was a renewed attempt 
to streamline strategic communication and coordination between the agencies of the government.  
Unfortunately, it failed to remedy many of the rhetorical ambiguities which plagued PDD 56. 
PDD 56 versus NSPD 44:  A Comparison  
 NSPD 44 is very different from PDD 56 on many levels.  The first difference is the focus 
on security.  The document begins, ―The purpose of this Directive is to promote the security of 
the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for 
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reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in 
transition from conflict or civil strife.‖354  While the intention of PDD 56 was likely also 
security, it did not expressly state so in such an overt fashion.  The second key difference of the 
documents is NSPD 44‘s focus on preemption.  Whereas PDD 56 states that the document is 
expressly for ―interagency planning of future complex contingency operations,‖355  NSPD 44 
speaks of the need ―to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly 
and effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, 
democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law.‖356  This difference expands the 
policy mandate of the interagency to include potentially any type of conflict.   
A final key difference between the two documents is NSPD 44‘s express designation of 
the Secretary of State (with the option of the assistance of the Coordinator for Reconstruction 
and Stabilization), as the ―focal point‖ of these types of efforts.357  While this appears to be a 
clear mandate, one can see that the policy guidance of the document creates a much broader 
mandate for action while at the same time blurring the lines of responsibility between the State 
and Defense Departments. 
 NSPD 44 calls for the Secretary of State to ―coordinate and lead integrated United States 
Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to 
prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.‖358  While this may 
seem clear at first, one must consider that the document addresses an extended collection of 
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conflicts which may or may not include a heavy military component.  This inevitably carries a 
potentially large responsibility for the military.  The authors of the document appear to recognize 
that fact midway through and state, ―The Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the 
Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military 
operations across the spectrum of conflict.‖359  Once this statement has been made, however, any 
effort for centralized coordination by designating the Secretary of State as the ―focal point‖ is 
lost and an ambiguous line of authority again prevails. 
 Unclear lines of authority and communication are mistakes which are easily repeated.  As 
was discussed, the conflict in Somalia demonstrated these challenges.  The US military‘s relative 
success during Operation Restore Hope prompted the UN to hastily expand the mandate of the 
operation while also hastily transitioning the authority and centrality of the operation away from 
the military.  As history has shown, in the Somalia case, this proved disastrous.  The unclear 
designations of authority within NSPD 44 risk repeating this failure.  While the document may 
rightly place authority for support and stability operations in the hands of civilians, it does so 
half-heartedly while simultaneously expanding the scope of operations which may fall under 
civilian authority.  History has shown that simultaneous unclear transition of authority and 
expansion of operation produces ambiguity which, in turn, inhibits clear strategic communication 
and coordination. 
Key Language  
 The language used and the policies presented within NSPD 44 are very different than 
those presented in PDD 56.  Because PDD 56 focused on detailed process and NSPD 44 focuses 
on harmonization and preemptive planning, a different interpretation of the language used in 
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NSPD 44 immediately arises.  Despite the document calling for the Secretary of State to be the 
―focal point,‖ which has already been discussed, the document also states that the coordination 
between civilian and military is ―to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. 
military operations across the spectrum of conflict.‖360   
 Because NSPD 44 is a policy document which is meant to give direction to all members 
of the interagency process, one can easily assume that members of these various organizations 
will not be reading the document in the same room together at all times.  Therefore, 
interpretation of the rhetoric is necessary to convey the message.  For instance, if the message of 
the document reads that the State Department is in charge, but must harmonize its efforts with 
planned or ongoing Defense Department operations, it is highly likely that someone of the State 
Department would take away a different message than someone at the Defense Department.  In 
this particular case the word ―harmonization‖ is in question.  What does this really mean?  
Essentially, it depends upon who is reading it.   
 The nature of bureaucracies is to demonstrate authority over whatever it is permitted 
within what it considers its jurisdiction, or turf, in terms of traditional agency missions, tasks, 
resources, culture, etc.  When reading NSPD 44, it is highly likely that an official in the 
Department of Defense may understand its reference to ―harmonization‖ as an indication that the 
State Department must harmonize its plans with what the military already has planned.  In other 
words, while the State Department may be the ―focal point‖ it will always be placed in a position 
in which it must adapt its plans in order to mirror the existing military plans, such as in the 
conventional phases in the War in Iraq.  In a case such as this, it could be interpreted that the 
State Department must always default to the military because it is the military‘s job to have 
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operational and contingency plans in place for virtually all parts of the world and every situation.  
Conversely, a State Department official reading NSPD 44 may read the word ―harmonize‖ to 
mean that the Defense Department must tailor its plans to coordinate with the plans put forth by 
the Secretary of State.  One can see how a dual interpretation of a single term can produce 
entirely different interpretations of the same passage. 
 The drafters of NSPD 44 may have envisioned the problems that the language could 
create.  Such a realization may have sparked the designation of a Policy Coordination Committee 
as outlined.  Whereas PDD 56‘s ExComm members were to be expressly tasked with individual 
responsibilities, NSPD 44 designates only the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization 
as the chair of the committee.  Beyond that, no clear divisions of labor are established. 
 Some may argue that all it takes is a clear understanding among senior officials to 
remedy the problem of multiple interpretations.  That may, in fact, be the intended function of 
the PCC.  However, the document does not make that clear.  It may be the point of these 
documents to provide a concrete written policy directive to be used throughout the interagency 
with a verbal understanding at the highest levels.  However, in large bureaucracies such as within 
the US government, a senior official cannot ensure that his or her entire organization has the 
same understanding of a document as he or she does.  Therefore, reliance upon written word is 
essential as an integral part of successful operations.  And, as has been shown, the rhetoric of 
these documents is often insufficient to produce uniform interpretation among the agencies. 
Expected/Intended Outcome  
 When drafting NSPD 44, the Bush Administration was already deep into the Iraq War 
and had an understanding of the complex nature that this ―new‖ type of conflict presented.  
However, the perception that the conflict was ―new‖ may have hindered the intended outcome of 
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the policy document.  In an effort to acknowledge the need for civilian support of the military, 
because the military could not meet all of the challenges that the conflict posed, NSPD 44 
attempted to provide a ―bridge‖ for transition.  It intended to place authority in the hands of the 
civilians to begin the process of a civilian takeover of many of the aspects of the conflict.  
However, the document was not able to start that process because it did not clarify how the 
ongoing action would be coordinated.  Because NSPD 44 failed to designate a way to establish 
the transition of authority to the civilian agencies, it is now caught in a holding pattern in which 
the military must retain increased authority in SASO due to the ―hot‖ wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.   
 Perhaps NSPD 44 will find more success in a future support and stability operations.  If 
implemented from the beginning of the conflict with the State Department as the ―focal point,‖ 
there may be a greater likelihood that the processes are interpreted in the intended manner.  
However, if a conflict is ongoing, the directive has little chance of success due to unclear rhetoric 
and perceived contradictions.   
 A final interpretive difference which may influence the future impact of the document is 
how the State Department and the Defense Department interpret language which suggests 
preemption.  Civil contingency planning and military contingency planning are very different in 
nature.  As has been previously discussed in Marcella‘s cultural comparison, the State 
Department prefers flexibility and options while the Defense Department dislikes ambiguity and 
unclear end states.  Therefore, the contingency plans that the two organizations develop are 
going to be very different in nature.  Subsequently, if a developing conflict becomes a crisis with 
little time for planning and preparation, as is typically the case, it will be natural for the US 
Government to default to military plans due to the likelihood that they will be more concrete, 
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organized and planned from start to finish.  No other federal agency has the military‘s capacity 
and supporting culture for planning in terms of organization, people, resources, education, 
training and experience.  One thing which the military and policymakers have in common is their 
constant search for certainty.   It is reasonable to expect that for the immediate future military 
contingency planning is likely to offer more substantial efforts than will the Department of State. 
NSPD 44 and DODD 3000.05 
 Only a few days before NSPD 44 was formalized, the Department of Defense put out 
Directive 3000.05.  While this analysis in no way intends to posit that the document was 
intended to override or contradict NSPD  44, it does appear to embody the interpretive 
challenges that are presented by the characteristically unclear rhetoric used in interagency-wide 
directives.  This analysis will examine the possibility that DoDD 3000.05 may have formalized 
its interpretation of NSPD 44 in an effort to minimize ambiguity.  
 DoDD 3000.05 begins by establishing some key definitions.  These include the definition 
for stability operations, which is ―military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum 
from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.‖  The definitions of 
―[m]ilitary support to stability, security, transition and reconstruction (SSTR),‖ which are 
―Department of Defense activities that support U.S. Government plans for stabilization, security, 
reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. 
interests.‖  Other key assertions made by the document include that stability operations ―shall be 
given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across 
all DoD activities..,‖ and the realization that ―[m]any stability operations tasks are best 
performed by indigenous, foreign or U.S. civilian professionals.  Nonetheless, U.S. military 
  
 
160 
forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when 
civilians cannot do so.‖361 
 While the majority of the document deals primarily with the responsibilities of the 
various DoD Under Secretaries, the document states, ―Assistance and advice shall be provided to 
and sought from the Department of State and other U.S. Departments and Agencies, as 
appropriate, for developing stability operations capabilities.‖362  Interestingly, despite the fact 
that DoDD 3000.05 and NSPD 44 were released so closely together, they address the same issue 
of coordination from seemingly contradictory standpoints.  While this is clearly not an overt 
attempt to be contradictory, it demonstrates the unclear understanding of the policy presented in 
NSPD 44 and attempts to create rhetoric which matches the needs of understanding of the DoD.  
When interagency-wide directives fail to provide clear language to dictate the policies and 
communication patterns which should be institutionalized within each organization, what are the 
individual agencies to do?   
 The value of the written word is indisputable.  It serves as the medium in which to ensure 
consistency of thought and concrete visual representation of a government‘s policy decisions.  
However, consistency of thought does not necessarily translate into consistency of interpretation.  
The United States is fortunate to have many government organizations and departments which 
possess uniquely different missions and cultures.  This fact is what makes the efforts of the 
interagency process comprehensive and strong while at the same time creating potential 
challenges which, if unacknowledged, can minimize effectiveness.   
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 The past sixty years have demonstrated that the United States, as the world‘s superpower, 
is in a unique position.  Instability within foreign nations, weak leaders and cultural conflicts 
have created a new type of combat of a dynamic nature which demands the expertise of the 
various US agencies.  The culture of the military alone or the culture of the State Department 
alone is not sufficient to succeed.  Somalia demonstrated the delicate balance needed between 
military might and civil humanitarian efforts.  Likewise, the failures of Somalia demonstrated the 
need for clear strategic communication and coordination.  Without a clear understanding of who 
will do what and who is in charge of what operations, the agencies are left responding to 
dynamic crises in an ad hoc fashion.  This approach has proven ineffective. 
 In an effort to develop a plan by which support and stability operations could be 
executed, the Clinton administration formed PDD 56.  The detailed, comprehensive nature of the 
plan provided the kind of detail that the military craves.  It also acknowledged the need for the 
civilian agencies to step up and take over in many areas that had previously been filled by the 
military.  However, the directive also used rhetoric that proved to be ambiguous and unclear, 
which may have contributed to view that the plan never being fully implemented despite several 
SASO operations in countries such as Kosovo. 
 In the wake of 9/11, the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the realization that the 
current interagency processes were not fulfilling the USG‘s strategic objectives, the Bush 
administration again attempted to streamline the interagency communication and coordination 
with NSPD 44.  However, because the conflict in question was already in progress, the language 
of the document proved to be unclear and at times almost contradictory.  Agencies were left to 
their own interpretation, which may indicate that DoDD 3000.05 was a partial attempt to 
institutionalize national policy in a coherent manner that appealed mainly to the military culture. 
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 Clearly, insufficient rhetoric is a problem in interagency efforts.  Theories of 
communication and of interagency dynamics indicate that the struggle to keep debate fresh and 
alive and the ability to clearly communicate intention is not an easy feat.  However, if the USG is 
to be more effective in support and stability operations, it must take advantage of all of the 
strengths that the interagency has to offer.  To do so, it must present a united front.  And, in order 
to present a united front, it must operate from a common understanding of policy.   
A Way Forward 
 Under the current directives, the understanding of intended coordination and 
communication patterns will probably not improve.  Therefore, this analysis will make 
recommendations for the development of future directives that seek to coordinate the interagency 
process for support and stability operations and develop an approach in its phraseology to help 
assure that the rhetoric is interpreted as intended.  This analysis will also offer insights as to how 
to understand the potentially varying interpretations and subsequent implementation of policy 
under current NSPD 44. 
 The first recommendation is for the interagency to develop an awareness of the varying 
organizational cultures that each agency brings to the table.  These cultures affect interpretation.  
The term interagency in and of itself carries an implication for the necessity of understanding 
multiple principals and agents.  Just as it is important for the US to understand the culture of 
another nation when communicating, it is important for the various US agencies to understand 
the differing cultures which each brings to the interagency process.  Understanding differing 
communications patterns is critical to a truly comprehensive approach and should not be 
inadvertently devalued in the rush to put out guidance, even in crisis situations.     
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When agencies seek to coordinate the rhetoric of a document in a manner which is 
appealing to all, it is important to question how each is interpreting the rhetoric.  Again, the use 
of the term ―response‖ can be interpreted very differently between, for example, the State 
Department, USAID and Department of Defense.  Therefore, merely selecting words which 
appeal to all is not sufficient as some phrases may confuse the situation rather than clarify.   
 Similar to the need for understanding agency culture and interpretation is the need to 
understand the implementation patterns of the various agencies.  For example, should the 
interagency process determine that a certain strategy demands that X objective must be fulfilled, 
it must realize that the manner in which the various organizations will go about fulfilling that 
objective are very different.  For example, if the objective is securing a particular village in Iraq, 
the agencies must realize how their approaches are inevitably going to vary given their differing 
cultures.  While it may seem obvious to say that the objective of ―security‖ may be achieved in a 
different manner by the military than by USAID or State, it is much more than that.  Timelines, 
willingness to accept flexibility, and satisfactory end states are likely to be very different.  There 
must be an understanding of these precepts prior to embarking on a joint effort or there will 
inevitably be confusion, frustration and, subsequently, less effective results. 
 The above two recommendations are those which must be considered in all phases of 
interagency coordination.  However, because the current policy directives that outline the 
processes for strategic communication and coordination are ambiguous and unclear, it is all the 
more important that the officials of the various agencies take the time to establish a common 
understanding of strategy and objectives at the highest levels.  If the officials in Washington are 
able to create a climate of common interpretation, then they will be more likely to disseminate 
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consistent interpretations to their respective organizations to create a climate of enhanced 
coordination both operationally and tactically. 
 Since it is highly likely that the US will continue to be involved in support and stability 
operations, the agencies must develop a policy for coordination and communication that clearly 
outlines a commonly interpreted process for carrying out policy and strategy.  Due to the 
rhetorical challenges and unclear lines of responsibility that the current directive poses, this 
analysis recommends that the process begin for formulating a new directive that approaches 
support and stability operations from two perspectives:  one that addresses specifically how to 
proceed in the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and one that addresses more generally 
how SASO should be approached in the future.   
NSPD 44 has demonstrated the challenges that arise when a directive is drafted in the 
middle of a conflict.  It is difficult to make the transitions of authority when one organization is 
put in authority while another is in the midst of completing the very operations that will 
inevitably be affected by such transitions.  It is equally important for the civilian agencies to 
have a role in this type of conflict.  Therefore, any new directive must acknowledge these 
necessities and challenges and approach drafting the directive in a manner that comes closer to 
satisfying the needs of each agency while improving the process overall. 
If a new directive that outlines the policies for coordination and communication in the 
interagency is drafted, it needs to address necessary rhetorical and policy-development structural 
changes.  A new directive for interagency coordination in support and stability operations must 
include clearer rhetoric.  By implementing the theoretical concepts of complexity theory, a new 
document would embrace the idea that, to a certain extent, different interpretations can be a good 
thing and that change in inevitable.  A new policy directive must have built into it the ability for 
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adaptation.  As complexity theory acknowledges, change is inevitable and should be included as 
a characteristic of the situation at hand rather than an interruption.  Also, change can occur at any 
level, making it necessary for clear yet dynamic lines of communication to be in place for both 
top-down and bottom-up communication.  This realization will fundamentally change the 
rhetoric used in a new directive. 
 Paradoxically, a new directive must be able to embody a line of communication that is 
consistent and flexible.  For example, while the role of civilian agencies is critical in support and 
stability operations, something may change in Iraq tomorrow at the tactical level that demands 
that the military take temporary control over the execution of a ―civilian‖  operation.  If change is 
feared, the result will be chaos.  However, if change is built into the directive, then it will be 
clearer as to when the military should be in authority and when it should relinquish its command 
back to the civilians.  A 2005 Government Accountability Office report states, ―Collaborating 
agencies should work together to define and agree on their respective roles and responsibilities, 
including how the collaborative effort will be led.‖363  While it may be desirable for interagency 
documents to be short and succinct, clarity and thoroughness must not be sacrificed in the name 
of brevity.  More clearly established lines of authority and coordination will require that terms 
such as ―response‖ and ―harmonization‖ are more thoroughly fleshed out rather than assuming 
that in times of crises a common understanding will be developed. 
 In a perfect world, the bureaucracy of the US Government would allow for a situation in 
which every officer of each department would be able to meet personally with the Secretary or 
head official of that organization in order to discuss the goals, objectives and intent of an 
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operation.  Of course, that is not possible.  Therefore, the agencies must rely upon the written 
word to convey these messages.  But, how are the many organizations as outlined in NSPD 1
364
 
to develop a common rhetoric which appeals to the organizational culture of their various 
agencies?  While it may be possible for the leaders of these organizations to come to a common 
understanding while meeting together face-to-face, it may very well be impossible to find 
language which will mean the same thing to an army general as it does to an ambassador.   
 The final, and perhaps most drastic recommendation, is the idea that the entire structure 
of policy development for SASO must change.  The rhetorical purposes of documents ―are 
shaped by contingencies specific to the organization in question‖365 and that ―technical writers 
are conscious of and accommodate the idiosyncratic constraints imposed by their organizations 
in the production of technical documents, as well as the expected constraints of subject 
matter.‖366  The leaders of the interagency organizations gather together to discuss these policy 
issues because they each bring a different expertise to the discussion.  Unfortunately, this 
expertise and organizational cultural understanding is often lost as the various agencies try to 
―harmonize‖ and ―coordinate‖ the rhetoric to be used in policy.   
 Harmonization and coordination are indeed essential and debate should not be neglected.  
However, the entire of purpose of these activities in Washington is to set the stage for 
coordination in the field where strategy is put to work.  In an effort to make coordination 
―seamless,‖ the upper levels of the interagency may have ―harmonized‖ the language of these 
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policy documents to an extent in which they no longer hold interpretive value for the individual 
organizations.   
 The final recommendation of this analysis is that the USG return to a system in which the 
organizational climate and expertise of the various agencies are upheld and articulated.  By 
focusing on what each organization brings to the effort at the highest levels, the agencies have a 
better chance of seeing true coordination in the field.  Organizational climate can be enhanced 
and utilized to the fullest by allowing each organization to draft a version of the policy directive 
using language which will be commonly interpreted by the people of that organization.  This 
does not mean that each organization drafts its own policy and operates without the knowledge 
and coordination of the others.  Rather, it takes advantage of the expertise of the agency heads 
and their understanding of their organization‘s culture and uses that knowledge to draft 
phraseology which will be understood clearly and consistently.     
 The agencies must take advantage of committees such as the PCC and ExComm and use 
them to get on the same page figuratively, not necessarily literally.  For example, Secretary Rice 
and Secretary Gates should be able to sit in the same room, speak, debate and reach an 
understanding of the policy objectives for the interagency.  In turn, they can then draft a 
specialized directive which uses language which will convey that message to their organizations 
without losing coordination at the highest levels.  Conversely, if they come to a verbal 
understanding and they try to compromise on language and draft a document in the hope that it 
will be commonly interpreted, their chances of maintaining that high level of understanding 
sharply declines.   
The US government should rely upon the creativity of its leaders and allow them to 
exercise their cultural knowledge and experience.  Written instructions and policies are critical, 
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but must be drafted in a way that allows for proper interpretation and implementation.  This may 
not be possible when tens of authors are present, all trying to agree upon a single word that will 
mean the same thing to all of their organizations.  By relying upon differing organizational 
expertise at the highest levels in Washington, the agencies‘ hopes for successful communication 
and coordination (from top-to-bottom and bottom-to-top) will actually increase in the field. 
 In a brief summary, the recommendations of this analysis are broken down into those that 
should be revised and implemented under NSPD 44 and those that should be considered when a 
new interagency coordination directive is drafted. 
Under NSPD 44: 
• The agencies must develop an awareness of the varying organizational cultures which 
each agency brings to the table and how that culture affects interpretation. 
 • The agencies must develop an understanding of how organizational culture  
affects implementation patterns by the various agencies. 
Considerations for the Future: 
• A new directive for interagency coordination in support and stability operations must 
include clearer rhetoric. 
• Clear rhetoric is established by relying upon organizational expertise at the highest 
levels and implementing a process in which each agency develops a document, an 
implementing directive that contains rhetoric that will be commonly interpreted by that 
specific organization rather than one common document which contains vague and 
subsequently ambiguous language. 
Conclusion 
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 Considering the recent history of the United States, the challenges of support and stability 
operations appear to be a relatively new phenomenon.  This type of conflict does not appear to be 
fleeting and will likely plague the US for many years to come.  Past conflicts, such as Somalia, 
have demonstrated the need for interagency coordination and for US and international  military 
and civilian agencies to be involved in the effort.  Additionally, conflicts such as Somalia have 
also demonstrated how difficult it is to communicate clearly and coordinate effectively among  
high-level organizations in Washington and New York, and implementers in the field.  Theories 
such as complexity theory by Philip Salem and the governmental interaction theories that Vicki 
Rast addresses, allow us to look at these types of conflicts in an objective manner by separating 
ourselves from the discussions of whether a certain strategy is good or bad.  These theories also 
allow us to understand the obstacles to cooperation that are inherent in organizations, in light of 
the differing cultures, missions, and preferences.  Conflicts are unavoidable and can actually 
benefit the interagency process since it is absolutely critical that the US government have a 
variety of diverse strengths to rely upon when meeting the demands of complex civil-military 
operations.   
 Given the challenges that Somalia and other conflicts have posed, the past two 
administrations have attempted to draft directives that institutionalize a process by which 
interagency coordination and communication are streamlined.  However, the rhetoric of these 
documents has proven to be insufficient or contradictory.  Unclear language has allowed for 
multiple interpretations and failed to acknowledge that the interagency is composed of very 
different agencies, each with its own organizational culture. 
 For USG policies and strategies in support and stability operations to be successful in the 
future, the processes that underpin the manner in which the interagency interacts must be 
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improved.  Drawing upon the expertise of the organizations, and treating their differences as 
strengths rather than weaknesses, will create a climate that is more conducive to the drafting of 
policy that meets the immediate needs of the situation.  Interpretation determines if rhetoric is 
clear or not.  By ensuring that directives are interpreted as intended,  correctly and from the 
beginning, the interagency has a better chance of seeing its strategy implemented successfully.  
Clarity must begin in Washington. 
 
B. Counterinsurgency Doctrine FM 3-24 and Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Bottom-Up 
 Review 
     Tyson Voelkel 
 
―Do not take the first step without considering the last.‖—Carl Von Clausewitz 
This paper provides a bottom-up review of Operation Iraqi Freedom to compare it to 
current counterinsurgency doctrine FM 3-24 (COIN) from a tactical perspective.
367
  Two 
vignettes will compare and contrast the prescriptive solutions from COIN with actions personally 
experienced in Iraq from March 2003 to February 2004.  
 The U.S. military is the most capable force in the history of warfare, but is it flexible 
enough to adapt to the paradigm shift in war fighting in an asymmetric conflict? If so, what is the 
best method of implementing changes, and does the COIN FM 3-24 provide the guidance 
necessary for such a change? Does the document provide prescriptive solutions for soldiers 
conducting counterinsurgency in Iraq, especially when ―the guerrilla wins if he does not lose?‖368 
History is a good indicator of future performance and many strategists, politicians, and scholars 
believe continuation of current policies in Iraq may overstretch our military and decrease the 
influence America has on the stability of Iraq and the Middle East. The range of options for 
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improving our military capabilities in support of COIN is considerable, but success hinges on the 
political will of American policymakers and the ability for tactical-level operational success.
369
   
Overview of American Military Strategy and Counterinsurgency (COIN) Warfare 
 In March 2007, America stands alone as the world‘s greatest economic and military 
power. The values that made America great in the 20
th
 century are unchanged in the eyes of 
policymakers in the 21
st
 century: liberty, capitalism, and economic liberalism drove America to 
find innovative solutions during the 20
th
 century for the betterment of humankind as well as the 
development of the most destructive weapons in history. Nation-states were the key players in 
the 20
th
 century, with most of the period dedicated to a bipolar balancing act between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. Strategies for success focused on robust military strength, nuclear 
stockpiles, and economic aid packages to countries sympathetic to democracy proved successful.   
 Coups organized, funded, and often led by U.S. covert operations were common and seen 
as necessary in the fight against the Red Army and communist ideology. The U.S. outlasted the 
Soviet Union and at the end of the Cold War it seemed the world would be safer with the 
benevolent United States as the sole superpower dominating world affairs.  
 Fast forward to the 1990s. Terrorism and rogue regimes replaced communism as the 
largest threat to the United States. Humanitarian intervention dominated public discourse as the 
United States committed troops to Somalia and organized a multinational force to address 
problems in Bosnia and Kosovo.
370
 In the meantime, ethnic civil wars were erupting in 
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Chechnya, Tajikistan, Myanmar, Kashmir, Sri Lanka and Croatia. The options for what U.S. 
policy should be toward intervention in the 1990s ranged from Chaim Kaufmann‘s nuanced 
support of external intervention in all ethnic wars to the other side of the scale, represented by 
Barry Posen‘s prescriptions based on internal solutions.371 Policymakers struggled with what role 
the United States would play in these conflicts and in one case stood by idly during the slaughter 
of 800,000 Rwandans—raising questions about American commitment and benevolence.372  
 In the 1990s, issues of intervention were based on American interests and defining when 
and where U.S. interests were in jeopardy. Genocide versus civil war became the litmus test for 
U.S. intervention. Why send troops to the Balkans but not to Rwanda? Various theories of ethnic 
war pervaded scholarly discussion—some even made it to policymakers‘ desks, providing the 
intellectual fuel for the military‘s Stability and Support Operations (SASO) doctrine of the mid-
1990s.   
 Slowly, U.S. policy documents and Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) revised 
strategic priorities for defense. Such documents include the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, 
2002 National Security Strategy, and most recently the 2005 National Defense Strategy.
373
 In 
these documents, terrorism, state failure, transnational crime, rogue states, and irregular threats 
replaced the Cold War threats as the main critical areas of concern for American strategy.   
                                                                                                                                                             
and not get involved in the genocide in Rwanda. American power came into question in the minds of terrorist 
leaders. They know we are averse to casualties and use that to foment dissent among the political body of America.  
371
 Chaim Kaufmann, ―Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,‖ International Security Vol.20,No. 4 
(Spring 1996): 136-75.  Barry Posen, ―Military Response to Refugee Disasters,‖ International Security Vol. 21, 
No.1 (Summer 1996):72-111. On page 30 Posen posits that ethnic groups should enhance communication to 
reconcile different views of history, and advises that external forces such as the U.S. should provide conflict 
resolution rather than military security forces that may end up siding with one group. Kaufmann‘s entire argument is 
based on external forces separating the feuding groups and then siding with the underdog using Armenia and 
Azerbaijan as successful examples of separation.  
372
 Samantha Power, A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, Harper Collins: New York, NY 
2002.  
373
 Stephen D. Biddle, ―Threats to American Interests,‖ Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute (April 2005): 1-44.  
  
 
173 
 Ironically, however, no contemporary counterinsurgency (COIN) document existed for 
those who would be the ―boots on the ground‖ in these new and more prevalent irregular 
conflicts. Even more disturbing was the absence of any national strategy for counterinsurgency.  
There was a doctrinal gap in the literature and education within federal government agencies, 
bureaus, and leadership that spanned almost 25 years. The current COIN manual was published 
in December 2006, meaning the Army had no clear doctrine in the war they were fighting before 
that time.
374
 As a result of this educational void, very few systems were in place at the strategic, 
operational, or tactical level to provide leaders in the federal government with the tools to 
conduct complex post-combat operations. The 1990s seemed to confirm the need for a 
transformation in the military to a more agile and expeditionary force, yet leaders failed to 
appreciate the enormous change in the international order caused by the fall of the Soviet Union.   
U.S. forces continued to train on Soviet-style doctrine and designed weapon systems and strategy 
to defeat Soviet-style threats. The Stability and Support Operations conducted in Kosovo and 
Bosnia were viewed as outliers and not the focus for the U.S. military.  
 In 1999, I was a young Opposing Forces (OPFOR) platoon leader in Germany. Our 
mission was to replicate Soviet doctrinal maneuvering warfare against U.S. forces (BLUFORCE) 
training in Germany. I maneuvered 12 M-113 vehicles rigged to look like Soviet Bronevaya 
Maschina Piekhota (BMPs) fighting vehicles.
375
  Rotations at the Combat Maneuver Center 
(CMTC) focused on High Intensity Conflict (HIC) for ten days, while two days were spent on 
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SASO. Our Soviet-replicated opposing forces (OPFOR) vehicles and knowledge of the terrain 
rarely allowed the American forces to win a battle. The Danish, Germans, and even Polish 
military fared no better against our U.S. OPFOR. The focus for the Germans, Danes, and Polish 
forces were also centered on HIC. It seemed that the world‘s military forces were destined to 
remain mired in Cold War doctrine and training techniques, while rogue regimes and terrorist 
organizations were increasing their capabilities and global reach.  
  Finally, in 2000 the U.S. military started to transition to four full days of irregular 
warfare at the CMTC with a focus on civilians on the battlefield (COB) and the use of media and 
Special Forces.
376
  Exercises were also developed to train and evaluate Corps, Division, and 
Brigade systems by the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). One example was the 
Urgent Victory Exercise, created as part of the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). The 
program, headquartered at Ft. Leavenworth, is designed to train and evaluate senior leaders and 
staffs across the Army on key mission-essential tasks. In 2000 the V Corps conducted the largest 
and most ambitious training exercise of its kind. New technology, communications platforms, 
and command and control systems were tested. Over 10,000 soldiers, 3,000 contractors, and 25 
brigade-sized headquarters were linked through simulations or brought to Germany for the 
exercise. The focus was primarily on command and control during conventional warfare—there 
was no training on insurgency or guerilla operations. The training exercise was hailed as a 
success, and in 2001 and 2002, the exercise continued with a focus on command and control 
systems—no training was conducted on establishing measures of effectiveness for fighting 
irregular conflicts, despite planning at the corps level in late 2002 for a possible invasion of Iraq. 
Conventional operations dominated military thinking in large part because it was the core 
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competency of senior leaders who experienced the euphoria of destroying the Iraqi military 
during the Gulf War. War was about destroying tanks and enemy command and control 
systems—not about insurgencies or nation building. Slowly, SASO and irregular warfare became 
more prevalent in discussions at senior leader education programs across the nation and at the 
maneuver training centers. Training Centers in California, Louisiana, and Germany increasingly 
placed performance measures on SASO operations. COIN development was the natural next step 
in the development of military capabilities, and the catalyst for that development was Operation 
Iraqi Freedom -- rather than strategic vision.  
COIN FM 3-24 Development 
Doctrinal literature for counterinsurgency operations is not new to the armed forces. The 
1950s saw a focused effort on developing counterinsurgency doctrine for the Army. The Combat 
Development Group, United States Continental Army Command, the Command and General 
Staff College, and Combat Developments Command were all organized to develop doctrine to 
better prepare the armed forces for conflicts.
377
 Prior to September 11, 2001, the military focused 
resources primarily on improving conventional war fighting capabilities. The Cold War and Gulf 
War were the templates for success, while Vietnam counterinsurgency lessons learned were not 
maintained or institutionalized.  September 11, 2001 changed the operational focus from purely 
force on force conventional victories to a Global War on Terror.
378
 The U.S. war against al 
Qaeda prompted Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. OEF focused heavily on 
Special Forces operations capabilities with impressive initial results. Both conflicts prompted 
strategists to reconsider what warfare would entail in the 21
st
 century. Many authors and 
practitioners with experience in conducting operations in Iraq made the claim that insurgency 
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operations will be the predominant operations of the 21
st
 century, highlighting the need for 
improved interagency operations and military training.
379
  
  In March 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) started with the stated goal of regime 
change. OIF, like OEF, started with impressive conventional victories and validation of the 
American way of war.
380
  Insurgency was an afterthought in the invasion planning, and at the 
brigade and battalion level the focus remained on destroying the Iraqi Army and militia forces. 
OIF was a conventional campaign with conventional goals until post-combat operations were 
declared. Prior to the invasion, units deploying to both combat zones began developing training 
plans to better prepare soldiers for expected operations.  
 Units, such as III Corps, developed exercises prior to deploying to Iraq, spurring After 
Action Reviews (AARs) for improving U.S. Army capabilities in Iraq. In January 2004, the 
counterinsurgency shortcomings identified in the III Corps exercise were consolidated and 
compiled for analysis. The next step in the development in FM 3-34 came as a directive from the 
Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center, at Ft. Leavenworth Kansas: an order for a 
new counterinsurgency field manual. In October 2004 the interim field manual was published for 
use in training and leader development courses.
381
  For one year (November 2004-November 
2005), extensive interviews and research were conducted on OEF/OIF in an attempt to gather the 
most relevant information to include in the doctrine for publication. 
 Simultaneously, key authors were selected under the direction of Dr. Conrad Crane. In 
February 2006, a counterinsurgency conference served as the final vetting venue prior to 
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publication.
382
  The document underwent revisions and analysis from February 2006 until June 
2006, when the first draft was distributed to the force, and in December 2006 COIN FM 3-24 
was published—three years after the invasion of Iraq.  
 COIN FM 3-24 was developed in less than two years, yet it contains salient prescriptions 
for the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Taken as a whole, the manual boils the 
complexity of counterinsurgency into five imperatives, eight principles, and nine paradoxes for 
successful execution of COIN.
383
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Imperatives 
- Manage information and expectations  
- Use measured force and discriminate 
actions  
- Learn and adapt 
- Empower the lowest levels 
- Support the host nation 
 
Principles 
- Legitimacy as the main objective 
- Unity of effort 
- Political primacy 
- Understanding the environment  
- Intelligence as the driver for operations  
- Isolation of insurgents from their cause and 
support 
- Security under the rule of law 
- Long-term commitment 
  
  
COIN Paradoxes 
- The more you 
protect your force, 
the less secure 
units may be 
- Doing nothing in 
some cases may be 
the best response 
to insurgent 
actions  
- The best COIN 
weapons are ones 
that don‘t shoot 
- Tactical success 
guarantees nothing  
- A tactic may work 
in one province 
but not the next 
* FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency December 2006  
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Understanding the imperatives, principles, and paradoxes offered in FM 3-24 ensures 
military planners have the requisite framework to view the problems encountered in irregular 
warfare. Executing operations based on this framework has proved to be a difficult task in Iraq, 
and it continues to influence domestic political debates and fuel discussions within the 
Department of Defense (DOD) regarding what course of action will lead to strategic victory in 
the prosecution of OIF.   
Combat operations in Iraq began on March 19, 2003, and FM 3-24 was published in 
December of 2006. It is difficult not to assume that some of the current difficulties in Iraq can be 
attributed to the lack of a focused COIN doctrine for planners at the strategic and operational 
levels. It is also reasonable to assume that there was not a national strategy for combating 
insurgency at the outset of OIF. Would FM 3-24 have provided the military with the proper 
framework to prevent the seemingly intractable situation facing the U.S. in Iraq in March 2007? 
The following firsthand account of operations in Iraq from March 2003-February 2004 may 
provide insights into the usefulness of the doctrine and its proper implementation in DOD 
training and learning centers.  
Operation Clean Sweep: 82
nd
 Airborne Division: Best Intentions Gone Bad 
Task Force Falcon's First Major Civil-Military Project with the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) 
 
  The 82
nd
 Airborne Division is renowned for its ability to rapidly deploy worldwide 
within 18 hours of notification to neutralize any threat. Our brigade combat team (BCT) of 3,430 
paratroopers conducted a ground assault, convoy and simultaneous tactical air insertion into Iraq 
on March 23, 2003. From that date until May 1, 2003, the 2
nd
 Brigade of the 82
nd
 Airborne 
Division conducted combat operations from Samawa to Falluja. During fierce combat 
operations, the brigade neutralized at least 700 fedayeen, Royal Republican Guard, and militia in 
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the battle for Samawa alone. Conventional joint operations as well as combined arms operations 
were second nature to the paratroopers of the 2/82
nd
. Losing a battle was not an option, and every 
minute of training and discipline were required to survive the extreme temperatures and battles 
with the fedayeen. Conventionally, the 2/82
nd
 was well-trained, equipped, and utilized. Leaders 
in the brigade were conducting joint operations with the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Special 
Forces, and the Central Intelligence Agency to neutralize the enemy threats and facilitate the 
regime change mission of the invasion. Every mission was conducted within the five phase 
framework of the strategic Operations Plan (OPLAN) 1003V.
384
  From February 3, 2003 to May 
4, 2003, the 2/82
nd
 conducted combat operations over 600 miles through nine Iraqi cities before 
reaching Baghdad.
385
  
 Morale was high. Mission success was paramount and brigade leadership made every 
effort to recognize the efforts of the unit‘s brave paratroopers. They were trained for direct-
action conventional combat operations and they were professionals.  Every paratrooper had 
completed rigorous training and certifications on critical war-fighting tasks at Ft. Bragg and the 
National Training Center (NTC) prior to the deployment—there was no certification on fighting 
guerilla operations.
386
    
 On the first of May, President George W. Bush declared an end to major combat 
operations in Iraq, signaling the move to Phase IV of OPLAN 1003V.  The brigade moved to 
Southern Baghdad for stability and support operations (SASO).  Our ability to adapt from high-
intensity combat (HIC) to low-intensity combat (LIC) operations within hours was critical to our 
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success. None of the paratroopers in our brigade envisioned conducting SASO/LIC operations 
prior to deployment. The focus at Ft. Bragg had been on conventional skill sets and conducting a 
parachute assault into enemy territory and neutralizing the enemy.  Counterinsurgency operations 
were not even mentioned during the development of OPLAN 1003V or introduced into our 
brigade lexicon during our first three months in Iraq. To complicate matters, civilian leadership 
in Iraq was transferred from retired LTG Jay Garner, then deputy at CENTCOM for 
reconstruction in Iraq, to Ambassador Paul Bremer. Authority shifted from CENTCOM to 
Ambassador Bremer for reconstruction in Iraq—to include security forces. The Iraqi Army was 
disbanded and Iraqi police force stripped of all high-ranking, experienced officers for fear of 
Ba‘ath Party resurgence. This single action changed our role of liberation force to one of 
occupation—an occupation that immediately took on the responsibility of policing Iraqi streets.  
 My role as a brigade staff officer during this period was simple: assist in the planning of 
tactical operations in Southern Baghdad to ensure the Ba‘ath Party leaders and Saddam loyalists 
were captured or killed. This was a typical task for an infantry captain on brigade staff, 
especially since I had been in the job for over 13 months and had the experience of two short-
notice brigade deployments. The focus of my job changed drastically when a Civil-Military 
Operations Cell (CMOC) was created by the artillery battalion commander (Lieutenant Colonel 
Smith). The CMOC consisted of volunteers from each of the primary organizations in the 
brigade combat team: artillery, air defense, intelligence, medical, legal, logistical personnel, and 
civil affairs representatives were all part of the new group. The group met daily to develop 
methods to spur economic growth, rebuilding, and infrastructure repair/creation—tasks no one in 
our unit was trained in and, frankly, not ones we thought we were responsible for. A common 
theme during this period was expressed by paratroopers: ―Sir, we did our job…we killed the 
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enemy and Saddam is not in power, now let‘s go home. I didn‘t join the 82nd to build sewage 
lines or get shot at while I help build a school.‖387    
 The CMOC group was ad hoc, and few had prior SASO training other than LTC Smith. I 
was responsible for coordinating all of the CMOC operations, as well as the unit‘s tactical 
operations. Twenty-hour days were the norm and showers were optional during the initial days 
as we drove ourselves into the ground trying to understand our new purpose.  
 The first CMOC meeting lasted five hours in a cinder block room in 115 degree heat. 
Each of the members walked away from the event stupefied at the Herculean task ahead. LTC 
Smith expected us to catalog every sewage pumping station, electric power station, school, 
mosque, church, and gas station by the end of the week. Despite our misgivings, we saluted with 
our brigade motto -- "All the way—let‘s go!" -- and accomplished the tasks over the next week. 
During the week, the CMOC group spent countless hours driving the streets and alleyways of 
Southern Baghdad. Most times we were greeted by smiling Iraqis, proud of their new freedom 
and excited at what lay ahead for their families. Children swarmed our Hummers trying to get a 
glimpse of our faces and especially our eyes. Elderly Iraqis often cried with gratitude. In all 
cases, the Iraqis I encountered wanted to be proud of their country and its enormous potential. It 
occurred to me that these men, women, and children were very similar to those in my 
hometown—people who wanted to work for a living and care for their families. They wanted to 
be proud of where and how they lived.  
 The problems the newly liberated Iraqis faced were immense. Unlike my hometown, 
there was no government system in place to provide basic necessities for the citizens. No sewage 
plan, no garbage collection plan, no electricity plan, limited job opportunities, and—worst of 
all—no police to enforce law and order. Corruption was rampant and looting government 
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buildings was viewed as a right for the poorest Iraqis. The lack of systems and motivation was a 
problem that would not be corrected quickly and would require more than just money or U.S. 
security. The Iraqis needed a paradigm shift in how to live and govern their lives. Sanctions 
against Iraq following the Gulf War left the country firmly at the mercy of Saddam and his 
regime. Most Iraqis I spoke to had no memory of initiative or self-reliance because of Saddam‘s 
rule. Over the past thirty years, they had no hope unless they pledged their unyielding support to 
Saddam and his regime; now, they could break free from these chains and live freely—but it 
would not be simple. Problems were around every corner and it seemed no actions the coalition 
took were fast enough or understood. The coalition wanted to fix everything right away—as did 
the Iraqis—however, the reality of the situation precluded anything from happening quickly. The 
disparity between the State Department and the military seemed wide, but not nearly as wide as 
the perception the Iraqis had of what America could do versus what America was actually 
capable of doing.  
 One problem seemed to stand out in my mind as a symbol of change in the city—the 
huge amount of space piled full of garbage from years of no sanitation cleanup. Saddam‘s 
garbage trucks were paid poorly by the government, and drivers earned more from tips from 
wealthy Iraqis than the government salary of one dollar a day. Naturally, the poor sectors of 
Baghdad had no means of tipping, so the garbage trucks never made stops there. This filth left no 
room for children to play sports, but plenty of room for disease, crime, and poverty—perfect 
recruiting grounds for insurgents.  
 A sight I will never forget is seeing children wading through sewage to pick up remnants 
of plastic bottles so they could use them to collect water. Looting was also rampant in the 
wealthier areas of our sector. The Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance 
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(ORHA) gave strict orders for U.S. personnel to remain neutral when facing looters. This 
mandate left many of our paratroopers astounded as Iraqis ripped the very cables out of 
government buildings to sell on the markets. Everything that could be ripped from walls and 
windows was stripped during the looting, and coalition forces were told to stand by and ―let the 
Iraqis police themselves‖—a policy we would all come to regret adopting in the coming months. 
Witnessing these activities and the plight of many Iraqis gave our CMOC the courage to 
continue working tirelessly toward some solution in our sector. I knew we could make an impact 
if we could find a way to clean up the major trash areas adjacent to living quarters. The more 
pride they had in their home, the less chance for the enemy to seek refuge or foment hatred. The 
main problem our units and Iraqi allies faced was scarce resources. Our brigade did not have a 
direct link to the other agencies operating in our sector other than ad hoc relationships created by 
motivated civil affairs personnel and paratroopers. Our brigade was equipped with the requisite 
equipment to kill insurgents, but not to educate, train, and rebuild. The only tool we had at our 
disposal was our unyielding desire to accomplish the mission we were assigned. We attempted to 
teach democracy, train security forces, and rebuild by scrounging and improvising. We certainly 
were not equipped to establish a large trash cleanup project in sector.
388
 
  To make our vision a reality, I needed money and expertise. I received the go-ahead on 
the project from our brigade commander with permission to use his military police detachment 
and Hummers. The brigade commander fully understood what operations his paratroopers should 
engage in during the day—rebuilding and legitimacy operations. He constantly told 
commanders, ―Without legitimacy our mission will fail, go out there and shake hands, don‘t 
break promises, and work 24/7 to figure out who the bad guys are…if you don‘t know who the 
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key players are in your sector, you aren‘t doing your damn job.‖389  As the operations officer for 
the CMOC, I had the freedom to stay in the relative safety of the compound or travel the streets 
of Baghdad. I chose to travel the streets and seek out the interagency personnel who could help 
our brigade with the mission of trash cleanup in the al Risala and al Shurta sectors. Within two 
days, I located the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) office in the 
Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) headquarters in the 
Green Zone. There was no directory of office locations or even a list of who was working in the 
Green Zone at this time, so finding key personnel to solve problems was a matter of chance and 
determination. I met with the USAID Chief of Station, and he agreed to send a team into our 
sector to see what could be done.  
 Within one week, USAID had established a Direct Assistance Reconstruction Team 
(DART) to assist in the project. DART teams from USAID consisted of a small handful of 
experts in waste management, water, logistics, medical services, and contract vetting.
390
 The first 
project we collaborated on included the delivery of thousands of medical aid kits to clinics in the 
2/82
nd
 sector. The DART team members were professionals and understood the importance of 
building credibility with the locals, and they wasted little time in the delivery of medical and 
dental supplies. For our next project, we envisioned 5,000 Iraqis working to clean up trash in 
their local areas. USAID insisted that the idea for a cleanup come from Iraqi city council 
members in the sector rather than a dictate from coalition troops. The 2/82
nd
 preference was to 
take control of the entire operation from start to finish. We decided to try the USAID method.  
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 The following week we held numerous meetings as the Iraqi city council members 
mulled over the ideas USAID presented.  Eventually the Iraqi city council members decided they 
needed a project to keep the young men off the streets.  This project had the potential to provide 
jobs and a purpose for thousands of the citizens in our sector.  Providing jobs would increase 
legitimacy of the council and coalition as well as deter potential insurgent recruits.  
 After a five-hour session with one of the USAID representatives, the council determined 
that it could hire 12,000 young men for the job. The estimate was far more ambitious than the 
USAID DART leader or I had envisioned, and we were ecstatic. The council members would 
take care of advertising, hiring, documentation, and pay distribution to each of the 12,000.
391
 The 
only requirement for U.S. forces was security at various checkpoints and along the perimeter of 
the trash cleanup area to protect the workers. USAID agreed to pay the 12,000 workers. I left the 
meeting with a feeling of pride and accomplishment. This was democracy at work—a free-
thinking group of Iraqis had solved a problem for themselves and all they needed was a bit of 
prodding and hope. The council members held a press conference immediately following the 
meeting for a gathering group of Iraqis. Reporters took notes on ragged tablets with stubs of 
pencils while the council announced the project. Singing and chanting could be heard for blocks. 
It was a good day for the coalition and the Iraqi leaders.   
 It was during this meeting that I learned that the most powerful weapon in SASO was 
offering hope and legitimacy to the Iraqis. Hope was the most powerful thing these people had: a 
hope for their families and for the future of their country. I was humbled by the effort the USAID 
representatives put into coaching the fledgling city council. Our paratroopers saw the Iraqis in a 
different light and also learned about the importance of liberty and freedom. It was a great day—
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everyone walked away from the meeting feeling as though we accomplished something 
extraordinary.  
  One week later, we began Operation Clean Sweep. 9,780 workers showed up and were 
paid that afternoon.  The next day we had close to 11,000 workers. The men came by foot, by car 
and by donkey; some carried brooms, some carried handmade shovels, and some could work 
only with bare hands and feet.  They were paid two dollars a day. They sang and danced as they 
cleaned one neighborhood after another. Various media outlets covered the success story and 
word spread throughout other Baghdad neighborhoods of the project. USAID was pleased and 
decided to replicate it on a larger scale in Sadr City in Northeast Baghdad. I made a trip to the 
sector to meet with coalition members, describe the success we had in Southern Baghdad, and 
pass on my lessons learned. USAID then replicated the project in Sadr City with tens of 
thousands of workers.  
 In the meantime, B-Company of the 3d Battalion of the 325th Parachute Infantry 
Regiment (3-325) took the lead on Operation Clean Sweep in Southern Baghdad. The 
commander saw the positive aspects of the project. Attacks decreased in his sector and his city 
council was pleased with the number of jobs they were able to create, giving them more 
credibility with their constituents. For many Iraqis, it was the first time they had clean fields for 
soccer games and other sports. Hope was increasing in direct correlation to our legitimacy and 
the credibility of the city council members. It seemed as though we found a solution to SASO in 
Iraq.   
  Our unit was still conducting tactical operations at night while working on civil-military 
operations during the day. The tempo was fast, and it was rare for our paratroopers to sleep more 
than four hours a in a 24 hour period. At this point we still had no air conditioner units, ice, or 
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consolidated forward operating bases. Infantry companies were operating out of their own 
forward operating bases in our sector. We were looking forward to redeploying on the 4
th
 of July. 
As the date for our redeployment drew near, we realized that we would be asked to stay for a 
longer tour. The Third Infantry Division (3ID) had been extended and we knew that it was going 
to be a long, miserable summer—but none of us knew how miserable.  
In mid-July at the brigade headquarters, we had just eaten lunch and were working on 
operational orders for future missions. The temperature inside the building was well over 100 
degrees, and the temperature outside in the sun felt like an open flame. No one was working 
directly in the sun and the Iraqis stayed indoors during the hottest parts of the day.  
 Our soldiers at the Operation Clean Sweep site were taking breaks in an air-conditioned 
bus as they guarded the borders of the clean up operation. Two soldiers, SPC Gibbs and PFC 
Burns, were taking their turn on the bus when two rocket propelled grenades (RPG) ripped 
through the bus, killing Gibbs instantly and severing Burns‘ legs and a portion of his right arm.  
 The report of the attack crackled across the radio as I listened intently. My heart sank and 
my lunch began to work its way back up. My first thought was one of guilt for establishing the 
trash project, since the soldiers would not have been there if I had not set it up. I was sick to my 
stomach and outraged at the Iraqis for what they had done. Our unit reaction followed standard 
operating procedure: we established a cordon around the immediate neighborhood, searched 
every home in the vicinity, placed the area under strict curfew, established checkpoints, and 
conducted field interrogations of questionable individuals. Morale of the unit was low and 
emotions ran high. Iraqi council members shared our disgust and did their best to calm the 
company commanders in the sector. USAID and other agencies stopped daily visits and only 
came to drop off large duffle bags of money to pay the Iraqi workers. Our paratroopers‘ 
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puzzlement at the complex environment developing before their eyes grew with each passing 
sunrise.   
 Our two-month deployment had turned into a six-month one as our focus had turned to 
civil-military operations rather than combat operations, and our minds and bodies were 
exhausted. The attack at the trash site affected everyone.   
  Paratroopers felt disgust; State Department, USAID, NGOs, and other agencies no 
longer wanted to drive into our sector unless they had armed escorts. My trips into the Green 
Zone were increasingly viewed as jumping the chain of command in order to get work done. 
Agencies felt concern over safety, and they had the ability to remain in the protected hallways of 
the palace while my men and I suffered the wrath of disgruntled Iraqis and uncompromising 
work schedules. To further complicate matters, many of the non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and Department of State officials refused to meet one-on-one with Iraqis unless our 
soldiers searched the buildings and vetted the individuals prior to meetings. The solution was to 
bring the Iraqis to the Green Zone for meetings. Insurgents only needed to document people who 
entered and left the Green Zone in order to target them later. Interpreters started to receive death 
threats, as did members of the city councils. The common assumption made at the embassy and 
military intelligence units was that Ba‘ath Party members had gone underground to cause the 
increase in violence. A new term was coined: Saddam loyalists.  
With a new term came new missions to locate and destroy or capture the Saddam 
loyalists in sector. A new purge of Ba‘ath Party members began. Under ORHA and later the 
CPA, Ba‘athists were automatically considered untrustworthy and were removed from any 
meaningful decision-making roles.  Coordination became more difficult, operations became 
more complex and reconstruction slowed to a snail‘s pace in the sector. The first improvised 
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explosive devices (IEDs) were being used in Baghdad and our brigade only had four armored 
Hummers.  I would spend hours on the highway daily in a Hummer with no doors, traversing 
roadblocks, checkpoints, and IEDs to obtain funding and encourage ORHA to honor our requests 
for reconstruction. The answer, more often than not, was, ―ORHA has the mandate for 
reconstruction and humanitarian assistance, but not the resources.‖392  
 To complicate matters for the trash project, many of the Iraqi workers left. Some left 
because of threats of further violence if they helped the coalition, others for fear of their lives, 
and some because they lost faith in the project and their countrymen. Ironically, thirty hours after 
the attack the two gunmen were traced to a sector outside of Baghdad. They had been hired to 
come into the sector and disrupt civil-military cooperation.  
 After we learned of the plot, our forces immediately put the word out to the Iraqi 
leadership and newspapers that the men who killed the U.S. soldier were not from al Risala or al 
Shurta.  They were Iraqis who wanted Iraqis to fail. Within two days of the attack, we were back 
in operation with over 12,000 Iraqi workers. But there was an important difference this time: our 
soldiers were very aggressive toward the Iraqis and suspicious of every vehicle that came within 
500 yards of the work site. The environment had changed, and it signaled a different type of 
warfare than we had been trained to fight.  
 We had officially entered the irregular warfare phase of OIF I. Two months passed before 
I was called back to the United States on emergency leave to care for my mother after a risky 
heart surgery, and I was in the United States for almost 20 days. My mother survived and was in 
good spirits. I could have stayed longer but my place was with my men in Iraq. I made a trip to 
Walter Reed Hospital to see the wounded soldiers from the 82
nd
 and saw PFC Burns, a triple 
amputee at age 19. He would receive his Purple Heart and U.S. citizenship from President Bush 
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later in the week.  His spirits were good, but what struck me the most was the pride and 
admiration his father held for America, my soldiers, and our mission. He believed with all his 
heart that his son was wounded in the pursuit of justice and hope for a democratic peace in the 
Middle East.  We had a wonderful talk, and as I left he told me, ―Good luck, sir. Take care of the 
boys.‖ I choked back tears as I walked past the rooms of wounded soldiers and family members. 
Some were not American citizens yet—but they sacrificed for America. I walked away thinking 
of how I could help prevent more of these young people from being injured or killed.   
 What was the best way to take care of my troops in this irregular war? I made a pledge to 
myself as I left. These men, their wounds, and their idealistic visions of American democracy 
would not be wasted. We had to succeed in Iraq to justify the pain and sacrifice these young 
people experienced. At this point, I was convinced that the solution lay in the hands of the Iraqis 
and not my soldiers. I returned to Iraq with a renewed sense of purpose and vigor. Our unit 
would rid the streets of insurgents, rebuild my sector, and provide hope for the children of al 
Risala and al Shurta.  
 My experience changed the methods I used in the Risala and Shurta sectors as a company 
commander. The difficult part was convincing my paratroopers that brute force, large scale 
operations, top-down intelligence, and technology were not the solutions for fighting the 
insurgency—they were simply tools that could be used as appropriate.  
 I returned to Iraq to find the attitude of the soldiers and Iraqis in a terrible state. ―Thank 
you for removing the tyrant, now go home‖ became the dominant attitude of many Iraqis.393 
Anger, frustration, and distrust were building toward the coalition and the Iraqi population we 
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were sworn to protect. Civil reconstruction projects had dried up, raids were turning up more dry 
holes than enemy combatants, and the news most of the Iraqis were getting was dominated by al 
Jazeera. ORHA was failing in its information operations and the military seemed to be blind to 
its importance. The seeds of civil war were being sowed and we were facilitating the destruction 
of the sector by not understanding the root of the problems. U.S. legitimacy was lost and the 
credibility of coalition forces in Baghdad had begun to erode. Coalition forces were continuing 
with a focus on raids and detaining enemy personnel. Measurement of success continued to be 
based on conventional standards. Numbers of enemy killed, raids, and offensive operations 
seemed to dominate senior leaders‘ rhetoric and evaluation of subordinates.    
 What caused the erosion of legitimacy? Who was best suited to solve the problems the 
Iraqis faced? Our unit had labeled all Iraqis as part of the same insurgent category and alienated 
many of our Iraqi allies by failing to ask these fundamental questions. How do we best protect 
our soldiers in irregular warfare while increasing the legitimacy of the fledgling Iraqi 
government and our coalition forces? The answer was not more large-scale operations, increased 
kinetic attacks, or decreased interaction with the local populace.    
Cultural understanding within our unit was low.  As a new commander in the sector, I 
came with a bird‘s eye perspective on the fundamental problems facing our unit. Cultural 
awareness was nonexistent, kinetic solutions were preferred to using ―soft power,‖ and the 
majority of paratroopers viewed their role in the country as ending as soon as the war was ―won‖ 
in May 2003. My first sergeant and I immediately instituted a cultural awareness class for every 
paratrooper under my command. Interpreters taught the classes. I focused my energy during the 
day on political solutions to the insurgency by meeting with business leaders, council members, 
and religious leaders. I rewarded soldiers and platoon leaders who focused on reconstruction 
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projects and interaction with school headmasters and the underrepresented areas of my mixed 
sector. The sector was made up of 250,000 Iraqis, 80% of whom were unemployed. 60% were 
Shia, 40% Sunni. There were 32 schools, 23 Mosques, one Christian church, two clinics, two 
markets, two gas stations, and a community of 400 amputees from the Iran-Iraq War.
394
  The 
sector was large and diverse, providing ample opportunities for insurgent recruitment and attacks 
against our forward operating base (FOB). Actionable intelligence was the only method of 
ensuring our unit‘s success and up to this point in the conflict intelligence was fed from higher 
headquarters to ground units to take action. This commonly ended in raiding the wrong homes, 
detaining innocent Iraqis, or getting involved in longstanding tribal disputes between families.   
After taking command, I decided to change our modus operandi for gathering 
intelligence.  We turned our intelligence operations into a focused effort of every paratrooper and 
established systems for the collection and dissemination of information within our company. We 
focused less on firepower during raids and even fielded non-lethal weapons on many operations. 
Tazers, rubber bullets, and foam grenades were favorites of my paratroopers—when we had 
them.  No longer was it standard operating procedure to blow up the doors of suspects with C-4 
or other explosives. Instead, we began knocking unless the threat was high enough to justify the 
use of explosive forced entry. Intelligence was no longer going to be spoon fed to my unit from 
higher headquarters: we would develop our own targets and feed intelligence to the battalion and 
division.  
 The paradigm shift took time, but within a month we reduced attacks against our 
compound and soldiers. We increased spending on reconstruction by two million dollars and 
regained the trust of the local council and many of the business leaders.
395
  Intelligence 
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operations were so successful that the senior commander in Iraq (LTG Ricardo Sanchez) told his 
staff in a Battle Update Brief in late September that A-Company 3-325 Airborne was setting the 
standard for operations in Iraq. The unit cohesion was higher than ever before and our vision for 
our purpose in Iraq changed. My men and I realized that the men and women of Iraq were not the 
future—the children were. If we could show them that we were there to help rather than hurt 
them, our unit would all return to Ft. Bragg—alive and better prepared for the next deployment. 
Two areas were critical to success in al Risala and al Shurta: first was the establishment of 
credible city councils, and second was reliance on the development of actionable intelligence.  
2
nd
 Brigade Combat Team, 82
nd
 Airborne Division: Operation Build Democracy: City 
 Councils of al Shurta and al Risala, Baghdad  
 
Establishing Democratic City Councils within al Risala and al Shurta, Baghdad 
 On May 1, 2003 President Bush declared an end to hostilities in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
signaling the beginning of Stability and Support Operations. Phase IV of the operation had 
begun, and the paratroopers were ready for the challenge. Priorities shifted from killing enemy 
combatants to protecting the local populace, rebuilding, and establishing city councils at the local 
level. 
 Each company sector contained at least one city council selected from residents who met 
specific criteria. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
2/82
nd
 City Council Criteria  (as of June 2003) 
- Could not be Ba‘athists 
- Could not be former military commanders 
- Must be high school graduates 
- Must be a resident of the neighborhood they represented  
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In my sector of 250,000 Iraqis, we built two city councils comprised of 23 total members from 
Sunni, Shi‘a, and Christian backgrounds. The brigade commander insisted that women serve on 
the councils, so each council initially had at least one female member. After four months, there 
were four women on the councils. The female members of my councils were bold, educated, and 
willing to sacrifice for the sake of their neighborhoods. I came away from interactions with them 
with a sense of hope for the women of Iraq and with a profound sense that in rebuilding Iraq 
women would play crucial roles.  Each council also had diverse career backgrounds, ranging 
from businessmen to Imams.
396
 The common denominator for all members was their eagerness 
to help rebuild their neighborhoods and provide jobs for constituents. Security, sewage, and 
electricity were the top priorities of most citizens.   
 Meetings were initially conducted for 5-8 hours in the blistering summer heat. At this 
time military units were starting to receive air conditioner units, but there was no money in the 
budget for such luxuries for the city councils. In typical Army fashion, we initially tried to teach 
democracy through the use of PowerPoint slides and visual aids. After burning up a number of 
projectors, we realized that the only way to make progress was through drinking plenty of chai 
tea and having long discussions.  
Unit commanders made requests through USAID and ORHA for basic supplies and 
equipment for the councils to function. After many trips to the Green Zone, we were able to 
secure funding through USAID for building renovations, supplies, and salaries for the council 
members. Eventually we were also issued cell phones from ORHA to give to council members 
for communications. Progress was slow (but noticeable) during August 2003, and meetings were 
the weapon of choice in problem solving.   
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 Initially, many meetings were canceled due to security conditions, other missions, and 
because meeting locations were simply too hot. In time, the meetings became part of our lives 
and part of our intelligence and psychological operations.  Members of these rudimentary 
councils spent countless hours debating the best methods of moving forward, and it took a 
considerable amount of energy for commanders to convince the council members to make 
decisions. Some unit commanders grew frustrated and delegated the task of attending and 
running council meetings to subordinates. Others took on the role of ―mayor‖ in their sectors, 
providing guidance, directing reconstruction, and detaining suspected insurgent supporters at 
night.  Fundamental to the establishment of the councils was education. Soldiers had no 
documents teaching them about democracy, and no representatives from ORHA to assist in the 
selection, training, and administration of the city councils. It was not until September 2003 that I 
learned of an office in the palace (the embassy) designated with the responsibility to assist 
military units in the establishment of local governance. Once I contacted the office, it was 
willing to assist in my city councils. I started to receive funding and support for a district city 
council headquarters. We still faced a perception problem with the Iraqis, and an even more 
difficult problem to solve was with the reluctance of many Iraqi men to take any initiative. The 
society under Saddam was not accustomed to making decisions or taking responsibility for their 
problems. This attitude was very difficult to overcome, and only time and relationships could 
change it.  
In late September 2003, the councils in my sector were functioning with great success. 
They conducted town hall meetings in which I was often the guest speaker and the person they 
could point fingers at and blame for problems within the sector. I was often on the receiving end 
of bitter language and insults, but I was never intentionally disrespected. When I spoke, the room 
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got quiet and the city council almost always agreed with my assessments. My unit‘s credibility 
was high and the local newspaper recognized our efforts. Electricity, sewage, and security were 
the top three concerns of the citizens of al Shurta and al Risala, and therefore these were top 
priorities for my unit.  
 Improving security required increasing our success with locating and capturing weapons 
caches and those responsible for funding the insurgency. Bottom-up intelligence operations 
enabled my company to capture many weapons caches while building credibility with informants 
in the area. My compound became a haven for disgruntled Iraqis who had information to sell. 
The information came in as a trickle at first, but I was able to establish myself as the point of 
contact for Iraqis with information to sell. This action established relationships based on trust 
with my informants and ensured their safety would not be compromised. Over time, my 
company developed a number of sources, informants, and a network of businesses and 
individuals who were dedicated to seeing the coalition succeed. With early successes came more 
information, caches, and insurgents.   
 The biggest problem I faced was from other intelligence organizations and turf wars over 
informant ownership. I was fortunate enough to have a battalion commander who appreciated the 
art of gathering intelligence from the ground up. He gave me the freedom to coordinate with 
special operations units in my sector and other agencies whose primary roles were gathering 
information and managing agents and sources. My company unit was not resourced or mandated 
to manage informants, but I had to in order to prevent attacks and protect my sector. 
Furthermore, in order to pay informants under the Army system, I would have to wait weeks to 
receive funds. Other agencies had cash on hand and could pay informants on the spot for good 
intelligence. Special operations forces carried huge amounts of cash and would pay informants 
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immediately. My word had to suffice for many of the informants who came to my forward 
operating base. This often forced me to spend my own money to keep from losing valuable 
information.  Over time, my unit developed relationships with the other intelligence operators in 
sector and conducted weekly meetings to unofficially share information. Although I did not 
always have cash to pay informants as other agencies did, I had paratroopers to take action on the 
information provided. In October 2003, the system was working very well. The second and third 
order effects of this success were paramount to the legitimacy of my unit, and by extension the 
city councils in our sector. The council members also became intelligence gatherers for me, and 
at city council meetings I would meet privately with certain members to obtain information. 
They trusted me completely, and as a result they were willing to accept the risk of conducting 
democratic elections for their jobs.  
 We were the first sector in Baghdad to ask for the CPA‘s permission to conduct elections. 
We were given verbal permission to go ahead with our plan because the CPA governance 
representative did not think we would be ready by the new year (January 2004). Our city council 
members spent money on flyers, debated each other in the local council center, and developed 
action plans for the department of public works and local schools. In the meantime, attacks 
continued to wane and support for our company increased in sector. However, there were also 
sometimes periods of unrest and protest.   
 There were often protests against me and my unit because of broken promises. For 
example, an NGO once promised my city council it would provide new books and supplies to all 
children in elementary school. Unfortunately, the NGO ran out of money before it could deliver 
a single book, leaving my unit to answer to the city council. Protests outside my compound 
started out small, but they grew larger over time. Rather than stop the protests with force, I 
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simply put on my gear and walked outside the gate of my compound and spoke to the mob 
through my interpreter. Many in the group were afraid that I would retaliate against them for the 
protest, and none looked me in the eye as I addressed them. I simply told them that I was proud 
of them for protesting and that they now enjoyed the right to do so because they were forming a 
democracy. I explained the situation about the NGO‘s failure, and I told them I was willing to 
listen to them if they could provide me information on a recent rash of rocket propelled grenade 
attacks. I left to applause and laughter. The protest lasted 15 more minutes and dissipated.  
Two days later, I had the information I needed to conduct a raid on the RPG attackers. 
Word of our successful capture of the RPG attackers spread quickly through the mosques and 
schools. We took the opportunity to conduct a psychological campaign to deter further attacks by 
spreading a rumor of a new weapon system that could detect and destroy anyone launching 
mortars or RPGs within our sector. To further spread the rumor we told our city council and 
police chief that the weapon was top secret.  That night we fired mortar illumination rounds and 
artillery rounds into an empty field and told our council the next day that the new weapon system 
destroyed the vehicle and men setting up a mortar outside the sector.
397
  Upon making the 
announcement, my interpreter and I received a standing ovation from the group. They then told 
me that they were ready for elections, and they wanted to know when they could conduct them.    
 The city council was prepared to have an election and had spent time and money 
campaigning. All that was left was for me to receive written permission from the Baghdad 
District Council (BDC) to conduct the election and recognize the winners at its conclusion. I was 
denied permission by the CPA and the BDC—despite their previous encouragement—and I had 
to return to the council with another broken promise. The trust I had built was beginning to erode 
                                                 
397
 Deception operations are key to COIN. Getting inside the decision cycle of the enemy is critical to success. 
Brigade commander used AH-64s and other weapons as part of our deception plans in Baghdad. Attacks always 
decreased after we concluded deception operations in conjunction with psychological and information operations.   
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with these broken promises and growing sectarian violence in other parts of Baghdad. Less than 
a week later our unit had orders to return to the United States no later than February 2004. We 
had less than forty-five days left in country, and things were beginning to change across Iraq.  
 Small FOBs were being consolidated into larger FOBs across the country. The goal 
seemed logical: move U.S. forces out of the sectors and allow Iraqi forces to pick up more of the 
security operations and governance.
398
 Our company forward operating base was closed and my 
136 paratroopers and I moved into Forward Operating Base FALCON. We now had a Post 
Exchange, hot showers, basketball/volleyball courts, full gym, and air-conditioned private 
barracks rooms and offices. We were ecstatic, but our council was not. They knew that the effect 
of moving out of sector would be negative for them.  
 The council was right. Most units decreased the number of patrols, raids, and 
reconstruction dramatically once they moved into FALCON. The top priority for many units 
shifted from the Iraqis to taking care of themselves. The entitlement attitude was contagious, and 
it was difficult for even the most motivated paratroopers to leave the comfort and security of 
FALCON to brave the streets of Baghdad. It was as much a psychological victory for the 
insurgents as a defeat for my company, and there was little I could do about it. The Relief in 
Place operation was approaching, and my last three weeks were spent creating a continuity file 
for the unit replacing mine in sector.  I met with my councils, business leaders, and informants 
for the last time and wished them well. Many tears and heartfelt hugs were exchanged during 
those final days, but the sense of hope was high. The 2/82
nd
 left Baghdad in February 2004 after 
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a year-long deployment. Our mission was complete and our success far outweighed our failures, 
yet we all seemed to know that Iraq would take many years to recover from the reign of Saddam 
Hussein and the sanctions of the 1990s. We had no idea that soon sectarian violence and 
insurgency would engulf every aspect of Iraqi life. Eight months after returning home, we were 
called back to Iraq on 96-hour notice to assist in the Iraqi elections of 2005. 
Comparing COIN to 2
nd
 Brigade 82
nd
 Airborne Division Tactical Actions in OIF I 
 
 Hindsight allows me to compare the actions taken on the ground in Iraq during OIF I to 
the prescriptive solutions found in FM 3-24. The vignettes used in the comparison were not 
written to highlight the special ability of the 2/82nd or brag about the success of any unit. Rather, 
the descriptions are meant to highlight the fact that soldiers in many units were doing the same 
things my unit was doing. Units across Iraq were learning and adapting to the environment they 
faced. Many had great success, while others experienced tragic failure. The main point of this 
reflection stems from the initial question of my research: would better COIN doctrine have 
caused a different outcome than the one the U.S. is experiencing in Iraq in 2007? In order to 
answer the question two areas are addressed. First, were any actions taken during OIF I counter 
to what is prescribed in COIN FM 3-24? Second, were any actions taken during OIF I similar to 
what is prescribed in COIN FM 3-24? After reviewing this data, I will suggest answers to these 
two questions to assess FM 3-24‘s doctrinal prescriptions.  
 The initial conventional operations conducted by 2/82 are not a point of deliberation. 
Leaders conducted conventional operations within the parameters of the Geneva Convention and 
the rules of engagement (ROE), winning every engagement with the enemy decisively.  At the 
conclusion of operations in OIF I, the 2/82nd had lost 24 soldiers killed in action and had 240 
wounded. The majority of these occurred after the President declared an end to combat 
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operations. The fundamental difference was in the type of war we were waging, and it had very 
little to do with the type of soldier we were waging it with. 
 Disciplined, motivated, and well-trained soldiers can accomplish any mission assigned; 
however, none of the 2/82
nd
 soldiers was trained for (or even aware of) the rising insurgency. 
Decisions were being made by ORHA and then by the CPA, as well as decision makers at 
CENTCOM, that inhibited the ability of soldiers to take action on the ground to prevent the 
insurgency from growing. Six critical areas are fundamental to understanding why the 
insurgency in Iraq gained strength despite coalition efforts:  
1. The disbandment of the Iraqi Army in May 2003 
2. The order from CPA not to take action against looters in May 2003  
3. Slow and negligent information operations across the spectrum of the interagency 
during post-combat operations within DOD and across the interagency spectrum 
4. Decentralized U.S. Army command structure—each division conducted 
operations in its area of operations focused on unilateral offensive operations  
5. No national strategy for conducting counterinsurgency operations  
6. No counterinsurgency focus at training centers or education centers across the 
federal government prior to OIF—mission success depends on individual 
personality, ad hoc organizations, and willpower of individuals operating without 
a system to provide synergy and leverage for all resources towards victory 
Each of these issues is also covered in FM 3-24 as being the worst possible actions an occupying 
force can take when fighting an insurgency. The list of best and worst COIN practices that the 
2/82
nd
 unknowingly committed follow.  
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Worst Practices by 2/82
nd
 OIF I 
- Conducted too many large-unit operations 
o 2/82nd reaction to insurgent action was always large-scale cordon and searches 
resulting in damage to innocent Iraqi homes, business, and morale 
o Operations at the battalion level almost always resulted in fewer weapons 
caches and less information than those conducted at the platoon or company 
level, yet the preference was for large-scale operations 
o Intelligence was usually driven from the top down rather than the bottom up, 
leaving much room for error. COIN intelligence operations are fundamentally 
driven by actionable intelligence gathered at the tactical level and fed up to the 
battalion for analysis rather than the conventional top-down approach 
o No system for quick payments to informants 
- Consolidated all company-level forward operating bases into one large forward 
operating base 
o FOB mindset is hard to reverse 
o Decreased the number of mounted and dismounted patrols in sector 
o Decreased the amount of contact with potential informants 
o Decreased the amount of information operations in sector 
o Decreased the rapid response time to emergency situations such as police 
station attacks or riots in sector 
- Placed priorities on killing insurgents rather than engaging and protecting the 
population 
o Promotion and awards were given primarily to those who had more offensive 
action and detainees than those with the largest reconstruction and civil 
military projects 
o Focus on killing led to increased collateral damage to include accidental 
killing of innocent civilians 
- Focus special forces on raids rather than training and advising host nation police and 
military 
o Direct action teams in sector were focused primarily on killing and detaining 
insurgents rather than advising and gathering intelligence 
- Built and trained the host nation police and military to look just like 2/82nd 
o The Iraqi Civil Defense Force and police were equipped and trained to look 
more like coalition forces than their own culturally accepted forces. This gave 
the impression that these Iraqi forces were just puppets of the coalition and 
therefore illegitimate 
- No interagency coordination cell until days before redeployment 
o Without a system for commanders to interact with USAID, DOS, and other 
agencies, the amount of progress made in sector was hindered 
o All relationships with other agencies were ad hoc 
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Best COIN practices of 2/82 during OIF I 
o Disciplined soldiers with a desire to positively impact their area of 
operations.  
o No Rules of Engagement violations or criminal activity 
o Appoint a single authority—usually a dynamic, charismatic leader to 
interact with local Iraqi leaders  
o Brigade Commander took the lead on relationships with local Iraqi 
leadership  
o 2/82nd was the first unit to receive funding for a consolidated district 
council headquarters for Iraqi citizens to voice concerns, find jobs, and 
report questionable activities in sector 
o 2/82nd was first unit in Baghdad to establish a weekly training session for 
city council members on democracy  
o Brigade Commander empowered company commanders with resources, 
time, and support on all civil-military operations 
o Focus on the population‘s needs and security  
o 2/82nd had the largest amount of reconstruction money per capita in 
Baghdad due to the efforts of the CMOC  
o Commanders were empowered to spend CERP funds on projects in sector 
($10,000 pre week), soccer fields, job creation, and short time span high-
impact projects 
o Train Iraqi military forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations  
o Established first ICDC training compound in Baghdad 
o Established police liaisons with Iraqi police  
 
-  
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COIN as a Panacea for Irregular War?  
  Is the American way of war doomed to fail against an insurgent movement? I do not 
think so. The American way of war can adapt to the new challenges posed by insurgent strategy 
and terrorist tactics. The most obvious fact supporting this adaptability is the new 
counterinsurgency manual. The manual is well-received among combat veterans of all ranks and 
those about to enter the Iraqi theater of operations.  Better late than never—FM 3-24 is replete 
with practical methods for the soldiers and marines at the tip of the spear in COIN operations. 
Had our unit trained on these tactics, techniques, and procedures prior to the invasion in March 
2003, the original transition from combat operations to COIN operations may have gone more 
smoothly. FM 3-24 may not be a panacea for counterinsurgency operations, but it does provide 
leaders at the operational and strategic level with a framework for understanding the problem and 
paradoxes of irregular warfare.   
  So, is the solution simply COIN training for military forces? Hardly. The point of my 
vignettes was not simply to display that military forces can adapt and succeed in irregular 
warfare. History shows the U.S. military is capable of achieving great feats with the requisite 
support.  The implications suggested by Andrew Mack, ―It necessarily follows that insurgents 
can only achieve their ends if their opponents‘ political capability to wage war is destroyed,‖ are 
more salient than ever.  
 The interagency is an area where more focus is needed. Resourcing, training,  mandates, 
and ideologies of the myriad agencies in the federal government must adapt to irregular warfare 
and post-combat operation reconstruction. The ―alphabet soup‖ of agencies operating in irregular 
conflicts must be better coordinated and resourced in order to provide targeted effects 
synchronized with military operations. Mobilization is more a function of political will than the 
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ability to produce the bodies and materials needed to rebuild a country. Deterrence against 
terrorists can be effective if used in conjunction with other tools of diplomacy and statecraft.
399
 
Determining the exact methods for deterring terrorist tactics and insurgent strategies hinges on 
targeting.  
 Targeting in insurgencies is a matter of determining the right question and then 
developing the right solution from a menu of options. The only menu the military has is force 
versus the lack of force. The National Security Strategy 2005 (NSS), Quadrennial Defense 
Review (QDR), and Presidential Policy Directive 56 set an optimistic tone for maintaining 
American security at home and abroad. Two themes pervade all strategic literature since 
September 11, 2001. Specifically, the two pillars of President Bush‘s introductory letter in the 
NSS highlight the optimistic tone of strategic-level decision makers with regard to the Global 
War On Terror:  
Promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity—working to end tyranny, to 
promote effective democracies, and to extend prosperity through free and 
fair trade and wise development policies. Free governments are accountable 
to their people, govern their territory effectively, and pursue economic and 
political polices that benefit their citizens. Free governments do not oppress 
their people or attack other free nations. Peace and international stability are 
most reliably built on a foundation of freedom.  
 
The second pillar of our strategy is confronting the challenges of our time 
by leading a growing community of democracies. Many of the problems we 
face—from the threat of pandemic disease, to proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, to terrorism, to human trafficking, to natural disasters—
reach across borders. Effective multinational efforts are essential to solve 
these problems. Yet history has shown that only when we do our part will 
others do theirs. America must continue to lead. 
400
 
 
Conclusion 
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 FM 3-34 provides useful guidance for military planners at all levels. Of course, there is 
no easy solution in the Global War On Terror or the war in Iraq.  Even now, soldiers, airmen, 
and Marines are engaged in the most complex environment imaginable in the GWOT. Actions 
taken by these soldiers with the best intentions can backfire in an instant. FM 3-34 is a ―best 
intentions‖ version of what the military is capable of accomplishing if the mission and vision of 
the campaign are aligned with the training and capabilities of the force.   The key to success in 
counterinsurgency is the ability for our military and interagency to adapt and change faster than 
the enemy.  
COIN operations can be successful with the proper support of the interagency. Irregular 
warfare is not simply a military problem with military solutions. Interagency roles are critical to 
the success of COIN. If my experience in Iraq is any indicator of the operational capability of the 
rest of the agencies in Iraq, then there is great hope as well as cause for concern. Key areas of 
disparity between interagency operations and those of the military include: 
1. Length of deployment across DOD should be standard. Current disparities allow for 
seams in the transition of key areas of Iraq and inter agency rivalries. Length of 
deployments for civilians should be similar to those of their military counterparts. 
The 90-day average deployment is too short to make an impact.  
2. Civilian agencies must find a way to arrive in theater better prepared for the culture, 
tempo, and risks associated with reconstruction of Iraq.  
3. Interagency working groups should be established prior to deployment and continue 
during deployment, utilizing technology to share information and streamline approval 
processes for projects, intelligence, and strategic planning.  
4. Key agencies involved in the rebuilding of Iraq should train with military 
counterparts at the maneuver training centers prior to deployments in order to educate 
the military and civilians on each federal organization‘s unique capabilities.  
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5. Turf wars should end upon entrance to the Iraqi theater of operations and Congress 
should mandate that agencies share resources, information, and expertise. A 
Goldwater-Nichols reform of the interagency would not solve current problems in 
Iraq, but it would lay the foundations for successful future operations.  
6. The National Security Council‘s role in OIF and OEF should be evaluated for best 
and worst practices.  
7. Information operations in the United States and abroad are more important during 
COIN than conventional operations. A complete review of standard operating 
procedures should be conducted to determine possible areas for improvements.
401
  
8. The military must adapt to the insurgency and fight COIN rather than attempt to force 
COIN into a conventional construct.
402
 
 The political will of American democracy must match the determination of those 
executing the missions in support of the Global War On Terror. All resources must come to bear 
on the problem facing the future stability of American security. The proper questions must be 
asked in order to solve the most important problems. Just as the problem my unit faced in 
Southern Baghdad was exacerbated by our initial response to the enemy, U.S. policy should be 
implemented to avoid making similar mistakes. My unit adapted to COIN by understanding the 
fundamental questions facing our security. We adapted to succeed. Adaptability is the key to 
winning the irregular warfare of the 21
st
 century, and FM 3-24 does an exceptional job of 
offering a framework for planners to utilize in the conduct of counterinsurgency.  
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C. Leadership Education and Training for the Interagency 
     Brian Polley 
 
The nature of the international security environment has radically changed over the past 
fifteen years.  No longer is the United States threatened directly by a large traditional military 
armed with strategic missiles, and no longer is the primary danger posed by nation-states and 
their leaders.  Instead, we currently face enemies that have no home country, respect no 
international borders, and disregard traditional rules of warfare.  Because the threats to national 
security have changed, so must our strategies and preparations for dealing with them.   
The need for change is reflected clearly in military doctrine and official government 
policy, from Army field manuals all the way to the President‘s National Security Strategy.  
These documents and others recognize that today‘s conflicts call for a renewed focus on non-
traditional operations, especially support and stability operations.
403
  Because of the nature of the 
enemy and the asymmetric warfare tactics they use, the type of conflicts the United States is now 
engaged in require a different government structure, a different military strategy, and a different 
type of leadership.   
One of the most important goals laid out in the National Security Strategy, and one that is 
necessary if Americans are to live in a secure international environment, is promoting democracy 
in countries where authoritarian governments persecute their own peoples.  Democracy 
promotion, and building state institutional capacity so democracy can be sustained, requires a 
stable environment relatively free of internal violence and foreign conflict.  Support and stability 
operations are those which the United States and its allies engage in to provide that stable 
environment and allow citizens to build democratic institutions and establish the rule of law. 
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The boundaries between the role of the military and the role of civil society have become blurred 
in support and stability operations.  Success in the conflict and post-conflict environments the 
US is in today and those of the future require close cooperation between military and civilian 
agencies.  Support and stability operations are necessarily interagency in nature—they cannot be 
successful using military means alone.  One of the most challenging aspects of coordinating 
interagency efforts in these operations is the function of leadership, or how men and women can 
lead effectively in post-conflict environments.  A number of important questions relate 
specifically to leadership issues:  
 How is leadership defined in military and civilian contexts? 
 How should various agencies communicate with each other in conflict and post-
conflict environments? 
 How should the agencies and stakeholders involved decide who is in charge of a 
task or operation? 
 How can we prepare men and women to fill leadership roles and solve difficult 
problems in dangerous environments? 
 How can various agencies improve the way they educate and train leaders to align 
goals and work together? 
 
In order to successfully create a stable and lasting peace in support and stability operations, it is 
imperative that the US do several things better.  Most importantly, the United States needs a set 
of standard, coherent leadership training programs to equip interagency officials with the tools 
necessary to function in complex, dangerous environments in which a number of different 
organizations are represented and have a stake in the outcome.  Coordination and teamwork in 
these kinds of operations are too often ad hoc and reactive; the United States government should 
make interagency teamwork part of its preparation for post-conflict reconstruction and 
peacekeeping.   
 To understand the functions and responsibilities of leaders in interagency support and 
stability operations, I will first discuss relevant interpretations of leadership, and in particular 
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how it is generally defined by the US government in military and civilian contexts.  Second, I 
will summarize various programs and practices currently used by US government agencies to 
develop leaders and prepare them to work on interagency teams.  Next, I will critique these 
programs and describe what tends to make some of them more successful than others, and what 
aspects of them are worthwhile.  Finally, I will discuss my overall findings and outline several 
recommendations for implementing successful practices in leadership development.  By 
following this progression we can better understand the roles and responsibilities of leadership in 
coordinating interagency teams in conflict and post-conflict environments.  
Defining Leadership 
An analysis of roles and functions of leadership in interagency cooperation in 
counterinsurgency warfare must begin with a discussion of the various definitions of leadership 
in military and civilian contexts, and a brief history of leadership theory‘s development.  Human 
beings have always been interested in understanding leaders and the qualities that enable 
effective leadership—according to theorist James MacGregor Burns, leadership is ―one of the 
most observed and least understood phenomena on earth.‖404  Thousands of years ago, Confucius 
sought to define the nature of the relationship between leader and follower.  Plato considered 
leadership at the highest levels, idealizing the ―philosopher-king‖ as the model for a perfect 
republican system of government.  Later, Plato and his followers established the Paidea in early 
Greece, a school and forum for discussing leadership and how best to develop it.  In the 16
th
 
century, the Italian Niccolo Machiavelli wrote his famous discourse on the more practical aspects 
of leading kingdoms and principalities.  These are only a few of the hundreds of influential 
thinkers across human history that have considered leadership an important concept and have 
contributed to the intellectual discourse on the topic.  
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For many of these influential thinkers, leaders are understood to be a select few 
exceptional individuals who have the good fortune to be born with characteristics required to 
inspire and motivate.  According to this ―great man‖ theory of leadership popularized in the 19th 
century and still somewhat prevalent today, ―there are only a few, very rare, individuals in any 
society at any time with the unique characteristics to shape or express history.‖405  The great man 
theory, while worthy of consideration, cannot be used to instruct leaders and therefore has little 
use as a scientific theory.          
The modern, scientific study of leadership can trace it‘s lineage to German and French 
psychologists and sociologists in the latter half of the 19
th
 century.
406
  Psychology and sociology 
have been leading fields in the development of leadership theory, but disciplines as varied as 
political science, history, military sciences, education, philosophy, management, public 
administration, anthropology, and biology have made significant contributions as well.
407
  Over 
the past century, the study of leadership has become increasingly scientific and quantitative, 
especially beginning with the emergence of Frederick Taylor‘s ―management science‖ concept 
around the turn of the 20
th
 century.
408
  Taylor disputed the commonly held assumption that 
fundamental interests of employers and employees are necessarily at odds with one another, and 
instead argued that the interests of the two groups are actually one and the same—that prosperity 
cannot exist for the employer unless it is accompanied by prosperity for the employee, and vice 
versa.
409
  Often applying his analysis to sports as well as ―soldiering,‖ Taylor believed that his 
reasoning led to the conclusion that the principal aim of both workers and management should be 
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training and developing each individual in the organization in order to reach full potential.  His 
scientific framework directly challenged the great man theory, since he advocated a system in 
which leaders are developed by organizing workers for efficient production, rather than reducing 
inefficiency by searching for exceptional leaders someone else has trained.
410
  Furthermore, he 
applied scientific management principles to all different kinds of human activities, from the 
simplest tasks to complex endeavors in large organizations.  Military scientists have been 
influenced by Taylor‘s scientific management for decades, and his framework has much to offer 
in preparing leaders to cooperate in support and stability operations.   
The mid- to late-20
th
 century saw a proliferation of leadership theories, when many 
distinct interpretations arose to complement or compete with great man and scientific 
management theories.  For example, Philip Selznick and others taking a sociological approach to 
leadership define it as a specific type of work or function within an organization, not as 
something special or glorified.  Leadership is defined by the demands of a social situation, and 
who emerges as a leader depends on the requirements of an organizational task; leadership is a 
relation that exists between people in social situations, and, therefore, we can expect to see 
different leaders emerge in different situations.
411
  The sociological approach also holds that 
leadership is not necessarily performed by those in high places or positions of authority, and that 
leadership is dispensable and not necessary in all situations.  
The ―business approach‖ to leadership, exemplified by John Kotter, echoes the 
sociological approach‘s tenet that leadership is nothing mystical or mysterious, but rather is a 
system of action that is largely about coping with change, as opposed to management‘s function 
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of coping with complexity.
412
  Since today‘s business environment is more dynamic and more 
volatile than ever before, the quickened pace of change has demanded a corresponding increase 
in leadership.  While Kotter argues that leadership and management are distinct concepts, he 
points out that they are complementary systems of action and are both required in a successful 
business.
413
  The business approach to leadership, while not obviously applicable to interagency 
cooperation in counterinsurgency warfare, provides a useful addition to other frameworks of 
analysis we will consider.  
Perhaps the most relevant for our purposes is the political science approach and its most 
prominent theorist, James MacGregor Burns.  According to the political science approach, 
leadership is best understood as a relationship between leaders and followers; it is exercised 
when someone uses ―institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, 
engage, and satisfy the motives of followers.‖414  An important distinction exists, to proponents 
of this approach, between true leaders and mere power wielders: power wielders exercise their 
authority and demand obedience, disregarding any desires or goals of their respondents.  
Leaders, on the other hand, work to motivate others to realize goals mutually held by both 
leaders and followers.  Like power, leadership is relational and purposeful, but a leader is a 
particular kind of power holder—the kind that induces followers to act for certain goals, needs, 
and aspirations shared among themselves and their leader.  It is this approach to understanding 
leadership that adds the most value to an examination of how to prepare men and women to 
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cooperate effectively in dangerous conflict and post-conflict environments, especially on 
interagency teams where different values and goals may be represented.   
These theoretical approaches vary in how much emphasis they place on personal 
attributes of individuals versus situational factors in determining the quality of leadership.  They 
also vary in the degree to which they consider ethical decision making to be a defining feature of 
good leadership, a distinction important to an analysis of leadership in support and stability 
operations.  This distinction enters most prominently in the debate over the relative merits of 
transactional versus transformational leadership, the two categories many theorists agree are the 
fundamental leadership styles all leaders display to some degree, but tend to use more of one or 
the other in their ―defining moments.‖415  Transactional leadership generally involves contingent 
reinforcement, or followers are usually motivated by leaders‘ promises, praise, and rewards, and 
they are corrected by negative feedback, threats, or disciplinary action.  Essentially, leaders react 
to whether or not their followers carry out what leaders and followers have ―transacted‖ to do.  
Thus, transactional leadership can be understood as a sort of contract between leaders and 
followers; it is somewhat impersonal and formal relation grounded in a worldview of self-
interest.  Telling the truth, keeping promises, distributing what is due to others, and using valid 
incentives and sanctions are all important aspects of transactional leadership.
416
   
Transformational leadership, on the other hand, is based on more than self-interest.  It 
tends to inspire a more realistic concept of the self—one that is connected to others whose 
welfare may be more important than one‘s own.  This concern for other‘s welfare is a key 
component of government service. In transformational leadership, moral obligations are 
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grounded in a broader understanding of cultural and social norms and beliefs.
417
  According to 
the most prominent transformational leadership theorist, James MacGregor Burns, leadership is 
best when it is both transactional and transformational—it is based on a set of agreements or 
bargains, but both leaders and followers are transformed it its course.  To be transformational, a 
leader must be morally uplifting; he raises himself and his followers to higher levels of morality 
through leadership.   
Transformational leadership contains four main components, and each is important for 
leaders who wish to raise themselves and their followers to higher standards.
418
   
1. Charisma, or idealized influence—transformational leadership is envisioning, confident, 
and sets high standards for emulation.  
2. Inspirational motivation—transformational leaders provide followers with meaning and 
challenges for sharing commitments to goals.  
3. Intellectual stimulation—transformational leaders encourage followers to think critically, 
and allow them to question assumptions and generate new and creative solutions to 
problems. 
4. Individualized consideration—transformational leaders treat each follower as an 
individual and as an end in him/herself, never as a means to an end.  The leader provides 
coaching, mentoring, and growth opportunities, always working to develop followers into 
leaders.  Transactional leaders tend to worry only about their followers‘ dependence.  
 
A defining characteristic of transformational leadership is that followers identify with their 
leaders and their leaders‘ goals.  Rather than simply obeying orders, followers want to emulate 
their leaders and grow into leaders themselves. 
 A final distinction bears mentioning—that between authentic transformational leadership 
and inauthentic or ―pseudo-transformational‖ leadership.  All aspects of leadership (both 
transactional and transformational) have ethical dimensions, and it is the behavior of leaders that 
is authentic or inauthentic.  Organizations need authentic transformational leaders in order to 
raise the organization‘s ethical standards; these leaders are persuasive, but not manipulative, and 
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use elements of both transactional and transformational leadership to increase the effectiveness 
of both.
419
   
 All of these theoretical frameworks have played a role in shaping the literature on 
leadership in military and civilian government organizations.  Since our focus is on interagency 
cooperation in support and stability operations, our analysis must consider the history and 
development of military doctrine on leadership and where these frameworks fit. 
 The United States Army first became acutely aware of leadership as it worked to shift 
from the small, professional army of the interwar era to the expanded structure required in World 
War II.
420
  There have certainly been leadership training and instruction programs in the US 
military throughout its history, but they were greatly expanded during this time.
421
  The Army 
and other branches began enlisting help from the civilian academic community, especially 
psychologists, to identify and develop junior leaders.  The 1940s saw a shift from management 
science to human relations in the academic community, and therefore a corresponding shift in the 
military community.
422
  For the Army, leadership and ethics are historically topics that go hand-
in-hand, and the years during and after World War II saw an enormous proliferation of books, 
journal articles, and classroom instruction on these topics.  The rapid increase in literature and 
instruction on ethics and leadership continued in the thirty years between the late 1960s and 
1990s: by 1998, the Army War College listed 1,670 titles in these two fields.
423
   
 The perceived crisis in leadership of the Vietnam War led to a resurgence of emphasis 
placed on developing ethical leaders.  Of the three presidents most closely associated with the 
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war, one commander-in-chief was assassinated, another chose not to run for re-election, and 
another was forced to resign.  This, coupled with shocking incidents like the 1968 My Lai 
massacre, encouraged a wholesale reevaluation of military leaders and leadership development 
techniques, and specifically the Professionalism Study commissioned by General Westmoreland 
in 1970 and others like it.
424
   The efforts had some success, as this same time period witnessed a 
dramatic rise in military professionalism and the amount of trust placed in the US Army as an 
organization—probably more than any other army in the world in the time between the end of 
the Vietnam War and the end of the Cold War.
425
  The most obvious evidence of the rise of 
military professionalism and the corresponding rise in public opinion of the military is in the 
tremendous respect and trust the American people (as well as other peoples) placed in the US 
military during and after Operation Desert Storm in 1990-1991.  Confidence of high ethical 
standards and effective leadership in the military may have been at an all-time high after the 
conflict in the Persian Gulf.
426
   
 Several crises in the 1990s struck a blow to this restored confidence in ethical military 
leadership, including sexual misconduct in the Navy, violence at Fort Bragg, and numerous 
charges of racism, sexism, and homophobia.
427
  The response to these incidents, led by then-
Army Chief of Staff Gordon England, eventually became known as ―Character Development 
XXI‖ and sought to reexamine military leadership training policies and eliminate some of the 
biggest weaknesses.  At the same time, an effort was underway at Fort Leavenworth to revise 
Field Manual 6-22, the Army‘s main leadership manual.  The primary goal was to have a set of 
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leadership ideals that also included an iteration of core values for the military.
428
  FM 6-22 is a 
model for similar documents in other branches of the armed service, and it is important to 
consider in its own right.  
 FM 6-22 is the primary document in military leadership doctrine.  The most recent 
revision was published in October 2006 and was written under the direction of then-Army Chief 
of Staff Peter Schoomaker.  The document applies to Army personnel at all levels, and its main 
functions are threefold:  
1. It defines what leadership means in the Army. 
2. It outlines leadership roles and requirements. 
3. It provides a general description of how to develop leadership within the Army.  
 
According to FM 6-22, there are three levels of leadership, each with its own set of challenges 
and competencies: direct leadership, organizational leadership, and strategic leadership.  
Common to all three levels, though, is the Army‘s ―warrior ethos,‖ an attitude integral to the life 
of a soldier.  An ideal Army leader at any level has a strong intellect, a commanding physical 
presence, professional competence, high moral character, and serves as a role model to others.
429
  
Finally, part of being a good leader in the Army is to also be a good follower.  
 Field Manual 6-22 describes Army leaders in a three part framework, based on what 
leaders should BE, what they should KNOW, and what they should DO.  In other words, leaders‘ 
behavior (what they do) emerges from who they are (be) and what they have learned (know).
430
  
The BE aspect of leadership is comprised of the values and attributes that shape one‘s character, 
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or internal and defining qualities that are possessed at all times.  Defined by FM 6-22, an Army 
leader is: 
Anyone who by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility inspires and influences 
people to accomplish organizational goals.  Army leaders motivate people both inside 
and outside the chain of command to pursue actions, focus thinking, and shape decisions 
for the greater good of the organization.
431   
 
The KNOW aspect of leadership refers to the knowledge that leaders should use based on 
personal experience and formal instruction.  Army leaders should have a general knowledge of 
military tactics, technical systems, organizations, management of resources, and the tendencies 
and needs of people.      
 Character and knowledge are not enough for effective Army leadership.  The DO aspect 
of leadership refers to leader actions, and it is directly related to the influence a leader has.  The 
act of leadership, according to FM 6-22, is ―the process of influencing people by providing 
purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the 
organization.‖  This definition mirrors the political science approach and transformational 
leadership, since leadership is seen as a relationship between people that improves both leaders 
and followers as well as the organization as a whole.  What leaders should do can be broken 
down into three constituent parts:
432
  
1. Influencing—getting people, including Army soldiers, civilians, and multinational 
partners, to do what is necessary.  Influencing is about providing purpose, vision, 
direction, and motivation.  
2. Operating—actions taken to influence others to accomplish missions and to set the 
stage for future operations. 
3. Improving—capturing and acting on important lessons of ongoing and completed 
projects and missions.  Improving includes developmental counseling, stressing team 
effort and focused learning.  
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 It is important to note that FM 6-22 and similar documents on military leadership 
doctrine divide leadership into three functional levels: direct, operational, and strategic.  
Strategic-level leadership, in particular, conceptually parallels some of the theoretical 
frameworks mentioned earlier and should be addressed separately.  Strategic leadership 
essentially means leadership ―at the highest echelons of organizations;‖433 it is concerned with 
big picture considerations and overall organizational goals.  Examples of strategic leaders are 
easy to find in both military and civilian organizations: General George Marshall, Henry Ford, 
and Lee Iacocca are a few of the better-known strategic leaders.
434
  Case studies of these men 
and other people like them raise the question of whether strategic leaders are born or made; to 
join their ranks, must one be born with exceptional leadership potential, or is leadership 
something that can be taught and learned?  This is an old debate that juxtaposes the ―great man‖ 
theory of leadership, which holds that leaders are exceptional people by birth, with the 
sociological and political science approaches, which hold that leadership is contextual and 
learnable.  Most leadership experts and psychologists agree that there is a dynamic interplay 
between innate ability and external factors across every person‘s life, and that leadership, like 
most other human traits, can be learned and developed.  A fundamental assumption of FM 6-22 
and military leadership theorists rests on this claim that there are learnable competencies 
essential for being an effective strategic-level leader.
435
  Civilian government agencies generally 
share this assumption, and it is to their leadership development programs that I now turn.  
 Just as military organizations have programs for identifying and developing potential 
leaders, so do civilian government agencies.  Government organizations including the 
Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, the Office of Personnel 
                                                 
433
 Fitton, 4. 
434
 Fitton, 4. 
435
 Fitton, 5.  
  
 
224 
Management, and the Central Intelligence Agency all have their own literature and programming 
for finding and training those men and women within their ranks who have the most leadership 
potential.  The Office of Personnel Management is historically something of a lead agency in 
defining leadership in US government, thus it will be my primary focus.   
 The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) sees itself as the government leader in 
designing and delivering educational and leadership development courses and programs.
436
  It 
has three locations across the country that offer in-residence formal leadership education, and it 
also custom designs leadership training programs based on the needs of particular client 
organizations.  Aside from formal leadership education, OPM also has a program called the 
Presidential Management Fellows designed to identify and recruit talented individuals with 
Master‘s degrees and doctorates.  Also created by the OPM is the ―Leadership and Knowledge 
Management System,‖ which focuses on identifying and addressing agency leadership 
competencies so that continuity of leadership is ensured, the organization shares knowledge 
throughout, and it creates an environment of continuous learning.  The custom designed training 
and consulting services OPM offers, tailored to individual needs of client organizations, include:  
 Succession planning and development 
 Management development and certification programs 
 Developing strategic collaborative partnerships 
 Consulting services that fit other agencies‘ needs. 
 
 In assessing potential leaders and identifying those who might meet government 
agencies‘ requirements for advancement, OPM‘s main document and assessment tool is called 
the Office of Personnel Management Leadership 360.
437
  The Leadership 360 focuses on six 
Executive Core Qualifications:  
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1. Fundamental Competencies—interpersonal skills, written and oral 
communication, integrity/honesty, continual learning, and public service 
motivation. 
2. Leading Change—creativity and innovation, external awareness, flexibility, 
resilience, strategic thinking, and vision.  
3. Leading People—conflict management, leveraging diversity, developing others, 
and team building.  
4. Results Driven—accountability, customer service, decisiveness, entrepreneurship, 
and technical credibility.  
5. Business Acumen—financial management, human capital management, and 
technology management.  
6.   Building Coalitions and Communication—partnering, political savvy, and             
 influencing/negotiating.  
 
 The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) also has some literature on 
effective leadership and development programs, particularly in the context of coordinating 
interagency efforts abroad.
438
  USAID has created formal instruction and other programs to help 
train men and women to be effective community leaders in poverty-stricken and post-conflict 
areas all over the world.  For example, USAID representatives provided nation-building training 
for town council members in Sierra Leone, building knowledge about leadership, public service, 
accountability, acceptance, and teamwork.
439
  Similar leadership training programs USAID has 
coordinated in Guatemala, Vietnam, and other countries have involved Americans as well as 
foreign nationals.  Programs like the ones USAID and OPM have offer valuable lessons to all 
organizations involved in interagency efforts, particularly those in dangerous environments and 
support and stability operations.  Civilian agencies are often successful in identifying and 
selecting those men and women who have the potential to lead others in novel, challenging 
situations.  
 Although many parallels exist between civilian and military leadership needs, there are a 
few important differences that bear mentioning. These differences suggest caution is necessary 
                                                 
438
 From USAID‘s website, www.usaid.gov (accessed February 5, 2007).   
439
 U.S. Agency for International Development, ―Sierra Leone Leadership Training Breaks Barriers,‖ 
http://www.usaid.gov/stories/sierraleone/ss_sierraleone_council.html.  
  
 
226 
before making too close a comparison between military and civilian leaders.  First, civilian 
leaders, in most cases, do not have the ―unlimited liability contract‖440 that military officers have; 
while civilian jobs in post-conflict environments and support and stability operations are 
certainly dangerous, military leaders are the ones most often targeted by enemies and are 
therefore in near constant mortal danger.  A second difference to consider is an effect of the 
general officer personality factor, meaning significant personality discrepancies between the 
typical military leader and the typical civilian leader.  For example, military officers are often 
described as the ―aggressive adventurer‖ type.  They also tend to have a high need for control, 
higher dominance than the typical civilian manager, greater comfort with data than with 
intuition, and also score high on an ―achievement through conformity‖ scale.441  All of these 
characteristics can be very positive in certain contexts, but some evidence suggests that they can 
all have drawbacks as a leader moves from the tactical to the strategic level.   
A final important difference between military and civilian leadership demands is the 
necessary but sometimes troublesome ―warrior ethos,‖ mentioned earlier.  This warrior ethic of 
authoritarian rule and unquestioning loyalty can serve to ―rationalize leader behaviors that are 
situationally inappropriate,‖442 for example when a leader‘s style and preference for centralized 
control results in poor decision-making because he or she cannot gain access to all relevant 
information.  The issue military leaders face is maintaining the warrior spirit while 
simultaneously allowing for change, agility, creativity, and self-awareness—the very 
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characteristics required of an army engaged in counterinsurgency warfare and support and 
stability operations.
443
   
Armed with all this knowledge, both theoretical and practical, the various agencies in US 
government that are involved in support and stability operations face the challenge of designing a 
practical and efficient system to identify potential leaders, place them in positions to gain 
experience, formally train them to lead others, and work closely with leaders from other agencies 
who often do not share all the same goals, values, or competencies.  This is a difficult task, and 
one various agencies have struggled with for years. 
Training Leaders for Interagency Cooperation 
 In support and stability operations, there is traditionally a common tendency to place too 
much emphasis on the military aspects of securing victory.  The US Army, in particular, often 
shoulders the lion‘s share of the burden for maintaining a secure environment and allowing 
reconstruction and capacity building after a major conflict.  The problem, though, is that the 
Army is only one aspect of American power that should complement and support other elements 
of national power in order to achieve desired objectives.
444
  In other words, the military effort is 
only one side of the equation, and support and stability operations are necessarily interagency in 
nature; the military must be able to work with civilian agencies to achieve a broad spectrum of 
goals.  Working with civilian agencies in these kinds of conflicts is about more than just 
coordinated action—it is about synchronization and a pervasive unity of effort across the 
political, military, economic, and psychological spectrum.
445
  In low-intensity conflicts and 
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counterinsurgency operations, nonmilitary resources often play a far greater role in achieving 
victory than do military resources.  This is true at all levels, from overall strategy down to 
ground-level tactical decisions.  This poses challenges to even the best military leaders since it 
requires an understanding and appreciation for the elements of national power other than 
military, which are generally not their main areas of expertise.  The bottom line is that the 
military aspects of low-intensity conflict cannot be separated from the political, social, and 
psychological dimensions.
446
   
 Of all the challenges leaders face when training to work on interagency teams, several are 
particularly noteworthy because they are especially difficult to overcome.  First, the lack of a 
common lexicon hampers communication in theater and coordination of training efforts.
447
  The 
fact is that representatives of different government agencies do not always mean the same thing 
when using the same terminology.  For example, the word ―counterinsurgency‖ does not 
necessarily mean the same thing to a Foreign Service Officer as it does to an Army officer.  The 
same applies for commonly used terms like ―nation-building,‖ ―security,‖ ―policing,‖ 
―democracy promotion,‖ and ―regime change.‖  Even the word ―terrorism,‖ used frequently in 
the media as well as in support and stability operations and leadership training, is defined 
differently by different agencies of the United States government.    
 A second important problem in training leaders for interagency cooperation is even more 
obvious: the lack of a common vision and shared strategic goals.  Agencies often train leaders 
differently because they seek different ends once in theater in post-conflict environments.
448
  All 
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agencies have their own interests (especially political interests), and these interests are not 
always shared by all members of an interagency team.  The result is too often a kind of turf 
battle, or a struggle to carve out which piece of the operation is for which agency, who answers 
to whom, and who has ultimate authority to make final decisions.  While this kind of struggle 
can involve representatives of many government agencies, it tends to happen the most often 
between the Department of State and the Department of Defense.
449
  Personalities can end up 
playing a large role in determining who takes responsibility for various operational aspects, and 
this is not necessarily the most efficient way of deciding on the best interests of the United States 
and its allies.  Besides pure personality factors, other considerations, such as which agency has 
the highest-ranking member participating on an interagency team, can determine leadership 
roles.  Whichever agency‘s representative is closest to the president may take charge; one‘s clout 
on an interagency team tends to diminish with increasing relative distance from the president.  
Though this is how leadership positions are usually determined on interagency teams in post-
conflict environments, strong evidence suggests that the process does not have to work this way.  
During the many interagency efforts in the Clinton years, these kinds of teams often showed 
deference to field experience rather than proximity to the president in a number of cases.
450
  In 
Bosnia, for example, US Army and other military personnel often followed the advice or 
delegated responsibility for important decisions to American civilians or UN officials.  This 
experience holds lessons for present-day US government interagency teams and leadership 
selection/development.  
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 A final important problem interagency teams face when delegating tasks and setting 
priorities is the lack of shared training or educational experience of many team members.
451
  
Interagency teams are often created ad hoc, and agency representatives might share little or no 
common training or related experience.  Contrast this with the general practice of the military 
services, where the preference is to form teams and coordinate the mission before deployment.  
Throughout the interagency process, things are far more individual—Foreign Service Officers, 
USAID personnel, and others may have shorter individual postings or rotate assignments more 
frequently.  In the State Department, for example, personnel posted to difficult locations 
(especially those in post-conflict or reconstruction environments) rotate in and out in short 
periods of time—sometimes as short as three to six months.  When one Foreign Service Officer 
really begins to understand a team‘s dynamics and mission goals, he or she might be replaced 
with someone new as he or she leaves for another post.  Leadership is especially challenging 
when the team is constantly changing and incorporating new faces is part of the routine.  A 
different model would have interagency teams assembled and trained together before 
deployment.   
 In today‘s efforts at interagency cooperation in support and stability operations, there are 
two main types of training and education programs: institutional or formal education, and 
interagency participation in military training programs.  The institutional education comes in 
curricula at the military academies, in ROTC programs in colleges and universities around the 
country, and in classroom instruction at places like the Federal Executive Institute and the 
Management Development Centers run by the Office of Personnel Management.  Curricula at the 
military academies and ROTC programs are often designed with the interagency process in 
mind, and the men and women in them are trained from the beginning to sometimes work on 
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interagency teams.  Non-commissioned officers (NCOs) receive similar training for interagency 
work, but usually only at a higher level (platoon sergeants or higher).
452
  OPM‘s Management 
Development Centers offer a broad range of formal instruction and coursework for civilian 
government leaders, including topics such as Bridging Organizational Cultures, Collaborating 
Across Organizational Boundaries, Developing High-Performing Teams, and a number of 
specially-tailored leadership seminars.
453
      
Interagency participation in military training programs is another way government 
organizations prepare leaders for the unique interagency challenges of support and stability 
operations.  This kind of less formal educational instruction happens at a number of military 
training centers and reserve bases, for example, at the Joint Readiness Center at Fort Polk, 
Louisiana and the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute at Carlisle, Pennsylvania.  
These programs actually partner military units with other government agencies to train them 
together, and they exist here in the United States as well as in theater.  An example of this kind 
of program might be an FBI forensics expert visiting a combat training center to help train troops 
in forensic science before deployment.  These interagency training programs are almost 
exclusively governed and coordinated by the Department of Defense—other agencies rarely do 
anything similar on a comparable scale.  A partial explanation for the Defense Department‘s near 
monopoly on informal interagency leadership training lies in the fact that it simply has the 
resources and funding to make the programs possible—other agencies often just cannot afford 
them.
454
    
Model Practices in Leadership Development 
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 Decades of research and theory have created a large body of literature on the topic of 
leadership development and education.  This literature comes from a variety of philosophical 
backgrounds and academic disciplines, but a large portion of it applies directly to development 
programs for civilian and military government organizations involved in interagency operations.  
Army regulations and military doctrine, for example, have proven very useful in providing 
lessons of how to lead teams and how to develop capable leaders, and these lessons apply to non-
military organizations as well.  In general, military leadership development is considered a 
career-long process that involves ―professional experience, formal professional training and 
education, and self-study, assessment, and reflection.‖455  The military generally operates from 
the assumptions that effective leaders are made, not born, that leadership is a skill set that can be 
developed over time, and that specific competencies exist essential for effective strategic 
leadership.
456
  Based on these assumptions, the US Army and other military branches have 
created and revised doctrine that outlines a number of specific institutional requirements for 
maximizing leadership potential of officers and NCOs.   
Give aspiring leaders early opportunities for varied responsibilities.  Specialization is 
important, but the best leaders will be trained and feel comfortable leading in a number of 
different situations and roles.  The US Army does this as well or better than most large 
organizations.  
Have clearly communicated standards for what it means to be a good leader.  This is 
about having practical guidelines and a well-developed and advertised system of monitoring.  
The US military tends to do this well, but not in all cases.  The corporate world seems to 
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understand this principle better, in terms of being serious about setting management standards 
and establishing appropriate style, mentoring, and measuring leadership results.
457
   
Provide feedback often and create a formal mentoring system.  The corporate world tends 
to do this better than the military, by formally pairing junior and senior leaders in mentor-mentee 
relationships.  Also, it takes a great effort to reduce institutional discomfort with providing and 
accepting feedback.  It might be worthwhile for military organizations to create a formal 
mentoring system—mentoring and coaching have been part of the Army‘s strategy for some 
time, but their use tends to be uneven and localized.         
Have a system in place that measures organizational attitudes and climate.  This means 
having a formal system for recording morale, mission focus, clarity of procedures and 
expectations, effectiveness of communication, trust in leaders, perceived level of discipline, 
support for initiative and innovation, and fair treatment of all personnel.
458
  This is essentially an 
easy and inexpensive way to monitor employee feelings and attitudes and alert leaders to issues 
before they become problems.  According to many retired and active military officers, the 
military falls short on this principle compared to the business world.
459
  
Train leaders in assessment methods, or in how to judge the effectiveness of other 
individuals and groups.  Neither the army nor large corporations seem to do this very well.  Too 
often, top management assumes that leaders know how to evaluate performance of others when 
this is not actually the case.  This is a more difficult principle to implement, but it is not 
impossible: the Office of Strategic Services made extensive use of assessment methodology 
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during and after World War II, and today there is an extensive literature on assessing leadership 
capabilities in personality psychology and related academic disciplines.
460
  
Use many sources of input for promotion decisions.  The corporate world is far ahead of 
the US military on implementing this principle.  Essentially, this means that the decision for 
promoting or passing on an officer should not be based exclusively on his supervisor‘s 
assessment—colleagues and subordinates at all levels should have a measure of input as well.  In 
other words, use bottom-up input as well as the standard top-down assessment for promotion 
decisions.  Personality and leadership assessments agree that some leadership traits or 
characteristics cannot be reliably observed from above; specifically, many aspects of 
transformational leadership, discussed earlier, are difficult to assess from higher in the 
organizational hierarchy.  Examples include articulating a motivational vision, inspiring 
teamwork, providing intellectual challenge, treating subordinates as individuals, being open to 
new ideas, modeling moral behavior, and demonstrating a willingness to subordinate oneself to 
the mission.
461
   
Formalize a system that promotes continuous learning.  This principle is one of the most 
important: too many organizations and government agencies provide initial training and then 
leave personnel to suffer the consequences of time and memory loss on the important educational 
aspects of that training.  The military—and the US Army in particular—tends to be better about 
this principle than most large organizations, including those in the corporate world.  The Army 
expresses and then demonstrates a commitment to encouraging education throughout an officer‘s 
military career.  Understanding this principle of continuous learning allows an organization to 
                                                 
460
 See, for example, the work of Gordon Allport, Raymond Cattell, Sam Gosling, and William Ickes, to name a few.  
These theorists come from a variety of backgrounds, but generally agree that personality and leadership potential 
can be assessed reasonably accurately, and furthermore that individuals can learn to be more accurate in their 
assessments.  
461
 Ulmer, 13.  
  
 
235 
―marshal [its] intellectual and operational resources to facilitate learning from [its] individual and 
collective experience.‖462     
 In many ways, the US military is actually ahead of other public agencies and private 
sector corporations in terms of developing human resource potential, which is partially explained 
by the fact that the military has at its disposal larger access to the full range of behavioral, 
cognitive, and social sciences.  Knowledge of these disciplines in the military is somewhat 
scattered, but vast.  To build on these already existing competencies, US military organizations 
should bear in mind institutional commitments to growing individuals in concern for compassion 
as well as in operational competence.
463
 
 Support and stability operations, and any operations in post-conflict environments, 
necessarily involve the various civilian agencies and not just the military.  Developing leaders is 
a task not limited to the Army, but instead is a goal that must be shared across the spectrum of 
US government agencies.  To be sure, the Army must be involved in the process of defining the 
nature of the peace, and therefore diplomats, aid workers, and other government civilians must 
have an awareness and understanding of the military capabilities in any post-conflict situation.
464
  
This is extremely important, but not always adhered to; soon after the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) took over in post-major conflict Iraq, for example, one senior CPA official 
observed that: 
The civilians in the Coalition generally had no knowledge of military organization, and thus no 
idea of which parts of the military might either assist them or need to know what they were 
planning.  The civilians didn‘t know whom to call.465   
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In order for all to be effective together, civilian government workers must have an understanding 
of military capabilities beyond the pure application of force.  Leadership development programs 
in civilian agencies should consider how best to integrate political and economic goals with those 
goals the military works toward, so all aspects of national power are aligned and moving in the 
same direction.  Legislation like that proposed in March 2007 by Senator Daniel Akaka is an 
excellent example of a step toward coordinating interagency training and efforts in theater.  If it 
becomes law, Senator Akaka‘s bill would encourage management and supervisory training for 
all government agencies—training which today varies across organizations and is inconsistently 
implemented.  The bill would require agencies to provide training during a manager‘s initial year 
on the job and mandatory follow-up training every three years after that.
466
  It would give public 
sector managers a clearer understanding of leadership roles and responsibilities and re-focus 
leaders on institutional goals shared across the US government.  Furthermore, coordinating 
leadership training across civilian government agencies would provide excellent opportunities to 
integrate leaders into joint training programs with military units and other interagency teams.  
Lawmakers proposed similar legislation in the past, but it foundered in committee—passing the 
current bill would be a step in the right direction and provide an impetus for integrating goals in 
Washington and in post-conflict environments abroad.   
 While the military is ahead of other large organizations in implementing some important 
principles of leadership development, certain non-military government agencies have their own 
well-developed competencies that offer lessons to their counterparts in other areas of 
government.  For example, the intelligence community generally communicates best from 
Washington to the field, and also seems to be most prepared to work closely with interagency 
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teams.
467
  This strength of intelligence agencies is telling, since gathering good intelligence is 
one of the single most important (and most difficult) aspects of fighting counterinsurgencies or 
low-intensity conflicts.  With the challenges they face, intelligence services‘ success could 
provide important lessons for other government agencies that are less effective in sharing 
information.  The Department of State has developed its own set of core competencies that might 
be useful for other organizations to learn from.  While Foreign Service Officers from the State 
Department are often stretched thin and lack sufficient numbers in theater, they frequently have 
regional or functional expertise in particular areas.  Other government agency personnel, both 
military and non-military, could improve performance by recognizing the expertise of their State 
Department counterparts and trying to combine knowledge to further overall operational goals, 
both in training programs and in the active operational environment.      
 Given these model practices in leadership development, all US government organizations 
participating on interagency teams have opportunities to improve on core competencies and have 
a more positive impact in support and stability operations environments.  Considering the 
knowledge accumulated in the body of literature on leadership theory, the experiential 
knowledge of various government agencies, and the problems that the interagency process has 
experienced in recent years, a number of important steps are possible that could streamline it and 
improve the overall functioning of the US government in Washington and abroad.  
Applying Leadership Knowledge to the Interagency Process 
 First, the interagency process would be significantly strengthened if the US government 
sought to develop a common lexicon or vocabulary on the topic of support and stability 
operations.  Government agencies should collectively decide on some formal definitions for key 
terms, including:  
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 Interagency 
 Counterinsurgency 
 Support and stability  
 Interoperability 
 Nation building (and state building) 
 Terrorism 
 
To the extent possible, this common lexicon should be developed with participation from the 
whole spectrum of government agencies involved in overseas operations, it should be 
formalized, and it should be published and made available to everyone.  There are a number of 
viable alternatives for the problem of who should take responsibility for creating such a 
formalized shared vocabulary.  One possibility is a stronger National Security Council with a 
new mandate to coordinate this project.  This does not mean the NSC would become 
operational, only that it would have a new and slightly broadened mandate.  Another possibility 
is giving responsibility to a new interagency task force or policy team, created in Washington, 
given the authority to develop a formalized ―dictionary‖ or list of terminology that would 
ultimately be used by all agencies participating in support and stability operations, however 
defined.  Either of these options falls short of creating something entirely new or hiring a set of 
new people—they simply shift resources slightly to reflect changing priorities.  Either would be 
more effective with vocal support from the president.  
 A second change the US government should make to improve the interagency is to 
increase the frequency and number of joint training exercises with both military and civilian 
participants present.  There are far too many people in government today who have never heard 
anything about training people for work on interagency teams; the dearth of interagency training 
opportunities results in a fundamental lack of knowledge of how one can traverse a professional 
atmosphere in which he must represent the interests of his agency as well as the mission and the 
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US government writ large.
468
  There are certain programs that exist today that utilize interagency 
simulations, but they are almost entirely created ad hoc—after problems arise and quick action is 
necessary—and in theater instead of in the United States.  ―Institutionalized ad hockery‖469 will 
not meet today‘s security challenges; we need interagency teams that are assembled, trained, and 
experienced together before deploying overseas.  These teams should include representatives 
from the whole spectrum of government agencies—not just Defense Department, State 
Department, and USAID, but also the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Commerce, 
Department of Agriculture, and the US Information Service.  All of these agencies have different 
areas of expertise that can strengthen interagency teams when they face challenging situations.  
Other agencies should be represented on the teams as necessary.   
 The training programs that assembled interagency teams experience together must 
simulate as closely as possible the actual environment that may be encountered in the field, 
especially when they will be sent to a country with an ongoing counterinsurgency campaign.  
Simulations are necessary in order for team members to experience what the military calls 
―reinforcement of competence,‖ or the learning process that takes place in an officer‘s mind 
during his peacetime training followed by the period of active service.  Realistic simulations 
make the transition to actual dangerous scenarios easier, and once in theater men and women 
take the step from being a leader in peacetime to a leader in war, what one historian calls a 
―renewal of competence.‖470  Military and civilian training that simulates the actual predicted 
reality in theater makes the step from the training situation to the combat (or post-combat) 
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environment as small as possible.  It is important to offer good training opportunities to all men 
and women who serve abroad, but it is especially important for those that will serve as leaders 
and commanders because not only do they have to know and understand their own tasks, but 
they also must safely command and control the actions of subordinates.  These training 
simulations are also opportunities for the best leaders to practice some of the leadership 
competencies discussed earlier, for example, the transformational leadership style and the 
Army‘s ―Be-Do-Know‖ framework.   
 A recent example of when interagency training opportunities were insufficient is in the 
US experience using Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, especially from 
2003 to 2005.
471
  There was usually no team building for groups except in theater, and there was 
no standard implemented training regimen for operating in the interagency environment.  PRT 
staffing was sometimes haphazard and did not necessarily match the needs of individual teams, 
and team members often shared no common understanding of the main goals and challenges of 
their missions.  Some other countries have used a similar model in Afghanistan, with more 
success.  Specifically, German and British PRTs were usually assembled and trained before 
being deployed to Afghanistan—sometimes as much as six months in advance.  Once in theater, 
these interagency teams were able to draw on common training experience to coordinate tasking 
and work cooperatively to accomplish their missions.
472
   
 It should be noted that while more joint training is very important, it is also usually 
desirable to have one agency (or even one person) with ultimate authority to make the final call 
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on tough decisions; joint training for interagency teams does not necessarily suggest that all 
agencies have an equal amount of decision-making power.  To illustrate, one of the main 
problems with peacekeeping operations (which, like support and stability operations, necessarily 
involve the interagency) is that more people show up than can contribute to the effort efficiently.  
In Bosnia in the mid-1990s, for example, UN peacekeepers were joined by a group of American 
civilians who wanted to teach the Bosnians Spanish as part of the peacekeeping effort.
473
  
Initially, the UN soldiers allowed them to stay and help even though there is simply no reason for 
Bosnians—whether Muslim, Serb, or Croat—to learn Spanish.  This was basically a failure of 
leadership: some person or group should have used its authority to say no to this group in order 
to keep the mission focused.        
 In some ways, the recommendation for increased joint military-civilian training implies 
―militarizing the interagency,‖ an idea first suggested by Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 
56 in 1997.
474
  However, it does not imply that the military should become completely in charge 
of interagency operations; rather, it means that the structures and functions of interagency teams 
should operate more like the military, with a clear chain of command and someone in ultimate 
command who delineates which agency is responsible for each task in accomplishing the broader 
mission.  It also means creating clearer lines of communication and eliminating structural 
obstacles to information sharing.     
 A third recommendation for improving leadership in the interagency is that the US 
government create a formal, centralized knowledge management system.  The problem that this 
recommendation addresses is the fact that every new presidential administration—at least every 
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eight years in other words—appears to come into office thinking that it faces totally unique 
challenges and this it is somehow the first administration to ever deal with many of the problems 
that require interagency cooperation.  There is almost never any sense of brining lessons learned 
from the past, or looking to previously documented knowledge and literature; each 
administration tries to ―carve its own trail‖ in counterinsurgency and other interagency 
challenges.
475
  This adversely affects US support and stability operations as well as peacekeeping 
operations that the United States participates in.  Ironically, there is a body of knowledge out 
there on things the United States tends to do well, for example recruiting international police as it 
did in Bosnia and Haiti, versus what other countries that we could partner with do well.
476
  There 
is also information available that outlines strengths of particular agencies and how their 
personnel might be used most effectively in particular operations.  The problem is that this 
information is never consolidated or organized in any coherent and meaningful way, so 
government officials involved in the operations may never know it exists or how to access it, and 
therefore they cannot use it to train leaders.  This is a problem some have labeled ―institutional 
memory loss,‖ meaning the US government collectively forgets that it has engaged in similar 
operations in the past and has sometimes been successful.  Even if the American government has 
not been successful, oftentimes some other government (or other agency, or other army) has 
been successful in the past.  The challenge is to organize and institutionalize this knowledge base 
and experience so that it can be tapped in future operations and used in future leadership 
education programs. 
Conclusion  
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 In current and future low-intensity conflicts, or counterinsurgency warfare, the United 
States will only be successful if it is able to utilize all political, economic, and psychological 
options at its disposal.  The challenges of these operations are unique, and require interagency 
cooperation from the level of small teams in theater all the way up to the highest levels in 
Washington.  The role of the military must be defined based on how the United States can best 
apply its military capability in synchronization with other elements of national power—we need 
to build capacity in the military as well as civilian agencies.
477
  So far, we seem to have been 
most successful at increasing the capabilities of only the military; early after the invasion of 
Afghanistan, ―99.9% of the resources in country were controlled by the Department of 
Defense.‖478  Adequately funding the military is essential, but since ―the humanitarian space and 
the battle space overlap,‖479 overall mission goals are best served by funding civilian agencies as 
well.  Military leaders must coordinate with the country team in order to achieve synchronization 
of military and political will, especially when it comes to planning and resourcing.  Faulty 
planning in support and stability operations are a national problem, and civilian agencies 
including State Department and USAID need to be better funded in order to meet challenges they 
face.  
 To implement these changes successfully, the United States needs bright, thoughtful, 
well-trained leaders who understand leadership theory and are motivated to cooperate with 
representatives of other government agencies in order to bring the full hard and soft power of the 
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United States to bear.  In today‘s counterinsurgency operations, there is something lacking in the 
interagency process—perhaps that thing is effective leadership.  To better prepare leaders of 
interagency teams, the United States needs a set of standard, coherent leadership training 
programs and evaluation methods that address three main problems: the lack of a common 
lexicon across the spectrum of government agencies; insufficient joint training with both military 
and civilian agencies present; and the lack of a formal knowledge management and knowledge 
sharing system. 
 By implementing these changes and coordinating planning and resource allocation, the 
United States can enjoy greater success in future counterinsurgency and support and stability 
operations.  Some of the most important reforms we need have to do with leadership—how we 
train and educate people and how we equip them to align civilian and military goals determines 
how far we are able to further US interests in strategically important areas of the world.   
 
 
D. The Influence of Stability Operations on the Army Profession and Public Management 
     Chris Cline 
 
 It can be argued that the Army bares the brunt of stability operations on the ground.  This 
is despite the fact that there exists a deeply rooted cultural bias within the Army profession, 
embodied by the Army‘s officer corps, that traditional combat operations are the Army‘s premier 
mission while stability operations are the responsibility of civilian agencies or specialized units 
such as civil affairs and military police.  The publication of National Security Presidential 
Directive– 44 (NSPD-44) and Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05 challenge this 
traditional mindset and forces the Army profession to confront how it will accept stability 
operations as a core mission with importance parallels to traditional combat operations and adapt 
its culture to this new operational dimension.  Stability operations are complex and have a large 
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interagency aspect to them. While the Army plays a vital role, many aspects of stability 
operations cannot occur without the integration of civilian government leaders.  It is the 
responsibility of civilian leaders, or more specifically public managers in government, to develop 
and carry out a multitude of programs within stability operations.  Recent events in Iraq have 
demonstrated that U.S. government officials, as public managers, need to reevaluate their 
methods and practices in light of resource and capability challenges.  Achieving success in 
stability operations may require both the Army officer and public manager to examine what 
knowledge and skills are necessary along with examining what changes, if any, both groups must 
make to cultural attitudes, beliefs, or practices.   
 Understanding what knowledge and skills are essential to operational success requires an 
examination of the elements comprising the Army profession and public management as well as 
possible challenges both cultures face.  This paper attempts examine these aspects in five 
sections:  
 Section One – Examines the practices linking the Army profession and public 
management in counterinsurgency and nation-building. Their respective cultures are also 
examined. 
 Section Two - Looks at the importance of National Security Presidential Directive -44 
and Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 as benchmarks for establishing stability 
operations as a U.S. national security concern and for creating knowledge and skill 
requirements for the Army profession and public managers.   
 Section Three - Focuses on the manner in which the Army profession and public 
management have approached, or should approach, stability operations, including 
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necessary knowledge and skill sets.  This section also contains insights from highly 
respected leaders in the studies of the Army profession and public management.   
 Section Four - Highlights areas of concern and interest for both the Army profession and 
public management regarding approaches to stability operations, and knowledge and skill 
development.  
 Section Five – Presents findings, recommendations and conclusions. 
The Army Profession 
 The Army‘s officer corps embodies what is known as the Army profession.  
Unfortunately for many officers and those outside the Army, the notion of the Army profession 
is often misunderstood.  What makes the officer corps a profession and what impact does this 
have on the role and expertise of the Army officer?  To develop proficiency in the necessary skill 
sets required for stability operations, the Army‘s officer corps must first understand what it 
means to be a professional.  
 Dr. Don Snider, a retired Army colonel and civilian professor at the United States 
Military Academy, has spearheaded many of the latest studies on the Army profession.  
According to Snider, the Army can be viewed as a large bureaucratic organization and a 
profession.  He notes that at times the Army‘s bureaucratic nature overshadows its commitment 
to military professionalism.  What has led to this overshadowing of professionalism is decades of 
organizational and bureaucratic concepts gaining prevalence and priority over more professional 
concepts.  This phenomenon has produced an organization focused on efficiency rather than 
effectiveness, he argues. He advocates a return to an Army where professionalism dominates 
elements of bureaucracy.  To achieve that goal the officer corps must first understand what 
makes them part of a profession. 
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 In The System of Professions (1988), Andrew Abbot outlines four characteristics inherent 
to a profession: knowledge, tasks, control, and jurisdiction.  Knowledge, or more specifically the 
academic knowledge system of a profession, provides for legitimation, research, and instruction 
while also providing new treatments, diagnoses, and inferences for the professional.
480
  Tasks are 
any problems that are open to expert service and are defined in the profession‘s cultural work.  
Professional controls include schools to train professionals, examinations to test them, licenses 
that identify them, and a code of ethics that guide how professionals practice their craft as well as 
informal controls pertaining to the worksite.
481
  A profession must also claim or assert its 
dominance over a jurisdiction, the boundaries of knowledge and expertise of the profession.  
This claim requires professions to ask society to recognize its cognitive structure through 
exclusive rights with social acceptance and forms of legitimating responses from society.
482
 
Abbott refers to jurisdiction as the link between a profession and its work, and as something 
which has culture and social structure.
483
 
Army Professionalism Defined  
 A set of established tasks is essential in considering the Army as a profession. Those 
tasks can be seen in the components of the Army‘s operational concept, full spectrum operations: 
offense, defense, stability, and civil support.
484
  This operational concept provides the foundation 
for all Army doctrine. Based on Abbott‘s theory, Snider and his research team drafted what they 
                                                 
480
   Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1988): 56-57. 
481
   Abbott, 79-81. 
482
   Ibid, 58-61. 
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   Ibid, 59. 
484
   The components of full spectrum operations comes from a document entitled ―Doctrine Review‖ (February 24, 
2007) written by the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate at the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center At Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas which summarizes some of the doctrinal changes reflected in the soon to be published FM 3-
0, Operations: Full Spectrum Operations.  The tasks within each component are listed as: Offense: movement to 
contact, attack, exploitation, pursuit; Defense: area defense, mobile defense, retrograde; Stability: civil security, civil 
control, restore essential services, support to governance, support to economic and infrastructure development; Civil 
support: provide support in response to disaster, support civil law enforcement, provide other support as required. 
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considered the negotiated jurisdictions of the U.S. military professional (Figure 1).  External and 
internal jurisdictions exist with external jurisdictions primarily serving the Army‘s client, 
American society, and internal jurisdictions serving the profession itself.  The four external 
jurisdictions consist of major combat operations, stability operations, strategic deterrence, and 
homeland security.  The Army sees competition within these jurisdictions from such outside 
professions as the other military services, other government agencies, nongovernmental 
organizations, private contractors.
485
   
 Developing Army professionals with expert knowledge and expertise comprise the two 
internal jurisdictions.  Four subsets or clusters exist within developing expert knowledge: 
military-technical, moral-ethical, political-cultural, and human development.
486
  Figure 1 shows 
how these clusters of expert knowledge correspond to the four identities of the Army officer: 
warrior, leader of character, member of profession, and servant of country. Expert knowledge 
and expertise are also traits which outside sources try to develop as well.  As a result, the Army 
sees competition within the internal jurisdictions from such sources as Army retirees and private 
corporations hired for contracting work.
487
  
  
                                                 
485
   Don M. Snider. ―The U.S. Army Profession,‖ in The Future of the Army Profession, 2d edition, project director 
Don M. Snider, ed. Lloyd J. Matthews (Boston: McGraw Custom Publishing, 2005): 19-20. 
486
   For the map of the Army profession‘s expert knowledge look at Richard Lacquement, ―Mapping Army 
Professional Expertise and Clarifying Jurisdictions of Practice,‖ in The Future of the Army Profession, 2d edition, 
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Figure 1 – Negotiated Jurisdictions of American Military Professions488 
 
2003 Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) Officer Study Report 
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 In 2003, the Army released the findings of the Army Training and Leader Development 
Panel (ATLDP) Officer Study Report.  The original mission of the ATLDP was to focus on 
contributing to the Army‘s Transformation Campaign.  However, as over 13,500 officers began 
to provide their input, it became evident that focus was needed on Army leaders themselves.  The 
findings demonstrated that officers failed to fully understand the Army Service Ethic and 
concepts of officership and professionalism. These findings echoed Snider‘s findings.  While 
officers demonstrated strong support for the foundations of Army Service Ethic -- pride in their 
profession, commitment to the Army and its values, belief in the essential purposes of the 
military -- these concepts, along with the concepts of officership, proved esoteric to officers 
since they were neither clearly defined nor reinforced throughout an officer‘s career.489       
 Perhaps an even more important finding was that Army leaders needed the requisite 
leader competencies to thrive ―in a complex environment marked by the challenge of high-
intensity combat and the ambiguities inherent in stability operations and support operations.‖490  
Backed by officer comments, the study found that the Army‘s educational experience failed to 
provide officers with the knowledge and skill sets needed for proficiency in today‘s operating 
environment. The changing operational environment, with the increased requirement for 
proficiency in full spectrum operations (offense, defense, stability and civil support) showed a 
number of inadequacies in the officer education system (OES).  Officers perceived OES was 
failing them.  The study found that OES did a good job teaching branch technical and tactical 
skills, but did not sufficiently teach combat support and combat service support officers the basic 
combat skills necessary for leading and protecting units in full spectrum operations.  The study 
                                                 
489
   Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report to the Army, The  (2003); hereafter 
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concluded that while there was increased emphasis on battle command at war within the 
education system, the Army needed to add stability and support operations to OES.
491
 
The Role of the Public Manager 
 Just as many officers are unaware of their responsibilities as members of the Army 
profession, public managers and interagency officials involved in stability operations also need 
to understand their roles and responsibilities. The redefining and clarification of Army missions 
and the requirement for interagency involvement calls not only for the Army profession to 
understand what knowledge and skills are expected from them, but also for public managers to 
understand as well.  Public managers play an important role in the military bureaucracy, the 
function of the Army, and the interagency process as a whole.  Unfortunately, many in society 
look upon the bureaucracy as too burdensome and obtuse.  Examining the traits of an effective 
manager will shed light on the professionalism needed within the bureaucracy to improve 
individual and organizational performance in stability operations as a whole.  
 An effective public manager, regardless of his or her particular position or responsibility, 
must possess the temperament and skills to organize, motivate, and direct the actions of others in 
and out of government towards accomplishing public purposes.  Additionally, like managers in 
the private sector, public managers direct the allocation of scarce resources for achieving specific 
goals.  Being a successful public manager involves comprehending exactly what public 
management is just as the Army‘s officer corps involves understanding what makes the military 
profession a profession. Public management has three dimensions.  Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., a 
public management professor at Texas A&M University with extensive experience in 
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government and academia, outlines these three dimensions as structure, craft, and institution, 
which translate to ―management,‖ ―manager,‖ and ―responsible practice.‖492 
 Public management was originally conceived as a structure of governance to provide a 
means for limiting and overseeing the exercise of state authority by public managers.  In terms of 
structure, public management exhibits the elements of lawful delegation of authority and external 
control over the exercise of delegated authority.  It is the means of striking a balance between 
capacity and control, which is a controversial aspect of public management.  Failing to create 
this balance often results in failing to achieve public management reform.  Tensions often arise 
when speaking about ―making managers manage‖ through the requirement of formal controls 
over managerial discretion and ―letting managers manage‖ through holding public managers 
accountable for their performance instead of adherence to formal rules and procedures.
493
 
 In recent decades the focus on public management as a craft involving behavioral skills 
and intellectual ability has increased.  Some managers are simply better than others, and 
performance and effectiveness often reflect whether or not a specific manager possesses the 
skills appropriate for success in a specific position.  Public management literature often 
characterizes successful public managers as understanding and mastering problems; having 
imagination; working effectively with interest groups, legislators, and members of the agency; 
possessing the ability to make effective arguments; and being inclined to act.  The idea of craft 
postulates that public management will be only as effective as public managers are able to master 
their craft.
494
  
 The concept of responsibility is significant when identifying public management as a 
self-regulated institution.  As an institution, public management provides a means to achieve a 
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balance between capacity and control.  An institution provides guidance to public managers and 
allows them to understand the need to practice their craft under a precept of values and ideals.  In 
essence, public institutions establish standards of professionalism. 
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Figure 2- Dimensions of Public Management and Axioms of Responsibility from Bertelli and 
Lynn 
 
Managerial Responsibility 
 Aside from being well-versed in the established directives and governing documents of 
the current administration, public managers should be students of the U.S. Constitution as well.  
Unfortunately, many within government do not know some of the basics outlined in the 
Constitution.  Understanding the Constitution and the role that public management plays in 
government helps the public manager understand their responsibility to government. 
 What constitutes responsibility in the sphere of public management?  In Madison’s 
Managers, Anthony M. Bertelli and Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. put forth what they consider as four 
axioms of responsibility, derived from constitutional values and seen in the classical literature of 
public administration: judgment, balance, rationality, and accountability.  These axioms help the 
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public manager operate within the contexts of the separation of powers, allowing the legislative, 
executive, and judicial to share powers.  According to Bertelli and Lynn, these axioms are not a 
classification of managerial functions like POSDCORB (planning, organizing, staffing, 
directing, coordinating, reporting, budgeting), principles, or qualities of action such as efficiency, 
effectiveness, professionalism, responsiveness, flexibility, consistency, stability, leadership, 
probity, candor, competence, efficacy, prudence, and due process.
495
  The difference is that 
judgment, balance, rationality, and accountability are fundamental to constitutional governance 
through adhering to Madison‘s ideal of administrative discretion.       
 Judgment, synonymous with autonomy and discretion, is considered fundamental to a 
constitutional scheme in which legislative powers delegate authority to the executive.  Public 
managers must exercise their discretion wisely since it often determines the level of action taken 
on a matter of public concern. Public managers must also exhibit balance in their decisions to 
avoid corrupting the constitutional process through acting on behalf of their own self interests or 
the interests of particular bodies or ideologies.  Instead, their goal is to identify and resolve 
inevitable conflicts among interests.  In terms of rationality, Bertelli and Lynn contend that the 
default position for public managers motivated to fulfill the constitutional scheme should be 
reasonableness in their actions and decisions.  Finally, balanced and rational judgment leads to 
accountability or responsibility, the ―entire purpose of public management as an institution 
among the separate powers.‖496    
Implications of DoD Directive 3000 and NSPD-44 
 In December 2005, the White House released a National Security Presidential Directive 
(NSPD-44) to address the management of interagency efforts concerning reconstruction and 
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stabilization.  In NSPD-44, the President sanctioned the Department of State, specifically the 
Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction, to act as overall coordinator of stability 
operations and to establish workable relations with all relevant U.S. agencies to ―prepare, plan 
for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.‖497  The Secretary of State is also 
required to coordinate stabilization efforts with the Secretary of Defense ―to ensure 
harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of 
conflict.‖498  Perhaps the most significant element of NSPD-44 is that it acknowledges the 
importance of stabilization and reconstruction efforts to US national security. 
 The release of DoD Directive 3000.05 in November 2005 is also significant in that, along 
with NSPD-44, it affirms stability operations as an element of U.S. national security.  Dr. 
Douglas V. Johnson, II believes this directive could ―be one of the most important documents of 
this decade.‖499  Stability operations, defined by DoD as ―military and civilian activities 
conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States,‖ is 
now considered a core U.S. military mission that requires the same priority as combat 
operations.
500
   
  Given these policy directives, Army professionals and public managers must understand 
the importance of stability operations and their roles in establishing the peace that ultimately 
wins the war.  Part of this understanding includes new expectations and outlined tasks.  DoD 
Directive 3000.05 states that stability operations ―are conducted to help establish order that 
advances U.S. interests and values.‖ Establishing this order entails providing the local populace 
                                                 
497
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with security, restoring essential services, and meeting the necessary humanitarian needs as part 
of the immediate goal.  The long-term goal of stability operations is helping the indigenous 
population develop the capacity for securing essential services, ―a viable market economy, rule 
of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.‖501 
 To further develop the immediate and long-term goals, the directive outlines three major 
tasks: 
 Rebuilding ―indigenous institutions including various types of security forces, 
correctional facilities, and judicial systems necessary to secure and stabilize the 
environment;‖502 
 Reviving or building the private sector, ―including encouraging citizen-driven, bottom-
up economic activity and constructing necessary infrastructure‖;503 and 
 Developing governmental institutions representative of the people.504 
 
While DoD Directive 3000.05 acknowledges that many tasks which fall under stability 
operations are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals, it makes 
clear that the U.S. military must be prepared to perform all necessary tasks in the event that 
civilians are unable to do so.   The question then becomes: What skill sets do Army professionals 
and public managers need to develop to become proficient in stability operations, particularly if 
the military has to perform them alone?    
The Army Profession and Stability Operations 
 Traditionally, the U.S. military has regarded conventional warfighting as its premier 
mission.  However, the Army‘s most recent experiences have demonstrated the need for the 
profession to embrace stability operations as a core mission.  DoD Directive 3000.05 is a 
landmark document in that it firmly establishes stability operations within the military‘s core 
missions.  No longer are the tasks associated with ―Phase IV‖ (post-conflict stability operations) 
                                                 
501
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the responsibility of other government agencies and NGOs.  The military must no longer be 
concerned with solely winning the war, but with winning the peace as well. As important as 
stability missions are, the concept may be a difficult task for many in the Army profession to 
accept and internalize. 
 Dr. Lawrence A. Yates, a former specialist in stability operations at the Combat Studies 
Institute, notes that despite the fact that the Army has participated in more stability operations-
type activities than conventional wars since 1789, the institutional Army maintains an emphasis 
on warfighting.
505
  As an example, Yates refers to the opening paragraph of FM 3-0, Operations 
(2001), in which it declares, ―Fighting and winning the nation‘s wars is the foundation of Army 
service – the Army‘s nonnegotiable contract with the American people and its enduring 
obligation to the nation.‖506  He also notes a prevailing attitude that follow-on stability operations 
are ―someone else‘s job,‖ either that of civilian agencies, specialized personnel or units such as 
civil affairs (CA), military police (MP), engineers, medics, lawyers, and special operations forces 
(SOF).
507
   
 While maintaining the ability to effectively destroy the enemy‘s military capabilities 
remains crucial and should not be questioned, many officers debate what exactly falls within the 
boundaries of warfighting and ultimately war-winning. Army participation in post-combat 
stability operations is common when instability prevents the immediate withdraw of military 
forces; however, many Army professionals are reluctant to accept and fully embrace stability 
operations as a core mission. Some of these traditionalists argue that combat troops would lose 
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warfighting skills and their warrior ethos if stability operations became a core mission.
508
 Any 
general officer or political leader who seeks to make stability operations a core mission of the 
military will have to overcome and transform a deep-seated, traditional mindset as to the Army‘s 
proper role, according to Yates.
509
   
 Yates and Snider agree that the Army‘s officer corps should accept stability operations as 
a core mission and not question whether or not it has a place in the Army‘s jurisdiction. That 
sentiment is now shared by the institutional Army as displayed in the developing doctrine and 
publications. Post-conflict stability operations are and always have been in the field of the 
profession‘s expert knowledge.  As Snider chides, ―Shame on us (the Army‘s officer corps) for 
not knowing it.‖510 History has several examples of the Army conducting stability operations: 
building and securing the frontier‘s infrastructure and establishing stability after the Mexican and 
Civil Wars and post-conflict Germany, Japan and South Korea.
511
  Snider believes it is the 
cultural bias Yates describes which has allowed updated and current doctrine to be ignored and 
the past lack of emphasis on civil affairs specialists to occur.       
 Even if the officer corps in its entirety accepts stability operations as a core mission, there 
is the concern of the Army‘s role.  Should the Army be completely responsible for operations or 
subordinate to another agency or interagency task force? More than likely the military will 
indeed stay and bear the brunt of stability operations because there is a tendency for other 
agencies not to get involved.  Michele Flournoy, former senior advisor in the CSIS International 
Security Program, explains that when the military is asked ―to undertake these kinds of missions 
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without adequate civilian partners, they get stuck with mission creep and no exit strategy….So in 
the short-term, they have to step into the breech.‖512  According to Snider, if the Army considers 
itself a profession, then it should be willing to step into the breech and take the lead. Snider 
believes that the Department of Defense is the only agency funded well enough to carry out 
operational missions abroad.   
 Despite the view of Snider and others that the Army profession should be responsible 
overall, there exists a competing view that perhaps the State Department should take 
responsibility for a significant part of stability operations. NSPD-44 supports this view and 
grants the State Department oversight of stability operations. Snider contends, however, that the 
State Department is responsible for manning embassies and, like other government agencies, is 
not funded for or capable of leading or taking part in SASO.  While the State Department may 
supply knowledgeable experts on the ground to assist with operations, they should not be 
expected to carry out the operational aspects of such missions or bear the overall responsibility.  
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), 
however, will always be involved since they have the ability to work operationally.
513
  
The Public Manager and Stability Operations  
 Stability operations affect the missions and tasks public managers are going to have to 
face.  As the lessons learned from Iraq indicate, public managers play a significant role in the 
planning and implementation of personnel management, overall operations, contracting, 
auditing, and various reconstruction programs to include institution building. Unfortunately, 
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many public management mistakes have been receiving most of the attention.  Examples include 
staffing issues such as reported in the Washington Post on February 24, 2007. The U.S. 
government contracted the job of promoting democracy in Diyala, a province northeast of 
Baghdad, to a Pakistani citizen completely unfamiliar with democracy.  Further, the U.S. put 
Diyala‘s Border Patrol commander in charge of the management of reconstruction projects 
despite his having no reconstruction experience.
514
   
 Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. states, ―The best thing to do for stability operations is to believe in 
stability.‖515  This quotation reinforces the need for public managers not only to do their job as it 
pertains to stability operations, but also to believe in the necessity of post-conflict stability itself.  
This belief in the mission and its importance is the first step to ensuring successful operations.  
An administration, agency, or organization which does not take seriously the role of post-conflict 
stability faces the risk of creating an environment which slides into instability from a lack of 
resources, sufficient planning, and organization.  Once government officials, as public managers, 
believe in their mission and tasks, they can begin approaching operations with the appropriate 
management skills. 
Required Knowledge and Skills 
 Conducting stability operations is not an easy task and is mired in complexity, involving 
issues ranging from politics, to extensive networking and effective communications.  The Army 
professional has to consider all the elements involved in stability operations which are not 
normally considered part of traditional military operations -- political, financial, social, 
economic, and humanitarian challenges.   Professionals have to educate themselves on what is 
required to effectively carry out the roles and responsibilities expected in such a complex core 
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mission.  No longer can military professionals concern themselves with only combat 
effectiveness; they must be concerned with the means of delivering stability to a region.  In short, 
the professional needs to learn to think and act in ways that increases the profession‘s expertise 
in stability operations. 
Thinking Like a Strategic Leader 
 The path to increasing the required expert knowledge for the Army professional is to 
begin thinking like a strategic leader.
516
  Professionals need to begin by asking themselves, 
―What knowledge and skills do I not have?‖517   They need to understand the map of expert 
knowledge and its jurisdictions as it pertains to the profession.
518
  Ultimately, it is the 
responsibility of the profession to develop this required knowledge. Also, the Army‘s mission 
and requirements necessitate strategic leaders that can work across boundaries.  Fortunately, one 
can learn how to work across boundaries through self development and institutional 
development.
519
   
 
 
                                                 
516
   A good description of what it means to be a strategic leader, strategic-decision making, and the competencies of 
strategic leaders see Leonard Wong and Don M. Snider, ―Strategic Leadership of the Army Profession,‖ in The 
Future of the Army Profession, 2d Edition,  project director Don M. Snider, Ed. Lloyd J. Matthews (Boston: 
McGraw Custom Publishing, 2005). Among the six metacompetencies they discuss are identity, mental agility, 
cross-cultural savvy, interpersonal maturity, world-class warrior, and professional astuteness. Snider believes that all 
field grade officers need to consider themselves as strategic leaders, Snider interview (2 March 2007).   
517
   For more on expert knowledge refer to Chapter 1 of The Future of the Army Profession, 2d Edition. 
518
   Refer to ―Mapping Army Professional Expertise and Clarifying Jurisdictions of Practice,‖ in The Future of the 
Army Profession, 2d Edition (2005). 
519
   This paragraph is from the Snider interview conducted on 2 March 2007 in reference to a question about how an 
Army professional should approach stability operations.  Snider believes that while the Army War College is 
making some steps forward regarding training senior officers to work across boundaries, much work is still needed 
in this area. 
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Stability Operations Considerations  
 
Doctrine 
How should doctrine address the distinctions between stability operations conducted during war as 
opposed to similar operations conducted during peacetime?  What principles should apply?  How 
and when should interagency participation be integrated?  How should planners integrate available 
allied forces, peacekeepers, or international police units?  What is the best way to incorporate 
lessons learned from emerging experience and expertise? 
 
Organization 
How should the Army organize itself to best fulfill the tasks associated with stability operations?  Is 
there a possibility for the creation of specialized units?  Would multi-tasking existing organizations 
to perform stability operations in conjunction with combat operations and other tasks prove too 
much to handle?  Should the same command carrying out combat operations be responsible for 
stability operations? At what organizational level should planning for stability and combat operations 
take place and should the same or different organizations be responsible?  Are soldiers who have 
just completed combat operations best suited for initial stability operations and providing for public 
security until the creation of a local police force can take over responsibility?  How should other 
government agencies and service providers such as NGOs, allied forces, and international 
organizations be factored into planning and execution? 
 
Training, Leadership, and Education 
What additions or modifications must be made to training and leader development systems to 
produce Army professionals adept at stability operations?  Is the training provided at the pre-
commissioning and basic training levels adequate for subjecting new soldiers to the realities of both 
stability operations and warfighting?  Are the tasks required for proficiency in stability operations 
addressed throughout a leader’s career?  Are realistic stability operations scenarios played out in 
the Army’s combat training centers? 
 
Material 
What are the material demands for stability operations?  Within the zone of conflict, what are the 
sources for supplying the basic needs of the population?  Which materials provided for unit 
sustainment can be used to aid stability operations?   What local assets will most likely be available 
to assist?  Given the requirement for Army units to exercise restraint and discrimination in 
potentially hostile environments, are there any material or technological solutions which could 
provide assistance in such conditions?  Can the Army preposition material required for stability 
operations in theaters of operations?  Is there a need for deploying additional support units such as 
transportation and medical to handle civilian requirements post-conflict? 
 
Personnel 
Do Army personnel systems meet the flexibility and fidelity requirements for identification and 
assignment of personnel and units needed for stability operations?  Is the right mix of individual 
specialties available to the Army?  Do the active forces possess enough personnel ready for 
immediate deployment?  Are specialists in the Reserves such as civil affairs and military police 
readily available in sufficient numbers for deployment and sustainability over multiple deployments?  
Does the personnel system track stability operations skills among reserve members along with 
relevant civilian specialties such as an infantryman with police, local government experience, and 
construction?   
 
 
 
Table 1 – Five Considerations for Stability Operations by Schadlow, Barry, and Lacquement520 
                                                 
520
   Questions developed by Schadlow, Barry, and Lacquement: 258-265. 
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 What should Army professionals consider when thinking about stability operations?  
DoD Directive 3000.05 states that stability operations ―shall be given priority comparable to 
combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including 
doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, material, leadership, personnel, facilities, 
and planning.‖521  Nadia Schadlow, Charles Barry, and Richard Lacquement narrow this down to 
five considerations (See Table 1, previous page) which they believe the Army professional needs 
to be aware of when incorporating stability operations within the core expert knowledge and 
practicing professional expertise – doctrine; organization; training, leadership, and education; 
material, personnel.  According to them, stability operations need to be as much a part of the 
Army professional expertise as warfighting since it is equally essential to winning the war 
strategically.
522
    
 Public managers play a crucial role in planning phases and must demonstrate creativity 
and the ability to think in abstract terms.  Public managers need to think of every possible 
scenario and contingency in an attempt to control events after things have been set in motion.  
Although Lynn refers to this as ―common sense public management,‖ it is an act that is 
sometimes overlooked.   Lynn cites a time when he was a member of the National Security 
Council (NSC) Staff during the Vietnam War. Henry Kissinger handed Lynn the war plan for the 
invasion of Cambodia and told him, ―I want to know everything that can go wrong; I want to 
know everything that has not been thought about or is not being thought about in that plan; I 
                                                 
521
  DoD Directive 3000.05, paragraph 4.1. 
522
  Nadia Schadlow, Charles Barry, and Richard Lacquement. ―A Return to the Army‘s Roots: Governance, 
Stabilization, and Reconstruction,‖ in The Future of the Army Profession, 2d Edition, project director Don M. 
Snider, ed. Lloyd J. Matthews (Boston: McGraw Custom Publishing, 2005): 257.  
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want to know everything you can think of that I (Kissinger) should be able to possibly anticipate 
and help the President anticipate.‖523  
 While he considers that situation a ―pretty small scale effort,‖ Lynn and his staff spent 
several days going over the plan to think of every possible scenario, such as, refugees, 
unexpected forces from the North Vietnamese side, reactions from the Cambodians, and 
reactions from Cambodian allies.  Questioning all assumptions in this manner is essential.  Any 
public manager taking part in or contemplating anything remotely similar needs to prepare for 
eventualities and unintended consequences.  The public manager also needs to take action and 
prepare for these potential worst case scenarios and risks, and to consider and acknowledge 
scenarios that seem highly likely from outside agencies or sources.  This preparedness becomes 
even more crucial in a dangerous and uncertain world.
524
     
Building a Toolkit  
 One useful public management tool that is needed in stability operations is the ability to 
identify the personnel that possess the requisite skills and expertise for success in a particular 
operation.  While the Army has such experts at its disposal, such as civil affairs, most other 
government agencies such as the State Department do not.  For example, while overall 
responsible for stability operations and for reconstruction teams such as those in Diyala, the State 
Department has no agronomists, engineers, police officers or technicians at its disposal.
525
  As 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has remarked, ―No foreign service in the world has those 
people.‖526   
                                                 
523
   This paragraph contains excerpts from an interview conducted between Dr. Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. and the author 
on 7 March 2007 at College Station, Texas. 
524
   Contains excerpts and ideas presented in the Lynn (7 March 2007) interview. 
525
   Chandrasekaran. 
526
   Ibid. 
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 The lack of qualified personnel and experts within civilian government agencies opens up 
the possibility of establishing a new public management strategy of reserve capabilities like the 
one the Bush administration has proposed and the Special Inspector General for Iraq 
Reconstruction (SIGIR) has recommended.
527
  The question then becomes, ―Where does this 
capability come from and how do we identify such personnel?‖  Are they part of a permanent 
establishment dedicated to stability operation missions or are they on a call-up status?
528
  These 
are not unlike the questions regarding personnel which Schadlow, Barry, and Lacquement 
address concerning the Army profession. The answer, according to Lynn, is through professional 
public management.
529
       
 The ability to identify and manage personnel is important because personnel management 
can have a major impact on how operations are carried out.  Staffing and manning requirements 
must place qualified applicants as the highest priority.  For stability operations, applicants must 
have appropriate language skills, experience in post-conflict operations, or expertise in stability-
related fields. In addition, there must be a sufficient number of personnel available to carry out 
the duties and tasks associated with ongoing operations.  Such staffing problems are evident in 
the rebuilding of Iraq where there is a dearth of qualified personnel to carry out the 
reconstruction efforts.
530
  
                                                 
527
   Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.  Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons Learned in Human Capital 
Management (February 2006); hereafter SIGIR (February 2006): 46. 
528
   Several aspects of the reserve force concept are outlined in an Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction & 
Stabilization at the U.S. Department of State presentation entitled, ―Building a USG Civilian Reserve for 
Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations‖ (2006).  According to the presentation prepared by Gary Russell, 
rationale for a civilian reserve include complementing USG civilian agency capacity; cost effectiveness of ―just in 
time‖ surge capability versus adding permanent USG staff; leveraging U.S. capacity with parallel international and 
multilateral capacity; reliability and command/control issues associated with contracting networks; the military‘s 
need for a civilian counterpart in order to phase down.  Civilian reservists would be specialists in all aspects of 
governance and recruited from state, local, federal governments as well as the private sector, and able to be deployed 
within 30 days of call-up and remain in country for up to one year. 
529
   Lynn interview (7 March 2007).   
530
   Chandrasekaran.   
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 In Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons Learned in Human Capital Management (2006), the 
Special Inspector General declares that personnel management and planning must ―clearly 
identify current and future human capital needs, the number of personnel required to accomplish 
a specific mission, the specific competencies necessary, and the sources from which skilled 
personnel can be drawn.‖531 Public managers must ensure such actions take place.  A flipside to 
such management planning exists which parallels the need for public managers to believe in the 
mission of stability.  Should public managers also be willing to execute their tasks and missions 
in the environment for which they are planning?  For example, part of the lack of qualified 
personnel in Iraq is attributable to a lack of desire for agency workers to work in a combat 
zone.
532
   
 Another important element of stability operations is the need to establish human service 
programs for the local populace. While primarily a public management task, the Army 
profession and all interagency officials would benefit from understanding the considerations 
involved in human service programs.  Gordon Chase provides what he considers a framework for 
thinking about implementation difficulties in establishing these programs.  Though this 
framework was intended mostly for programs in the United States, all interagency officials 
involved in stability operations should be aware of its elements, especially since they can be 
transferred to other aspects of stability programs.  
 According to Chase, the three general sources of implementation difficulties include the 
operational demands implied by a particular program concept, the nature and availability of the 
resources required to run the program, and the program manager‘s need to share his authority 
with or retain the support of other bureaucratic and political actors while assembling the 
                                                 
531
   SIGIR (February 2006), 11. 
532
   Chandrasekaran. 
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necessary resources and managing the program.
533
  Careful and thorough examination of these 
three sources of difficulties may help the public manager identify all or most of the problems 
related to various program implementation.  The added dimensions of interagency involvement 
and potentially hostile operational environments demonstrate why public managers must 
carefully plan, coordinate, and implement their management programs. 
The Importance of Language and Cross-cultural Savvy 
 Some Army professionals argue that the Army ―has not been able to provide post-conflict 
stability sufficient for strategic success in the type of wars it seems destined to face in the 
coming decades.‖534  If one could narrow success in stability operations along with its 
interagency implications to two essential skills, what would they be? There should be a set of 
essential skill sets which one can develop as early as the pre-commissioning phase to aid the 
junior officer on the ground and help provide the backbone for a successful transition to strategic 
leader. For instance, Don Snider adamantly recommends all officers possess language 
proficiency and cross-cultural savvy.  These two skills, he believes, will help the Army 
profession achieve success in the world of stability operations and interagency involvement.  
Lawrence Lynn believes these two skills are vital to public managers as well.
535
    
 Cross-cultural savvy is the ability to work across boundaries and understand other 
cultures.   It includes not only the ability to work with non-U.S. militaries, but also the ability to 
                                                 
533
   Gordon Chase. ―Implementing a Human Service Program: How Hard Will It Be?‖  Public Policy, 27 (1979): 
391.  Chase further breaks down the considerations of each program difficulty.  The manager should focus on the 
following dimensions of the program: the people to be served; the nature of the services to be delivered, the 
likelihood and costliness of distortions and irregularities that may be implicit in the program concept, and the 
program‘s controllability.  As for the various resources required, the manager should examine money, personnel, 
space, and supplies and technical equipment.  Bureaucratic and political actors requiring consideration include: the 
overhead agencies, other line agencies, elected officials in the same government, higher levels of government, 
private-sector providers, special interest and community groups, and the media. 
534
   Michael J, Meese and Sean M. Morgan. ―New Requirements for Army Expert Knowledge: Afghanistan and 
Iraq,‖ in The Future of the Army Profession, 2d Edition, project director Don M. Snider, Ed. Lloyd J. Matthews 
(Boston: McGraw Custom Publishing): 349. 
535
   Lynn interview (7 March 2007).   
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understand cultures beyond one‘s organizational, economic, religious, societal, geographical, and 
political boundaries.
536
  Cross-cultural savvy enables members of the Army profession to interact 
with a variety of actors such as Congress, the media, tribal warlords, members of the diplomatic 
corps, and NGOs.  It allows the officer to work outside of their traditional comfort zone and to 
do so effectively while being grounded in the values of his or her organization.  Cross-cultural 
savvy is an essential skill for an officer to possess as interagency involvement increases along 
with foreign interaction from globalization. 
 Most importantly, cross-cultural savvy can be developed as early as the pre-
commissioning phase.  Courses in international relations, foreign language, and regional studies, 
coupled with internships with other agencies and study abroad, help expand one‘s worldview and 
cultural awareness.  Institutional schools can provide instruction in interagency issues along with 
education on specific geographical regions.  During the early mid-point of one‘s career, a general 
understanding and awareness of other cultures can be further enhanced with experience on joint 
or multi-national staffs.  Additionally, Congressional internships, graduate school education, 
overseas tours, training with industry assignments, and fellowships can help educate culturally 
savvy officers.
537
  
 Going hand-in-hand with possessing cross-cultural savvy, an officer needs to be able to 
speak with the local populace in a trustworthy manner.  Achieving success in stability operations 
means the Army professional must have the local populace trust what they are being told.  It is 
simply not enough to have the ability to say a few key words and phrases in the local‘s native 
language.  It is not a matter of the local populace understanding what officers are trying to tell 
                                                 
536
   Leonard Wong and Don M. Snider, ―Strategic Leadership of the Army Profession,‖ in The Future of the Army 
Profession, 2d Edition,  project director Don M. Snider, ed. Lloyd J. Matthews (Boston: McGraw Custom 
Publishing, 2005): 614. 
537
   Wong and Snider, 615. 
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them.  It is about speaking and listening in a language with enough proficiency to establish an 
element of trust between the Army on the ground and the local populace.  It is about 
understanding local concerns. Therefore, foreign language skills are essential to the Army 
professional.
538
       
 Perhaps the best way to establish an officer corps that is proficient in the necessary 
language skills is to require them for commissioning.  Snider believes that language is such an 
important skill that he recommends that an officer candidate not receive his commission unless 
he demonstrates at least Level 3 proficiency in a language.  The language the officer is proficient 
in may not be the right language for particular operations; however, that first language provides 
the foundation for the study of a second, more applicable language.  Snider admits that a 
language requirement for commissioning would produce fewer officers, but in his view it is far 
more important to produce officers with the ability to communicate in a trustworthy manner than 
to produce a greater amount with the inability to effectively communicate.
539
 
 Possessing language proficiency and cross-cultural savvy as the foundation of expert 
knowledge for stability operations proves highly beneficial to the junior officer.  Speaking at a 
conference on the impact of stability operations upon the armed forces, rear Admiral Richard 
Cobbold of the Royal United Services Institute remarked that the demands for comprehensive 
training are higher for stability operations than for warfighting.  Unfortunately, training doctrine 
manuals are unable to address every eventuality because of the diversity of tasks and unexpected 
nature of the operations.  Cobbold adds that this lack of spelled-out instruction for every situation 
                                                 
538
   Snider interview (2 March 2007).  The importance of language was given as a response to a question regarding 
whether or not junior officers have the necessary skills sets and expertise to effectively carry our stability operations. 
539
   Snider interview (2 March 2007).  Level 3 proficiency corresponds to a rating of Superior by the American 
Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages (ACTFL).  ―Speakers at the Superior level are able to communicate 
in the language with accuracy and fluency in order to participate fully and effectively in conversations on a variety 
of topics in formal and informal settings from both concrete and abstract perspectives‖ (American Council on the 
Teaching of Foreign Languages, 1999). 
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may cause junior officers and non-commissioned officers to draw upon inculcated values gained 
through education rather than procedures and tactics learned in training.  This is where a solid 
foundation of cultural awareness and communication becomes indispensable.
540
  
 Additionally, public managers need to develop a sense of cross-cultural savvy and 
language proficiency parallel to that of the Army profession.  One of the SIGIR 
recommendations regarding program management in Iraqi reconstruction efforts includes having 
program managers integrate local populations and practices at all levels of planning and 
execution.
541
  The SIGIR found that the most successful reconstruction managers in Iraq took the 
time to understand the local customs and practices.  The ability to cross cultural boundaries in 
the affected country can have a significant impact on project and program success.  Of course, 
obtaining cultural knowledge of an affected country prior to involvement is optimal.     
 Cross-cultural savvy is beneficial in interagency environments as well.  As public 
managers work with other agencies to accomplish mission tasks, they increasingly need to work 
outside the boundaries and cultural settings of their resident agencies.  Feeling comfortable in 
and operating within unfamiliar environments enables the manager to be more effective and 
establish a better communications base with other agencies.  There is perhaps a greater need for 
public managers to possess cross-cultural savvy in the interagency sense than Army officers 
because of the nature of the public manager‘s tasks in general, particularly at the higher levels of 
government policy making and operations. 
Implications of Stability Operations and Considerations  
Education and Officer Commissioning Sources 
                                                 
540   Peter F. Herrly. ―The Impact of Peacekeeping and Stability Operations on the Armed Forces,‖ Heritage Lecture  
(2 December 2005).  Rear Admiral Cobbold was speaking at a conference titled ―The Test of Terrain: The Impact of 
Stability Operations Upon the Armed Forces,‖ held in Paris, France, on June 17-18, 2005. 
541
   Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.  Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons Learned in Program and 
Project Management (March 2007); hereafter SIGIR (March 2007): 17. 
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 Snider and Lynn both agree that two crucial skills for operating in a foreign environment 
are language proficiency and a high level of cultural awareness or cross-cultural savvy.  While 
proposed ways of developing these skills in officers include increased language study at the pre-
commissioning level as well as instruction in the social sciences, this development ultimately 
requires the need to examine the commissioning sources themselves.  Looking at the capabilities 
and nature of the commissioning sources is recommended for further study and will help with the 
question of developing leaders capable of operating in the post-conflict environment.   
 One aspect of the commissioning sources requiring assessment includes curriculum.  Any 
curriculum reforms, however, must consider several questions.  Do the three commissioning 
sources (Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), United States Military Academy (USMA), 
and Officer Candidate School (OCS)) have the ability to establish a curriculum sufficient to meet 
any proposed language and cultural awareness requirements within the timelines of their 
programs?  Should there be an established academic program of study for the Army profession 
similar to other professions such as doctors and lawyers?  Would an established academic 
program hinder diversity of backgrounds and knowledge among the officer corps?  Should only 
select academic majors be considered for commission?  Would additional requirements be 
needed for commissioning through OCS?  Could future cadets and officer candidates entering a 
commissioning program be pre-selected for a particular track specialty or branch with applicable 
curriculum based on a set of pre-existing academic knowledge and skills (based on previous high 
school curriculum or work experience for example)?  Would an increase in commissioning 
requirements have the effect of additional barriers to entry into the profession and thus create 
opportunities for new competition?  
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 The location and character of ROTC programs and schools need to be examined as well. 
Following the Vietnam era, several ROTC programs at elite colleges and universities in the 
Northeast were discontinued.  However, many new programs were established at schools in the 
South where 49 percent of Army, 41 percent of Air Force, and 41 percent of Navy ROTC 
programs are located.
542
  Many of the new programs in the South were established at state 
schools where it is more likely that participants come from that particular state or region.  The 
result, as Michael C. Desch contends, is a cadet pool that was predominantly Southern.
543
  How 
does an officer candidate pool composed of a significant number of cadets with a particular 
regional background affect the cultural awareness of those future officers?  Does limited 
interaction with students from other regions and backgrounds at schools have a significant 
impact on the cultivation of cross-cultural savvy?  Would internships or study abroad 
experiences be sufficient outside exposure for students at such schools? 
 There are also civil-military implications that result from the creation of an officer corps 
which possesses enhanced expertise in stability operations and the requisite skill sets.  If  the 
officer corps does not adequately represent the civilian population or reflect the beliefs and 
values of the American populace, then an officer corps which possesses roughly the same skills 
and educational background could further broaden the civil-military gap.  Such a difference in 
skills and education may not ultimately matter, but it is an issue which the Army profession 
should address.  It is difficult to say at this point how such changes within the officer corps 
would affect the values and beliefs of the military; however, such studies will be needed in the 
future. 
Redefining a Culture? 
                                                 
542
   Michael C. Desch. ―Explaining the Gap: Vietnam, the Republicanization of the South, and the End of the Mass 
Army‖ in Peter D. Feaver and Richard Kohn, eds., Soldiers and Civilians (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001): 295. 
543
   Desch, 295. 
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 Is there a need for public managers to adopt something akin to a ―warrior ethos‖ or 
redefine the notion of ―selfless service‖ regarding operations in hazardous war-torn regions? Is 
this too much to ask of civilians? The inability of some agencies to require its managers and 
experts to take part in overseas operations has created situations that lack insufficient personnel 
to provide crucial stability related services.  Simply put, not many civilian agency officials are 
quick to volunteer for lengthy tours in the areas where stability operations take place.
544
  
However, their knowledge and expertise are critical to success and a greater willingness to make 
personal sacrifices may be helpful to operations.  
 Also, do public managers need greater operational experience?  Should public managers 
be expected not only to develop cross-cultural savvy and language proficiency, but also spend 
their early years in operational jobs?  Greater operational experience early in a manager‘s career 
may provide a greater appreciation for the managerial planning involved in operations.  Should 
there be a separate class of public managers who possess these skills and operational experience 
who specialize in stability operations and interagency involvement, an interagency professional? 
Public management should consider all these questions.  
Contractor Involvement 
 One threat to both the Army profession and public management which may arise from 
stability operations is dependence on contractors and outside government agencies.  The skills 
and resources that contractors and outside agencies bring to stability operations are skills and 
resources which the Army profession and public managers must control.  There will be a need 
for contactors to provide expertise in specific areas, but a heavy reliance on knowledge that the 
Army profession and public managers can and should learn needs to be reduced.  The Army 
profession and public managers must ask themselves, ―If contractor involvement ceases 
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   Chandrasekaran, AO1. 
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altogether, would we still have the knowledge and expertise to complete the mission?‖  If the 
answer is no, then a problem may exist.  However, if contractors must be used, it is best to try 
and establish contracts and relations among the local populace as the SIGIR recommends.                
 A factor which impacts on the use of contractors in stability operations and presents a 
serious challenge to public managers is the deployabilty of civilian agencies.  The SIGIR report 
on human capital management cites the conclusions of a U.S. Institute of Peace report which 
made the following statement on the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) experience in Iraq:   
―Even if planners had correctly anticipated the difficulty of establishing stability and governance 
in post-war Iraq, there is simply no capacity in U.S. civilian government agencies to mobilize 
large numbers of the right people quickly.‖545  Public managers need to find a method for 
overcoming the manning challenge or the use of contractors will likely increase.  Again, a 
reserve capacity may be the answer, but only if deployabilty concerns are resolved.  The Army‘s 
taking the lead in all aspects of operations may be a possible alternative as well. 
Length of Tours and Continuity 
 Length of tours and the desire to maintain continuity is another issue which the Army 
profession and public managers need to examine.  As stability operations progress into 
timeframes of several years, inappropriate or incongruous tour lengths, particularly among key 
players, can have a significant impact on establishing proper continuity and making the mission 
seamless.  The recurrent turnover of key personnel proved to be a debilitating factor in the Iraq 
reconstruction program, according to the SIGIR.
546
  This problem is perhaps mostly centered on 
civilian agencies which do not have standard practices for deployments and lacked established 
deployment cycles.   
                                                 
545
   SIGIR (February 2006), 30. 
546
   SIGIR (February 2006), 27. 
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 Active-duty Army units in Afghanistan and Iraq now serve 15 month tours while key 
Army personnel can serve even longer.  However, tour lengths of other military services vary 
with typically six months for the Navy, four months for the Air Force, and seven months for the 
Marines.  The inconsistent military and civilian tour lengths present coordination problems along 
with establishing lasting and trustworthy working relationships.  An across-the-board minimum 
tour length could be a consideration.  Both groups need to consider this factor in their planning 
and develop a method and means to overcome it.    
NSPD-44 and Army Expertise 
 The President authorized the Department of State via a National Security Presidential 
Directive (NSPD-44) to coordinate all stabilization and reconstruction efforts overseas.  How 
will an Army profession which strives to be the expert in stability operations coexist with the 
new DoS Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)?  If the Army profession 
establishes itself as the outright expert in operations, then a risk of the military‘s undermining 
NSPD-44 or the State Department‘s authority could result.  At the very least, significant tension 
could exist between the Department of State and Department of Defense, particularly during 
planning and execution phases.  How should S/CRS personnel be integrated into military plans 
and organization?  Does the inability of the State Department to provide an adequate number of 
qualified personnel to regions, such as Iraq, bolster an Army profession‘s argument for primacy 
in stability operations?  How would the situation change if S/CRS was adequately funded to 
carry out its missions?  In the end, the agency with the greatest resources available and ability to 
provide trained experts will likely become the recognized leader. 
The Army Taking the Lead? 
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 If government agencies lack the ability to adequately conduct stability operations because 
of personnel, logistical, or budgetary constraints, then what is the best method to ensure unity of 
command and overall effectiveness?  Would the Army‘s taking the lead in stability operations 
provide a better alternative to the State Department?  This would certainly be a practical 
alternative because it provides an organization, the Army, which has made cultivating expert 
knowledge in stability operations a priority.  Also, the Army is arguably better equipped and 
organized to handle such operations than other government agencies in terms of personnel, 
deployabilty, funding, and overall operational experience.  Not only would Army responsibility 
help with a smoother transition from combat to stability operations, but also it could aid in basic 
coordination, continuity, and management given the Army‘s longer length of tours and ability to 
assign Army professionals to a particular region based on skills and experience. 
 Of course, the entire Army profession lacks the necessary expert knowledge of stability 
operations to make such an alternative possible at this time.  Expert knowledge and capabilities 
from outside agencies are essential and should be promoted.  This is where true interagency 
involvement is required with subject matter experts and teams from agencies and organizations 
to work with the Army and to integrate all aspects of training, planning, and execution.  The 
Army alone is incapable of handling the multitude of managerial tasks as well.  The knowledge 
and skills of public managers are required and always will be required.  Public managers must 
ensure that they are prepared for stability operations and interagency involvement as well.    
 Unless other agencies have the ability to restructure their organizational culture towards 
embracing stability operations and the sacrifices participation in such operations entails such as 
working in hazardous environments, lengthy tours, and frequent deployments then perhaps the 
Army should provide overall coordination.  DoD Directive 3000.05 already establishes that the 
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military will be prepared to handle such operations whether or not support from other agencies is 
available or not.  However, there is still the matter of NSPD-44 which grants the Department of 
State authority to coordinate all matters of stability. 
Findings, Recommendations and Conclusion 
 Stability operations have always been and continue to be part of America‘s wartime and 
peacetime responsibilities. The delicate and complex nature of stability operations requires 
personnel with the skills and expertise to be successful.  Army officers and public managers must 
realize this fact and develop the knowledge and skills necessary to conduct successful operations. 
Stability operations are going to be a part of military and government operations whether or not 
military and government actors prepare for them.  Together, Army officers and public managers 
are going to play vital roles in planning, executing, and learning from stability operations. 
 In terms of the knowledge and skills most applicable to both the Army profession and 
public managers, three areas should be examined.  Although two different cultures, both the 
Army profession and public management can benefit greatly from:  
1) Thinking like a strategic leader (asking what knowledge and skills do you not have and 
considering all possible outcomes during planning);  
2) Cross-cultural savvy (not just a sense of cultural awareness but the ability to work across 
boundaries and understand other cultures); and 
3) Language proficiency (not simply speaking and having others understand what you are 
saying, but having the ability to communicate in a trustworthy manner with the local 
populace). 
 
The need for these three skills comes up several times in various literatures on the Army 
profession as well as in lessons learned from bad management practices in Iraq.  Snider and 
Lynn mention these three areas in some form or another as essential to Army officers and public 
managers, respectively.  
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 These skills, at least the foundations of these skills, would best be developed early in 
careers, during the pre-commissioning phase of Army officers and during the first few years of a 
public manager‘s career.  In terms of developing cross-cultural savvy, the most feasible means of 
accomplishing this within the officer corps is to provide exposure to other cultures through 
cultural emersion programs, internships, and instruction in history and the social sciences.  A set 
curriculum is probably not the best approach, but a choice of electives in addition to pre-
commissioning military science courses may suffice.  This approach may help address issues 
because some colleges and universities which host ROTC programs simply do not have a robust 
selection of courses to choose from. Cross-cultural savvy within public management may best be 
achieved through selective assignments for public managers where they are exposed to 
operational environments and working with other agencies through internships or various 
interagency missions with incentives for overseas assignments. Self development and self study 
should be encouraged as well as a means for broadening one‘s boundaries and understanding of 
various cultures. 
 For Army officers and public managers to better internalize the importance of language, 
language ability should be tied to career progression and advancement.  Higher levels of 
language proficiency should increase the potential for advancement and promotion.  This would 
be similar to joint experience as a requirement for advancement among senior officers. Higher 
level public management positions, particularly those with substantial interagency involvement, 
should also have language proficiency as a prerequisite. This requirement would provide the 
incentive necessary for Army officers and public managers not only to learn a language but also 
take the necessary steps to develop and maintain their language speaking and reading ability. 
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 Army officers and public managers must not simply work on developing their ability to 
think like a strategic leader, their cross-cultural savvy, or their language proficiency. These 
individuals need to first realize the importance of and their role in stability operations.  The best 
thing for stability operations is to believe in stability.  For Army officers this is most important 
since it means overcoming a deep-rooted cultural bias in the Army which regards stability 
operations as ―someone else‘s job.‖  
 Many in the Army continue to believe that conventional warfighting is the Army‘s 
premier mission.  However, the Army‘s most recent experiences have demonstrated the need for 
the profession to embrace stability operations as a core mission, particularly with the 
publications of DoD Directive 3000.05 and NSPD-44.  If the Army‘s officer corps considers 
itself a profession then stability operations becomes part of the Army profession‘s expert 
knowledge and within its professional jurisdiction. 
 The officer corps must be mindful, however, not to become so overwhelmingly focused 
on stability operations and miss the mark of winning wars.  Warfighting is the Army‘s 
responsibility and it must never forget this fact.  While stability operations needs to be accepted 
as equally important in terms of winning the war, the ability to defeat the nation‘s enemies 
militarily should never be questioned.  Maintaining the warrior ethos is a vital part of this 
responsibility.    
 Unlike with the Army profession, stability operations are unlikely to produce profound 
changes within public management in terms of developing knowledge and changing a deep-
rooted mindset.  Interagency public managers need the ability to adapt to changing environments 
and instability, but the fundamental aspects of public management do not change.  Public 
managers will need to properly and effectively manage the systems which are in place, ensuring 
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that they prepare for and address every possible outcome and contingency.  As in the case with 
the development of an effective personnel management tool for identifying personnel with 
desired skills and placing them where they will be most effective, public managers will need to 
be creative and forward-thinking.  In addition, the nature of stability operations and the possible 
involvement of other agencies will require public managers to develop their own sense of cross-
cultural savvy and be comfortable with not only their own environment, but outside and 
international environments as well. 
 For public management officials, other questions require further study.  For example, 
there have been several cases, particularly in Iraq, in which public managers simply did not want 
to take part in operations within a dangerous environment.  This opens up several staffing and 
manning concerns as outlined in the SIGIR reports.  In addition, civilian agencies have difficulty 
forcing employees to work in such environments and in most cases there are no incentives for a 
worker to do so.  This is where a cultural change may be necessary.  Perhaps public managers 
need to examine the possibility of adopting something akin to a warrior ethos or reexamine their 
notion of selfless service.  Another possibility may be for agencies to place a greater emphasis on 
having public managers work at the operational level early in their careers, making it a 
requirement for advancement. 
 An important factor to success in stability operations is unity of command.
547
  Having the 
Army take the lead in stability operations with the integration of expertise available from outside 
services and agencies may be the best means of establishing that unity of command.  If the Army 
profession manages to establish itself as the premier expert in stability operations (which some 
argue it should if it considers itself as a profession) while other agencies continue to lack the 
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requisite skills, experience, and operational ability, then the Army profession has no choice but 
to affirm its statue as the leader in such operations.  With the Army, you have an organization 
already taking steps to become proficient in stability operations.  This type of impetus is lacking 
in several civilian agencies such as the State Department. 
 Stability operations require an Army profession and public managers who not only 
understand the importance of stability operations but also their roles and responsibilities within 
those operations.  Education and training programs will require adjustments.  Cultural attitudes 
and beliefs will require examination.  In the end, the Army profession and public managers will 
need to establish long-term development programs tailored to new definitions of warfare and 
security missions where multiple, diverse players exist. Together, officers and public managers 
can make a significant impact on America‘s success in winning the complete war.   
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IV. Acronyms and Abbreviations 
 
ATA Afghan Transitional Authority 
BCT Brigade Combat Team 
CAT Civil Affairs Team 
CENTCOM US Central Command 
CERP Commanders Emergency Response Program 
CFC-A Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan 
CHLC Coalition Humanitarian Cells 
CJCMOTF Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force 
COIN Counterinsurgency 
DoD Department of Defense 
EOD Explosive Ordinance Disposal 
FIS Foreign Service Institute 
FSO Foreign Service Officer 
ISAF  International Security Assistance Force 
JRT Joint Regional Team 
MoD Ministry of Defense 
MoEC Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
MoFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
MoI Ministry of the Interior 
MOS Military Occupational Specialty 
NGO Nongovernmental Organization 
OHDACA Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid 
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team 
PSOP Psychological Operation 
QIP Quick Impact Program 
ROE Rules of Engagement 
SSTR Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction 
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
USDA United States Department of Agriculture 
USIP  United States Institute of Peace  
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